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ABSTRACT
Little Siberia, Star of the North: Prisons, Crisis, and Development in Rural New York, 19681994
by
Jack Norton
Advisor: Ruth Wilson Gilmore
This is a study of how prisons became a common sense solution to economic and social decline
in northern New York in the 1980s, about how prisons became synonymous with development in
rural counties in the long wake of New York City’s fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s. The United
States imprisons more people per capita than any other nation-state on earth. The number of U.S.
prisoners has increased nearly six fold since 1970 and there are now over 2.25 million people
incarcerated across the country. Accompanying and encouraging this rise in the prison
population was an expansion of the prisons themselves, with many states building new
correctional facilities in depressed rural areas or deindustrializing small towns. New York State,
emerging from the economic crisis of the mid-70s and shifting its development priorities from
urban renewal to carceral expansion, presided over a vast prison infrastructure build-up in rural
areas and deindustrializing small towns from the 1980s to 2000.

The increase in the prison population over the past 40 years involved a concomitant broadening
and deepening of prison capacity: one of the most expansive and expensive infrastructural
projects in the history of a state that has led the country in massive public works. Thirty-eight
new prisons were built in New York in the period between 1983 and 2000, despite the
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electorate’s rejection, in a referendum in 1981, of a bond issue meant to fund new prison
construction. To bypass the voters of the state, in order to continue to expand carceral
infrastructure, then-Governor Mario Cuomo and the New York State Legislature funded new
prison construction in the 80s and 90s through the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), a
public corporation created by Nelson Rockefeller in 1968 to build low income urban housing.
The story of how New York expanded the state prison system is then also the story of how
financial technologies and governmental and quasi-governmental (or shadow-governmental)
institutions transformed and were transformed by the economic and social crises of the 60s, 70s
and 80s.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Figure 1: Washington County, NY

This is a study of how prisons became a common sense solution to economic and social decline
in northern New York in the 1980s, about how prisons became synonymous with development in
rural counties in the long wake of New York City’s fiscal crisis in the mid-1970s. The United
States imprisons more people per capita than any other nation-state on earth. The number of U.S.
prisoners has increased nearly six fold since 1970 and there are now over 2.25 million people
incarcerated across the country (Justice Policy Institute, 2000; U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2009). Accompanying and encouraging this rise in the prison population was an expansion of the
prisons themselves, with many states building new correctional facilities in depressed rural areas
or deindustrializing small towns. New York State, emerging from the economic crisis of the mid70s and shifting its development priorities from urban renewal to carceral expansion, presided
1

over a vast prison infrastructure build-up in rural areas and deindustrializing small towns from
the 1980s to 2000.

In 1970, there were roughly 12,400 people imprisoned in New York. In the early 1970s,
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and the legislature passed mandatory sentencing laws for nonviolent drug offenses in New York State—called the Rockefeller Drug Laws—the first and
harshest laws of this kind in the United States (Kohler-Hausmann, 2010). New York State's
prison population began to increase steadily as the new laws --enforced unevenly across axes of
race and geography, by design--took effect (Correctional Association of New York, 1982). The
state prison population peaked at 71,400 at the turn of the millennium. This nearly six-fold
increase occurred despite the fact that crime rates in the state began to decrease, and have
continued to abate, since 1990.

In the last decade, mostly as a result of struggles that have led to the reform of some of the
state’s mandatory sentencing laws, the number of imprisoned in New York has dropped 25%.
There are, however, currently more than 54,000 people locked up in New York, primarily in the
rural northern and western regions of the state, and the New York State Department of
Corrections employs approximately 31,000 people in some of the now most lucrative and steady
jobs in these rural counties.

The increase in the prison population over the past 40 years involved a concomitant broadening
and deepening of prison capacity: one of the most expansive and expensive infrastructural
projects in the history of a state that has led the country in massive public works. Thirty-eight
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new prisons were built in New York in the period between 1983 and 2000, despite the
electorate’s rejection, in a referendum in 1981, of a bond issue meant to fund new prison
construction. To bypass the voters of the state, in order to continue to expand carceral
infrastructure, then-Governor Mario Cuomo and the New York State Legislature funded new
prison construction in the 80s and 90s through the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), a
public corporation created by Nelson Rockefeller in 1968 to build low income urban housing.
The story of how New York expanded the state prison system is then also the story of how
financial technologies and governmental and quasi-governmental (or shadow-governmental)
institutions transformed and were transformed by the economic and social crises of the 60s, 70s
and 80s.

Others have written about the phenomenon and effects of rural prison construction across the
country during the last four decades (Beale, 1996): in the rural West (Bonds, 2012), in
Appalachia (Perdue & Sanchagrim, 2016; Schept, 2014), in the rural South (Eason, 2017), and in
Pennsylvania (Che, 2005), and in New York (Huling, 2002; King, Mauer, & Huling, 2003;
Morrell, 2012a, 2012b). This study concerns the ways in which New York State repurposed
institutional state capacity in the prison construction boom on the 1980s, and how rural
communities in the north of the state were organized by the state around this project, as urban
areas were drained of resources.

Development can mean many things to many people. I use the term in this study to refer to the
struggle over the way the relations of capital are reproduced and expanded in a given time and
place. In this study, I focus particularly on social reproduction (Caffentzis, 1999; Katz, 2001;
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Norton & Katz, 2017); on the ways in which the state works with capital to increase or decrease
the social wage unevenly in a process that both facilitates the reproduction of the relation of
capital, and is by default race-making. As Gilmore has succinctly put it, “capitalism requires
inequality, racism enshrines it” (Gilmore, 2015). At the same time, the conditions of the
reproduction of the capital relation change, and so thus do the relations that produce race as a
material social category. The massive increase of incarceration and criminalization in urban New
York following the rebellions of the 1960s and the fiscal crisis of 1975 were part of a state-led
developmentalist project implemented, to paraphrase Tancredi, to change things so that
everything might remain the same (Gilmore & Gilmore, 2016; Lampedusa, 2007 [1958] ).

As Cedric Robinson shows, capitalism, which requires inequality, requires racism (Robinson,
2000 [1983]). Race, as a material social relation, shifts with changing conditions of production
and reproduction, unevenly and at different scales. Racism and race-making, in other words, is
fundamental to the reproduction and expansion of capitalist social relations. It is an unstable,
grounded relational category, which cannot be isolated from the class relation (Hall, 1980).
Criminalization, policing, and incarceration are fundamental to race-making, as they are central
to the way capitalist social relations are reproduced and reorganized, during the period of my
study. This study is geographically bounded. The focus is on how prisons became synonymous
with development in northern New York; how prison construction as a solution to a crisis of
social reproduction in a rural area was made commonsensical in 1980s upstate New York.

This common sense was created through organizing on the part of the state. In New York City, a
racist common sense around crime and criminality as the impediment to development and well-
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being was organized by the finance and real estate capital and its state proxies in the wake of the
fiscal crisis as part of a recapture of part of the social wage by these factions, and the
implementation of what we often call neoliberalism (Harvey, 2006a; Stuart Hall, 1978). By the
mid-1980s, rural upstate New York was brought into this project of remaking the social and
economic relations of the state, and was itself, as a region, remade into a series of prison towns.
There was decisively little support for mass incarceration in rural New York in the decades
previous to the prison boom, except perhaps in the few towns where prisons had been
constructed in the late 1800s, and then again in the 1910s and 30s. Rather, the region’s status as a
prison colony was produced through new class alliances in the context of the economic and
social crisis of the 70s and 80s, in a process that was related to but also distinct from the panics
around crime and disorder that were so central to reorienting New York City towards FIRE
industries (Mahler, 2007; Phillips-Fein, 2017; Smith, 1996; Tabb, 1982).

“The tradition of dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the living” (Marx, 1994).
Likewise, the built landscape and dead labor of generations past shapes and constrains the social
relations that follow. In this study of prisons as development in northern New York, I focus on
how past institutional and infrastructural forms are re-valorized in the process of managing crises
of social reproduction in the years of the prison boom. As David Harvey has demonstrated, fixed
capital provides both a solution for crises of capitalism, while creating constraints for the
expansion of the capital relation (Harvey, 1996, 2007 [1982]). When Merle Haggard sang about
the California cottonfields being “as close to wealth as daddy ever came,” he could have been
referring to the cotton in the fields, or to the land itself, invested with the dead labor of
generations past. For wealth to be capital, however, it needs to circulate and change form. This
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study follows Gilmore’s theorization of prisons in California as a spatial fix. In New York, as in
California, prison construction remade urban-rural relations across the state, part of the
construction of a new political/racial geography in the context of a falling rate of profit and crisis
of social reproduction in the state. Prisons in New York were a wealth transfer from urban to
rural areas, one that helped revalorize the built infrastructure of northern New York by fixing
surplus labor, facilitating the uneven but continued circulation of capital and commodities in a
new moment, through new class alliances, producing a new social formation (Gilmore, 2007).

A note on methods and sources
I conducted the research for this study using ethnographic methods, semi-structured interviews,
and archival research. I interviewed 35 people across northern New York, as well as people who
had been involved in the prison expansion program in New York State during the governorship
of Mario Cuomo (1983-1994) but who have since relocated out of state. In the early stages of
research, I used a snowballing sample, and then studied up in the power structure of the region,
following the political and social connections as they came into view through early interviews
and archival research.

The focus of this study is on northern New York, and on the ways in which the state worked with
local elites, and contributed to the formation of local elites, through prison expansion. My work
here is a Gramscian analysis of the creation of a common sense, of how prisons became
synonymous with development in northern New York, and thus how a class alliance was created
across the geography of the State. I interviewed working people in northern New York, as well
as media workers, state and county officials, ex-Department of Corrections administrators, and
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business owners. In some cases, I was able to reconstruct the events of the early 1980s by
interviewing different people who were involved at different levels of the state and community,
and combining this with archival research.

Many of the people I would have liked to interview have passed away. Others, recalling their
exploits of in some cases over thirty years ago, tend to construct the past through the lens of the
present. With this in mind, and to guide the interview process, I relied on newspaper archives
from northern New York, as well as from New York City and Albany for the sections on
statewide campaigns or institutional shift. Most valuable among these were the archives of The
Malone Telegraph, the daily paper of Malone, NY, which I read in entirety, in the basement of
the Wead Library in Malone, for the years of 1983-1989, using ethnographic archival methods to
both research the daily life of the community during the 1980s, and to understand the local
media’s role in the process of prison siting. I also accessed the archives of The Chateaugay
Record, The Lake Placid News, The New York Times, The Albany Times Union, The Ogdensburg
Daily Courier-Observer, The Adirondack Daily Enterprise, and the Glens Falls Post-Star. Most
of this is available in the State Library in Albany or in the Crandall Public Library in Glens Falls,
NY.

I relied on archival research for the study of the changing role of the Urban Development
Corporation, Department of Corrections, Office of General Services, and the New York State
executive branch in this process of prison expansion in New York. At the State Archive in
Albany, I studied the Urban Development Corporation papers, the records of the Office of the
Budget, Office of General Service Records, the Department of Corrections archive, the archive
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of the Public Authority Control Board, the Moreland Commission on the Urban Development
Corporation (1975), among others. I also studied all corrections related material in the papers of
Governor Mario Cuomo for the 1983-1994. At SUNY Albany, I used the papers of State Senator
Ronald Stafford. At St. Lawrence University, I went accessed the archive of the S.T.O.P. the
Olympic Prison Campaign, as well as the papers of U.S. Congressman Robert C. McEwan. In
Binghamton, I studied the University of Binghamton’s collection of the papers of Graham
Hodges.
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Chapter 2. The Shadow of the Empire State: Housing, Infrastructure, and the
Urban Development Corporation
Incentives to attract private capital for the rebuilding of slum areas must be provided.
This can be accomplished on a large scale all over the country by agencies such as New
York State's wholly new Urban Development Corporation. — Gov. Nelson A.
Rockefeller, 1968 (Rockefeller, 1968; 49)
The modern authority answers neither to voters nor stockholders; it is accountable only to
God and the bond market (not necessarily in that order). (Fitch, 1993; 151)
Introduction
Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the New York State Legislature created the Urban
Development Corporation (UDC) in April 1968, in the days immediately following the
assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., to address a lack of affordable housing and decent jobs
in poor Black and Latino neighborhoods in the state. After 1975, in the wake of the New York
City fiscal crisis, the state diminished the size of the UDC, as well as its role in building lowincome housing, and at the same time redirected its authority toward the subsidization of private
investment in commercial enterprise. From 1983 to 2000, the UDC was used to finance the
construction of 36 new state prisons, all of them in rural counties of New York, all of them
subsequently filled, by and large, with people of color from many of the neighborhoods that the
UDC was ostensibly chartered to improve.

In this chapter, I tell the story of how and why the Urban Development Corporation was created
in order to address disparities in housing, and with itsocial reproduction, the ability to create and
sustain life, in urban New York, and then was deployed to create death-making infrastructure in
the rural counties of the State. The UDC, created by Rockefeller to manage a crisis of social
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reproduction in urban New York—deterioration of housing, industrial decline—came to be the
State of New York’s economic development arm, an institution used for the enactment of
development policy in the post-Keynesian moment that emerged after the Fiscal Crisis in 1975.

After the fiscal crisis, as New York intensified and sped up the shifting of its budgetary priorities
from the provision of social welfare to the subsidization of FIRE industries, the UDC became
one of its primary instruments for mediating the shifting relationship between state and capital.
Known since 1995 as the Empire State Development Corporation—the UDC has been a central
tool in the transformation of New York’s social, economic and literal landscape during an era
defined by deindustrialization, falling rates of profit, and stagnating wages. While it began its
institutional life as a means to build housing for the urban poor, the UDC is now an all-purpose
shadow institution of the State that aids in private business growth and state-led gentrification
schemes. In the 1980s and 90s, the UDC was used by the state in order to finance the largest
prison construction program in state history, deployed to manage a new, redefined crisis through
the remaking of urban and rural places in New York.
The Creation of the Urban Development Corporation
The need to transform our urban core areas into decent places to live and work in is the
priority domestic challenge confronting this Nation. No longer can we tolerate the decay,
degradation and despair that exists there; no longer can we ignore the discontent that
breeds there.
Yet, thus far, we have not fully applied to the leading domestic challenge, the single force
most responsible for the material well-being generally prevalent in the Nation—the
private enterprise sector of the economy.1

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Special Message to the Legislature, Accompanying the Bills
for the Urban Development Corporation,” February 27, 1968, McKinney’s Session Laws of New
York, 1968, 191st session, Vol. 2, p. 2359, as quoted in (Brilliant, 1975)15.
1
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In 1964, State Senator Robert C. McEwan, of the 40th state senate district, ran for U.S. Congress
on the Republican ticket, and won. Hugh Douglas Barclay (H. Douglas Barclay) ran as a
Republican for the open state senate seat, and won. But 1964 was generally not a good year for
Republicans in New York. At the convention, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, early in his
quadrennial (and perennial) fight for the Presidency, had stood up to the shouts and jeers of the
rightward shifting crowd of delegates, and had barely been able to finish a speech denouncing
the conservatives who were gaining control of the party. With Goldwater at the head of the
Republican ticket, Lyndon Johnson won every state but five in the Deep South, and Arizona. In
New York State, Democrat Robert F. Kennedy beat incumbent Senator Kenneth Keating, and the
Republicans lost their majority in the State Senate. One the Senators who was removed from
office in the 1964 election was MacNeil Mitchell, who had been the Chair of the Joint
Legislative Committee on Housing and Urban Development, and for whom the Mitchell-Lama
housing program is named (Holloway, 1996).

The young H. Douglas Barclay entered the state senate as voters swept the majority of more
senior Republican legislators out of office during the Presidential election in 1964. The following
year, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the reapportionment of 1964 had been illegal.
There was another election, in 1965, this time without the Goldwater heading the Republican
ticket. The Republicans regained their majority in the State Senate, and many of the districts
were broken up, including Barclay’s sprawling northern 40th, from the east side of which the
legislature carved a new district. This new eastern district, which included Clinton County,
elected a young man from Dannemora named Ronald Stafford. Stafford was to became Barclay’s
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closest friend and would later to play a central role in prison development in Upstate New York.
The Republicans won back the state senate in 1965, and, because of the Democratic sweep in
1964, the 34-year-old Barclay was by 1966 one of the more senior senators in the ruling party,
was assigned the chair of the Joint Legislative Committee on Housing and Urban Development.2

Barclay’s district was now the very northwestern part of the state: the land between Lake Ontario
to the West, the St. Lawrence River, to the North, and Stafford’s district to the east. Barclay had
grown up in a wealthy land-owning family in Pulaski, where Lake Ontario empties into the St.
Lawrence. Barclay was a young, Yale-educated lawyer who had returned to build his career near
his family’s estate in Pulaski. His district also still included the City of Ogdensburg—on the
newly constructed St. Lawrence Seaway—as well as the vast and sparsely populated farmlands
of St. Lawrence County.

It was unusual for a rural, upstate legislator to have the responsibility for Housing and Urban
Development, and so Barclay placed Whitney North Seymour, Jr., a lawyer and state senator
from New York City as executive of the committee.3 Seymour and Barclay toured the City, and
made stops in Harlem and the South Bronx. When I interviewed him nearly fifty years later,
Barclay recalled being impressed with the scale of the problems and the depth of the poverty he

Interview with H. Douglas Barclay, September 15, 2015. Syracuse, NY. See also: (Eyle, 1998).
Whitney North Seymour, Jr., was the son of the lawyer, Whitney North Seymour who had
served in the Hoover Administration and who had been the 84th President of the American Bar
Association (1960-61). Seymour, Jr., also known as “Mike,” was a Republican State Senator
from 1966 to 1968, representing Lower Manhattan. He ran for a congressional seat in 1968, but
lost to Ed Koch. Seymour went on to serve at the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York from 1970 to 1973, where he represented the U.S. Government in their quest to prevent the
New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers.
2
3
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found there, which he compared to the rural poverty he observed later in his career as a diplomat
in El Salvador. Urban Renewal, he said, had led to the demolition of large swaths of the Bronx.
Barclay blamed the union controls and local opposition in New York City for red tape that
hindered the construction of affordable housing.
We had to do something. […] You couldn’t build anything in New York City because
you had the unions, you had the codes, you had the local pressure groups. So if you
wanted to build low-income housing somewhere, you couldn’t do it, everybody would be
objecting. So we had to come up with a thought, and that thought was, ‘well, let’s balance
it off.’ So we balanced the city off, in a sense. It’s economic development. So, you build
the housing project, but you’ve got to provide jobs for those people living in the housing
project, so you can put light industry or something of that nature to provide the jobs.
Then what you did is you did away with the codes and you did away with the zoning, and
you just forced the issue, to be built. That was the concept.4

In 1967, Barclay sponsored a bill to create the Corporation for Urban Development, a nonprofit
corporation that would use seed capital from private industry to build low-income housing and
subsidize the creation of light industry in blighted urban areas (Fusco, 1967). The bill passed
both the assembly and the senate. Governor Rockefeller, who had his eye on the Presidency,
studied the bill and then vetoed it.

Rockefeller’s UDC
In his 1968 State of the State speech, Rockefeller announced his intention to bring the private
sector to bear on urban development and the construction of low- and middle-income housing.
He proposed a “revolutionary,” $6 billion ‘superdevelopment agency’ that would have
extraordinary powers to issue bonds, to take land through eminent domain, to create subsidiary
corporations, and to override local zoning regulations throughout the state (Brilliant, 1975;
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Interview with H. Douglas Barclay, September 15, 2015. Syracuse, NY.
13

"Upstate mayors welcome Rocky's urban formula," 1968). John Lindsey, the Republican Mayor
of New York, opposed Rockefeller’s agenda on the grounds that it would erode Home Rule,
giving more power to the State to direct planning in New York City.

As winter turned to spring, Rockefeller made the case for his new development authority around
the state. Upstate mayors were generally supportive, while Lindsey continued to oppose. Lindsey
opposed the inclusion of the ability to override local zoning restrictions as an encroachment of
Home Rule, but they had been included as a tool that could transcend municipal boundaries in
order to address white flight to the suburbs of Westchester and Long Island. The UDC’s ability
to float bonds would be a way to circumvent a growing unwillingness by upstate and suburban
voters to support referenda for bond issues for public housing. In 1964, voters had rejected such
bond issues for the first time since 1938. They opposed another bond issue in 1965. This early
‘tax revolt’ limited the State’s capacity to act on the urban crisis, which was framed by the State
largely as a housing crisis due to a lack of low-income housing after Black and Latino people
rebelled in urban riots in Buffalo, Rochester, and Harlem in response to incidents of police
violence and repression.

The opposition to the public housing bond issues of 1964 and 1965 came mostly from white
upstate and suburban counties. Downstate media and politicians denounced this opposition as
racist reaction among rural and suburban white working-class voters to State expenditure on
public housing for impoverished New York City residents, more and more of whom were Black
and Latino (Brilliant, 1975; "End of low-cost housing?," 1964; "Rockefeller signs housing bond
bill," 1964). Yet, by this time, liberal elites, planners, and activists had also disparaged public
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housing as a social good and poverty-alleviation strategy. Urban Renewal guru Edward Logue,
Rockefeller later appointed as the first Director of the Urban Development Corporation, went on
record in 1967 to denigrate public housing in favor of more private investment in urban areas
(Brilliant, 1975).

The UDC that Rockefeller proposed was a public authority with the power to engage in regional
planning, at the state level, in the context of white flight, deindustrialization, and the
concentration of poverty in New York’s urban areas, and in particular New York City. The UDC,
theoretically, would be able to override regional political fragmentation in order to desegregate
the suburbs, encourage private industry in blighted areas, and provide substantial funds for the
construction of low-income housing despite resistance from suburban and rural voters. In the
context of deindustrialization, population loss, concentrating poverty, and urban rebellion across
the United States in the 1960s, Rockefeller proposed the UDC as a national model for dealing
with the urban crisis. The UDC would be an agency robust and powerful enough to deal with the
unprecedented crisis of the cities, creating a record on which to run for the presidency in 1968
(Brilliant, 1975; Rockefeller, 1968).

A wave of urban rebellion swept the U.S. in the days following the assassination of Martin
Luther King on April 4th. Nelson Rockefeller flew to Atlanta for the funeral on April 8, just as
the New York State Legislature was completing the 1968 session. Rockefeller left instructions
with the Secretary to the Governor, Al Marshall, to see that the UDC Act passed the Senate, and
Assembly. H. Douglas Barclay, who was supposed to attend the funeral with the Governor, also
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stayed behind in Albany with instructions to make sure that nothing impeded the passage of the
UDC Act.5

At the beginning of the legislative session, the press considered the UDC to be one of
Rockefeller’s ‘pet projects’ (Schanberg, 1967). As a development initiative by a presidential
hopeful, it was competing with Robert F. Kennedy’s Bedford-Stuyvesant Development
Corporation, and, for a while in 1966-67, with a much-discussed national Urban Development
Corporation under discussion in the United States Senate Government Operations subcommittee,
vocally supported by Senator Jacob Javits. David Rockefeller, President of Chase Manhattan
Bank and Nelson’s brother, was involved directly in these discussion about how to lure (and
guarantee) capital investment into disinvested urban neighborhoods (‘the ghetto’) (Heinemann,
1967; Kiefner, 1967; Semple, 1966; "White House shift on slums denied by Johnson Aide,"
1967). In the context of widespread urban unrest, by 1966 or 1967 addressing ‘the crisis in our
cities’ by guaranteeing capital investment in housing, would be a key component for any
presidential campaign platform. Johnson, Javits, Kennedy, and Rockefeller were all offering
some form of public-private partnership in an attempt to subsidize investment in central cities.
The funeral of Martin Luther King Jr. and the rebellion in cities across the country provided a
charged backdrop to Rockefeller’s attempts to pass the UDC Act in 1968, an act whose
ostensible purpose was the creation of a bold, innovative agency that would address the built
legacy of racist housing policy in New York’s cities. Rockefeller had been promoting the UDC
in the months leading up to April, and would continue to point to the UDC as a model for how to

5

Interview with H. Douglas Barclay, September 15, 2016. Syracuse, NY; (Persico, 1982).
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“save and rebuild the cities of our nation” (Apple Jr., 1968). The assassination of King lent a
sense of urgency to Rockefeller’s opportunism.

The UDC Act passed in the Senate at 2pm on April 9, and was sent to the Assembly, which
voted it down (Sibley, 1968). After a session of “legendary arm twisting,” which included phone
calls from Rockefeller from Atlanta, the bill was reconsidered by the Assembly, and was passed
after midnight.6 The Urban Development Corporation was the newest public authority in New
York State, and it had extraordinary capacities, four of which are especially relevant to a
discussion of how the UDC shifted to the center of the State’s development strategies, and how it
ended up as one of the cornerstones of an expanded carceral state. These four powers are as
follows:
1) The power of eminent domain: The UDC has the power to seize land for the purposes of
development, purposes that included industrial, commercial, and residential development.
2) The power to ignore local zoning restrictions: The UDC is able to build, theoretically,
whatever it wants, wherever it wants. This capacity was included to enable the UDC to

That Nelson Rockefeller was calling from the funeral of Martin Luther King Jr. is part of the
legend of the ‘drama and pressure’ around the passage of the UDC Act. Barclay, when I spoke
with him in 2015, still remembered the excitement of the bill’s passage, and explained how they
got the Assembly to reconsider and then to pass it: “How to get it through? Now one of the most
difficult things to do is to get a bill through after it’s been defeated, because nobody wants to
change their vote. […] And it was worked out whereby the Legislative pension plan, that really
good one which has now been amended out, where you retired in twenty years with half pay at
any age—if you’d gotten elected at fifteen, at thirty-five you could have retired. So Travia liked
it, Louis Lefkowitz liked it, Earl Bridges liked it […] So it came up, about two o’clock in the
morning, and it was forced through. And we had to twist an awful lot of arms, and I had to twist
the Republican members’ arms in the Assembly, because we needed the Republican votes—
there weren’t enough Democrat votes, I can’t remember what the composition was. The
Democrats controlled and we had to change some votes. And it was absolutely wild.”
6
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ignore restrictive zoning in order to integrate the suburbs, a task which it was unable to
complete when faced with political pressure in Westchester County.
3) The power to create subsidiary corporations: The UDC can create subsidiary corporations
with the same powers as the UDC, including the ability to provide tax breaks to private
business, the ability to make tax-free loans to private business, etc.
4) The ability to sell bonds outside of voter control: When the UDC was created it was
endowed with $700 million dollars of ‘seed money’ by the state and was given a $1
billion debt limit. This limit was increasingly, and with minimal-to-nonexistent oversight,
increased from 1968 to 1974. Using moral obligation bonds, the UDC was able to go into
debt on behalf of the state without the consent of the voters of the state. In addition to its
own debt limit, the UDC received infusions of funds from other public authorities,
created during the same period with the ability to sell moral obligation bonds. Of
particular note is the Housing Finance Agency, which, after the creation of the UDC in
1968, funneled moral obligation bonds into UDC projects until the fiscal crisis in the
mid-1970s.

The Public Benefit Corporation
The Urban Development Corporation is a public authority, or public benefit corporation. A
thorough history of the public benefit corporation would trace the origins of public corporations
back to early mercantilist and colonial enterprises such as British East India Company. A public
authority combines state power and capital in such a way as to enhance and extend flexibility and
capacity of both, while allowing the corporation to act outside of, to degree, the direct
responsibility and control of the state while protected by the risks of ‘the market.’ The first
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public authority with a presence in New York State was the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey, chartered in 1921 by an interstate compact, authorized by the U.S. Congress, and
modeled after the Port of London Authority. Government entities create public benefit
corporations in order to get around problems of multiple jurisdiction, such as with the case of the
port and transportation infrastructure on both banks of the Hudson, in New Jersey and New
York. Public corporations are also created in order to coordinate the construction of—and issue
bonds for— specific infrastructure. Once the project is complete and the bonds paid off, in
theory, the corporation would dissolve, and the infrastructure would revert to the State that had
chartered the original corporation, whose public the public benefit corporation was formed to
benefit. This has never been the reality of public authorities in New York, where public
authorities are numerous, powerful, seemingly permanent, and where many of them have been
designed to take on an increasingly confusing variety of projects. The proliferation of public
authorities in New York State, institutions which are often considered a “fourth” branch of State
government, took place in two ‘waves.’ The authoritarian (undemocratic) and bureaucratic
nature of these authorities, as well as the history of their formation, has led many to associate
these two waves of institutional expansion with two figures Robert Moses and Nelson
Rockefeller.7

In categorizing these periods of public authority creation according to the authoritarian
‘strongman’ most associated with each era I follow the lead of (McClelland & Magdovitz, 1981)
who drew heavily on Caro (1974). Fitch (1993) and others have cast doubt on Caro’s assessment
of Moses’ power, urging a more structural analysis of Moses’s era and position, and urging
against a view of the public authority as overdetermined by the megalomania, bureaucratic
ambitions, and vindictiveness of one man. I argue, and in this I agree with McClelland and
Magdovitch’s assessment, that the public authority, as an institutional form, is structured so as to
reward the ambitions of careerist bureaucrats and to avoid legislative (and at times executive)
checks and balances. The two figures most responsible for consolidating and shifting this
institutional form are Moses and Rockefeller, with the possible addition of August Tobin.
7
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Public authorities in New York can be thought of as a forth branch of government, accountable
to the executive branch to an extent that has depended on historical conditions since the 1920s.
Perhaps the most well-known example of public authorities operating as a shadow state, as an
unelected branch of the government, is the Triboro Bridge Authority under Robert Moses (Caro,
1974). Moses controlled, at one point or another during his long career in public service, 12
public authorities in New York State, New York City, and Nassau County. He headed multiple
authorities simultaneously, and, while never elected to public office (despite an attempt at the
Governorship), he wielded enormous power in the State and City. While he did not invent the
public authority, he transformed what it could do, its institutional longevity, and he is generally
credited with moving the form firmly into the center of infrastructural development in New York
State, in particular in and around New York City (Caro, 1974; McClelland & Magdovitz, 1981).

Moses did not single-handedly create the proliferation of public authorities in the 1930s, 40s, and
50s. Public authorities, or public benefit corporations, are created by the State legislature, and
Moses served at the head of the various authorities he controlled often at the pleasure of the
Mayor of New York City, or across 5 or 6-year terms that were appointed by the Governor.8
However, in an era of the proliferation of public authorities, Moses came up with a number of
legislative and bureaucratic innovations that changed their form and allowed for both his

Public authorities that were controlled at one point or another by Robert Moses include the
Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority; Henry Hudson Parkway Authority; New York City
Housing Authority; New York City Parks Department (which, while called a ‘department,’ is
actually a public authority); Marine Parkway Authority; New York City Housing Authority;
Long Island State Park Commission; New York State Council of Parks; Bethpage State Park
Authority; New York State Bridge Authority; New York State Power Authority; and the Nassau
County Bridge Authority (McClelland & Magdovitz, 1981; 220).
8
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individual dominance of the authorities and the authorities’ longevity and expanded power vis-àvis the branches of government that answered, at least nominally, to the electorate. Two
innovations of this period are worth mentioning, as they help us to understand the form’s
changing relation to the State and to the bond market. As I mentioned earlier, public authorities
are ostensibly created to efficiently manage some sort of infrastructural project for, but outside of
the political partisanship of the State. A public authority will issue bonds for the project, revenue
bonds that are backed say, by tolls on a bridge or a highway. When the principle and interest
bonds are paid, the public authority should dissolve and the finished and paid for infrastructure
should revert to the state, to the public. However, as long as there are outstanding bonds, the
authority cannot dissolve. Moses, when renewing legislation for the Triboro Bridge Authority, an
authority which he controlled, wrote in a provision whereby the authority could issue new bonds
to pay old bonds, thereby guaranteeing the permanence of the Triboro Bridge Authority for as
long as outstanding debt, the issuance of which he controlled, remained.

Robert Moses managed to expand and maintain his power in the State of New York through the
control of public authorities. These authorities were being created, in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, a
time of infrastructural expansion in New York City, and a time of national political and
economic dominance for New York State. Moses managed to stay in power over the course of
numerous Mayorships and Governorships, partly because many of the terms he served did not
overlap flush with the terms of those who had appointed him, but largely because while the
power of the public authorities may derive from the state, their responsibility is towards the bond
holders, not the public which they are created to serve. Moses, again, is often credited with
enhancing the powers of the public authorities under his control by writing the powers of the
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authorities into the bond agreements. As long as the debt was outstanding, the authority would be
beholden to the bondholders under the constitution, a relationship which no Governor or Mayor
might alter. During the ‘Moses era’ in New York State, undemocratic and increasingly
bureaucratic public authorities became increasingly more central to the ways in which large scale
development projects were undertaken in New York State and New York City, mirroring the rise
of Public Corporations like the Tennessee Valley Authority at the Federal level and in other
regions. The construction and development through public authorities during this era, however,
relied on debt through bond issues, which is to say that Robert Moses had a relationship with the
financial community in New York City whereby they would lend money and collect interest.
Revenue bonds financed most of the projects during this period. For example, the future toll
revenue of the Triboro Bridge was used to back bonds sold to build the Triboro Bridge. After
Moses’s bureaucratic and legislative innovations, the future tolls from the actual, material
bridge—monopoly prices—were used to back further bond issues, more debt that was then used
for various projects across the city and the state that might or might not have a revenue stream
built in. At the end of the day, however, Moses’s relationship to Wall Street—his ability to sell
bonds and leverage capital—was based on his control of the bridge, and on his ability to collect
tolls from commuters.

Nelson Rockefeller’s relationship to the financial community, on the other hand, during the years
of his governorship, was based on his control of the State. In addition, Nelson Rockefeller was in
a unique position vis a vis Wall Street. Nelson and his siblings were in control of one of the
greatest fortunes in American history, which represented the maturation of much of the surplus
value of the industrialization of the United States, as well as much of the capital accumulated
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through monopoly pricing, plunder, and theft by his grandfather and father. Nelson’s brother,
David, was the President of Chase Manhattan bank, the largest buyer of municipal bonds in New
York. The New York State legislature, under Nelson Rockefeller’s Governorship, created a
number of public authorities whose purpose was to build, whether housing, the State University
System, highways, offices. Public authorities that Rockefeller created, which, although they were
supposed to be self-supporting corporations in the mold of the Port Authority or the Triboro
Bridge Authority, did not use revenues to finance debt. Low-income housing, for example, while
it may collect some revenue in the form of rents, does not accumulate surplus through rents at the
same rates as ‘market’ rate housing. Public housing, or low-income housing, should not actually
facilitate the accumulation of capital at all, as it exists to provide for the social reproduction of
labor in relatively de-commodified, or subsidized, form.

This is the reason that banks do not invest in public housing. It is the reason that financial
institutions, created for the maximization of returns on capital, do not generally invest in public
infrastructure such as highways or bridges, unless there are user fees that can provide interest on
money lent (as is the case with revenue bonds). Each firm must by necessity maximize its
accumulation of surplus value, which is why it generally falls to the state, which can transcend
intra-class competition among the bourgeoisie, to invest in public infrastructure such as public
housing or in public highways (investment in fixed capital that facilitates the movement of
commodities, including labor). The extent to which State capacity is directed towards the social
reproduction of labor, the quantity and quality of that reproduction, and the ways in which it is
funded, are all the product of class struggle, which often appears as tax struggle over the social
wage. In the 1960s, with a racially and geographically uneven crisis of social reproduction in
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New York City, the State faced a dilemma. How would this crisis be resolved, and how would
the solution be organized, and funded?

A governor and legislature can raise taxes on income, consumption, and production, and New
York State did all of this throughout the 1950s and 60s. The tax base of the State and City,
however, was declining due to deindustrialization and outmigration. A state agency or public
authority can borrow money against future revenue from a project, just as the Triboro Bridge
Authority did until its incorporation into the MTA in 1968, or just as the New York State
Transportation Authority does against highway tolls. If the state—or a state agency or public
authority—needs to borrow money for a project which will not pay for itself (plus the cost of
borrowing), however, it would need to borrow against the State’s ability to tax the people of the
State, with general obligation bonds, which require a statewide referendum under the New York
State Constitution. For debt that would be a general obligation—i.e. debt that was backed by
ability of the State to tax the public and assumes the public’s future productive capacity—the
public has a constitutional right to approve or disapprove.

Throughout the early 1960s, the electorate voted down statewide referenda on issuing bonds for
public or low-income housing. Governor Rockefeller circumvented the democratic checks on
public debt in two ways: lease-purchase agreements and moral obligation bonds. While moral
obligation bonds were the financial instrument of choice for most of the public authorities in
New York State throughout the 60s and until the fiscal crisis, lease-purchase agreements have
had an enormous impact on the way the State has created public debt after the crisis. The use of a
lease-purchase agreement remade Albany in the middle of the century, and lease-purchase
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agreements were to remake much of the rest of upstate New York, through prison expansion, in
the 80s and 90s.

Lease-Purchase Agreements and the Empire State Plaza in Albany
“I found Rome a city of bricks and left it a city of marble.” --Augustus9

Figure 2: Empire State Plaza, Albany, NY

Albany, New York, the state capital and the northern-most navigable port on the Hudson River,
appeared in the early 1960s as shabby to Nelson Rockefeller, a man of perpetually frustrated
Presidential ambitions, and one of the wealthiest human beings on Earth. If you approach Albany
today, from the river, you will see an enormous gleaming platform of marble rising above the

9

Marmoream se relinquere, quam latericiam accepisset (Suetonius, Div. Aug., 28).
25

ground, five-levels deep, with four marble-covered towers above it, the tallest buildings in New
York outside of New York City, full of state offices. To your left, there will be a massive elevenstory Brutalist trapezoid, which houses the State Museum, the State Library, and the State
Archives. To your right, on a narrow platform, there is a marble-covered half-oval, which looks
like a docked alien spaceship, or an enormous white egg that a giant cut longwise and on a
poaching stand. This is the New York Performing Arts Center, also called “The Egg.” Eventually
named the Nelson A. Rockefeller Empire State Plaza, known also as ‘The South Mall,” the
construction of this impressive modernist city within a city ended up costing the State of New
York over 2 billion dollars. The construction displaced some 9,000 people, and involved the
demolition of Albany’s working-class Black and Italian neighborhood.10 The Empire State Plaza,
which looks like (and then was) the future as imagined in 1962, was not completed until the
1980s. Its costs were staggering, and the scale of its open spaces more comparable with Brasilia
or Chandigarh than with Sacramento or Trenton. People living in and around Albany often refer
to the plaza as Nelson Rockefeller’s pyramids; a costly and impressive monument to the
authoritarian power that one of the wealthiest people in the state was able to consolidate and
make visible in the landscape.

For more on the building of the South Mall and the destruction of this neighborhood, see
(Kennedy, 1983), and (McClelland & Magdovitz, 1981). In recent years, there has been a
grassroots re-evaluation of the South Mall project in Albany among descendants of Italians who
were evicted during the construction. See The Neighborhood that Wasn’t There. While it is
beyond the scope of this work, the story of the evictions of the South Mall has been understudied
and not frequently discussed as a New York variant on State-led modernization and monument
building that, in concert with redlining and housing discrimination, shaped ghettoization, housing
decay, and racist accumulation by dispossession in upstate New York.
10
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The oft-repeated origin story for the Empire State Plaza is that Rockefeller, as part of his duties
as Governor, accompanied Queen Juliana of the Netherlands on a drive through Albany on the
occasion of the quadricentennial of the city’s founding by Dutch colonists. Embarrassed at the
upstate city’s humble appearance, and dismayed particularly by the Italian and Black ‘slums’ of
the South End, the Governor resolved to build a governmental seat more in line with his
ambition, one that would reflect the State’s preeminence and power.11 The State was able to use
power of eminent domain in order to seize the land that the project required in the center of
Albany despite the objections from the O’Connell/Corning Democratic political machine, which
stood to lose both tax revenue and votes from the destruction of the neighborhood.12

Rockefeller was able to use eminent domain to seize the land for the project, but would need to
raise the capital needed for the ambitious construction. The voters of New York State, who had
recently been voting down bond issues meant to fund low-income housing, were unlikely, to say
the least, to support the financing of a monumental project that was initially priced at half a

Like many of the stories that circulate about Nelson Rockefeller’s governorship, this one
comes from Joseph Persico’s 1982 biography of Rockefeller, which is mostly, in fact, a memoir
of the author’s time spent as the Governor’s speechwriter. Persico, the son of working-class
Italian immigrants to upstate New York’s Mohawk Valley, is both proud of his work in the
Rockefeller administration, and cynically wry in his observations of the ways in which
Rockefellers unique position among the U.S. (and global) bourgeoisie shaped the way power was
exercised in New York State during the four terms of his governorship. Numerous books and
scholarly articles that examine New York policy during the period of the late 60s and early 70s
rely on Persico’s anecdotes, as there has been precious little written by those who rose through
the Rockefeller administration.
12
The City of Albany and Albany County were controlled by one of the most entrenched
Democratic political machines in the country (separate from Tammany), from 1921 until the
mid-1980s. Dan O’Connell controlled the machine until his death in 1977 left Erastus Corning in
sole control of what was by then one of the last urban political machines in the United States that
had been forged during the Progressive Era. Erastus Corning (2nd) was the Mayor of Albany
from 1942 until his death in 1983.
11
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billion dollars (the real cost would balloon to nearly 2 billion dollars) and that was born from a
governor’s grandiose ambitions and his distaste for the shabby humility of an impoverished
upstate neighborhood.

Rockefeller circumvented the limits on the State’s capacity to borrow money for the construction
of the new State Capital with a lease-purchase agreement with Albany County. The deal, put
together between Rockefeller and the Albany County machine in 1965, had the State transfer
ownership of the land, which they had acquired through eminent domain in 1962, to Albany
County. Albany County then financed the construction of the project through the sale of bonds,
and the State built the project for the county. The state paid the county ‘rent’ on the land (which
had been transferred from the state to the county). These lease payments were equal to the
payments, plus interest, that the county would make on the bonds that financed the construction
of the plaza, and were to continue until 2004, at which point the land, along with the finished
plaza, would officially belong to the state again. These bonds were not general obligation bonds
but were revenue bonds, even though the money used to pay them would come from the State’s
taxation of the people of New York. The lease-purchase agreement allowed Albany County to
sell the bonds as revenue bonds, with the county’s lease agreement with the state backing them.
The state’s rent payments were the revenue stream. Through this shell game and fictive revenue,
the State of New York was able to bypass voter controls on debt, with the backing of the
financial community, which could get a higher interest rate than would have been the case with
general obligation bonds. The O’Connell/Corning Machine, for its part, was able to exert an
outsized amount of influence in the state throughout the long period of construction, given the
way the deal was structured to allow them to essentially blackmail the state legislature with a
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refusal to issue bonds mid-construction as the costs of the marble-covered plaza mounted. This is
how Albany was rebuilt in the 1960s and 70s, and this financial arrangement, the lease-purchase
agreement, would prove to be useful as a means with which to overcome limits on state
capacities to expand carceral infrastructure in the 80s and 90s, with the UDC acting the part of
Albany County, now under control of the executive branch.

Moral Obligation Bonds
As voters began striking down bond issues for low-income housing the State sought new ways to
circumvent limits on the capacity to act, on the ability to sell bonds to incur debt, and to build its
way through the crisis of social reproduction that was breaking in waves in places like Rochester
(1964), Harlem (1964), and Buffalo (1967). During Nelson Rockefeller’s governorship (19591973), public authorities proliferated, public debt soared, and the percentage of New York State
debt held by public authorities skyrocketed. In 1962, during Rockefeller’s first term, there were
26 statewide public benefit corporations with a combined outstanding debt of $3.3 billion. When
Rockefeller was confirmed for the Vice Presidency in 1973, there were 41 statewide public
authorities, with a combined debt of $13.3 billion (McClelland & Magdovitz, 1981; 214). The
creation of public authorities during this period, and the use of moral obligation debt provided
the State, constricted by democratic limits on its ability to borrow money in the name of the
people of New York, to circumvent voter restrictions and access municipal credit markets with
the cooperation and encouragement of finance capital (the so-called financial community).

Moral obligations bonds were a financial instrument created by John Mitchell, Rockefeller’s
bond counsel, for the HFA, backed by the so-called moral, but not-called legal, obligation of the

29

State. While the language in the bond issues said that they could be backed by legislative
appropriations legally without a referendum, the legislature was not allowed to raise this money.
Moral obligation bonds were, in essence, a vehicle with which public authorities could access the
bond markets without the approval of the voters. Mitchell, who became Attorney General under
President Richard Nixon, and who later went to federal prison for Watergate-related crimes,
explained in a 1984 interview that moral obligation bonds were simply a way to get around
existing limits on the state’s ability to buy money from Wall Street (Gotschall, 1984).13 H.
Douglas Barclay echoed this statement.14 Since the implementation of moral obligation financing
in New York, 20 other states have used this financing mechanism for public agencies (Gotschall,
1984).

The UDC and the Fiscal Crisis
In February 1975, after years of issuing moral obligation bonds under Logue’s leadership, the
UDC defaulted on its bond payments. That spring, New York City lost its access to the bond
market its credit rating was downgraded (Hoffland, 1977; McClelland & Magdovitz, 1981;
Phillips-Fein, 2017; Tabb, 1982). The austerity that was imposed on New York City from
members of the ‘finance community,’ placed in control of the City by New York State in the
years following, reoriented the City toward FIRE industries, and provided a blueprint for later

Gotschall interviewed Mitchell for Bond Buyer in 1984: “Q: Critics of moral obligation bonds
say they are a form of political elitism that bypasses the voter's right to a referendum or an
initiative. A: That's exactly the purpose of them.”
14
I interviewed H. Douglas Barclay at his office in Syracuse, NY in September 2015. We
discussed the Empire State Plaza, lease-purchase agreements, and moral obligation bonds. After
asking him whether he saw similarities between the way lease-purchase agreements were used to
build the Albany Mall, the way in which they were used to construct prisons, and the ways in
which the UDC used moral obligation bonds for construction in the 60s and 70s, he answered:
“It was all… It’s all to get around the Constitution.”
13
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austerity programs imposed Global South by bankers in the International Monetary Fund (Katz,
2004). The UDC was scaled back considerable, its use of moral obligation bonds decried and
then prohibited, and its powers reoriented, in the years following, towards large-scale private real
estate development in New York City.

If we draw a line from the UDC’s role in building low-income housing in the 1960s and early
70s, to its use as a means to empower and enrich private business in the State amidst rising
inequality in the 1990s and 2000s, we find nearly 40 rural prisons. Indeed, the prison expansion
of the last 40 years was fundamental to the ways in which the State of New York responded to
the changing conditions of production and capital accumulation during this time.

In January of 2011, Governor Andrew Cuomo gave his first State of the State address, and
shocked many across the State by signaling that he would begin closing prisons and juvenile
facilities in the wake of recent scandals, and in the context of a prison population that had been
declining since the turn of the millennium. Cuomo’s immediate predecessors had also attempted
to close facilities. Governor David Patterson, amidst a barrage of criticism and protest from
upstate communities, had managed to shutter three. Yet Patterson had backed down on others,
leaving both Ogdensburg and Moriah open after sustained campaigns by both communities to
‘save’ their northern facilities.

During that 2011 address, Cuomo addressed much of the previous upstate organizing around
prison closures in one sentence: “Prisons cannot be a jobs program. If people want jobs, we’ll
give them jobs. We can’t lock some people up to give other people jobs.” (Hakim & Confessore,
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2011). In other words, prisons would no longer be considered a development program for upstate
New York, and a clarifying moral argument was selectively deployed in order to preempt a
dubious and ingrained moral-economic argument—that prisons provide tangible economic and
social development for prison towns in northern and western New York. And yet there is nothing
about caging and warehousing human beings at the outskirts of partially abandoned towns that
would suggest social and economic development. This understanding of prison as a
developmental solution to the social and economic problems of upstate New York had been
made commonsensical by decades of the ideological work of prison construction. How did
prisons become synonymous with development in New York State? For this, we must look to
how the prison expansion of the 1980s and 90s was financed, and to the Urban Development
Corporation, an institution that made this financing possible, a public authority that has played an
important and instrumental role in redefining what development looks like in New York State.

The case of the UDC in New York shows us the centrality of mass criminalization and
incarceration to the project of capitalist development and reproduction in the United States
during the revanchist restoration of bourgeois class power at the state and national scales since
the mid-1970s. At the same time, it demonstrates again, in a limited way, what we already know:
that the key institutional infrastructure of carceral neoliberalism was already in existence by the
1980s, built for crisis management in the 1960s and 1970s (Murakawa, 2014). Mass
criminalization and prison expansion in New York were part of a broader project of capitalist
state building, not simply a concession to the ‘backlash’ of racist working-class white people
upstate. This points to the need for a class analysis of racial capitalist development of this period,
and to the imperative of moving away from moralistic and liberal arguments about the causes of

32

and solutions to mass incarceration. Instead, we must understand how prison construction fits
into wider patterns of contradiction and crisis, how different class fractions at different scales
aligned to articulate a response to political economic shifts, and how the organizing around
particular responses shaped and reworked existing social relations.

I follow the example of Stuart Hall’s reading of Gramsci, and see the necessity of conjunctural
analysis that delineates the ways in which the state is struggled over by different factions of the
“dominant economic class” (Hall, 1986a: 18-20). The history of the UDC offers us a window
through which to see the further ascendance of real estate and finance capital in New York State
during the long crisis of the 1970s, and the ways in which the state has been struggled over and
re-formed through this process. The UDC, with its barely-checked powers of debt issuance,
eminent domain, subsidiary corporate development, and re-zoning, provides those who dominate
the State of New York with an authoritarian and opaque means of quashing localized resistance
to ‘development,’ however defined. That the UDC financed the construction of upstate prisons in
the aftermath of the collapse of manufacturing in New York is an example of the material and
infrastructural reworking of the relationship between the State and capital that was part of a
restructuring of geographically articulated class alliances in New York. In other words, the UDC
provided, among other things, a way for existing and ascendant ruling class fractions in New
York State to ally with poor, rural, white upstate communities at the expense of working class
Black and brown people in urban areas of the state.

The transition of the UDC—from building low-income housing to financing prison construction
and subsidizing commercial re-development—epitomizes a more general shift from state
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investment in life-sustaining infrastructure to investment in an infrastructure of insecurity and
human sacrifice. The story of the creation and subsequent roles of the UDC in New York can aid
an analysis of the changing relationship between the state and capital, and of the political
formations and reformations that led to the current historic-geographic bloc characterized by
neoliberal ideology and mass incarceration and criminalization. An analysis of the shifting role
of the UDC in the State of New York’s development strategy helps clarify the centrality of mass
criminalization to the current regime of accumulation. This analysis also helps us to locate the
ways in which the State of New York and its capacities were struggled over during the past 50
years at the base political level (between departments, and through electoral politics and
appointments) and in a wider political sense, i.e. historical bloc (Hall, 1988b).15 An analysis of
New York State’s use of the UDC to finance the prison expansion of the last thirty-five years can
shed light on the shifting imbrications of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ in the state during the
wider transition from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism (or post-Keynesian militarism, or
authoritarian populism).16

See Hall’s introduction to The Hard Road to Renewal 1988), and the discussion of
‘hegemony’ (pg. 7)
16
One thing that these myths have in common is that they confusedly assume a separation
between the economic and the political, between the State and capital(ism), a separation that is
made to the detriment of effective political action. Furthermore, the assumption of a separation is
actually a key part of the ideology of neoliberalism (where there is ‘no such thing as society,
only individuals and their families,’ an ideology that makes a common sense of the illusion that
market relations, whose can be applied to everything, are paradoxically bounded and separate
from political decisions, ideally. That the misunderstanding of the role of prisons stems from this
common sense is important to note, as it is an example of one way that ‘commonsensical’
ideological formations are so central for the maintenance of hegemony, in this case of the
carceral state and of the historic-geographic bloc that has come together around mass
criminalization since the crisis of the 1970s.
15
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When Andrew Cuomo gave his State of the State address of 2016, he proposed tax breaks for
businesses and infrastructural development programs that would cost over $100 billion. It was, in
the Governor’s words, “a development initiative that would make Governor Rockefeller jealous”
("Transcript of Cuomo's 2016 State of the State Address," 2016). Much of this infrastructural
development, and most of the tax breaks and grants planned for businesses in New York as part
of this ambitious budget, will likely be planned and funded by Empire State Development, a state
agency that serves as an umbrella for the UDC (Empire State Development, 2016). All of the
prisons built in New York with UDC financing are public institutions, operated by the
Department of Correctional Services, as indeed are all of the prisons in New York. If the UDC
was meant to build low-income housing in urban areas, and encourage business growth, how
does the construction of public prisons fit into this mandate?

The history of the UDC’s role in financing prison construction, in building low and middleincome housing, and in providing tax breaks and grants to private companies speaks to a broader
discussion of the changing relationships between the State and capital at the regional scale, in the
shift from Keynesian demand-led growth to Neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), or to
what Gilmore has called “post-Keynesian militarism” (Gilmore, 1998). Many scholars have
noted and detailed the ways in which the shift from demand-led growth to supply-side economics
in the United States and elsewhere has been characterized by an active and geographically
uneven disinvestment from working-class communities and their built infrastructure (Brenner &
Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002); the fostering of competition among abandoned workingclass people for resources that have been purposefully been made scare (Larner & Walters, 2004;
Peck, 2001); and the structuring of the redistribution of surplus value so as to place cities, states,
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regions, and counties in competition with one another in order to roll back wages and
environmental regulations17 (Arrighi, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Katz, 2001).

Scholars have also documented the ways in which this rolling back of the gains of labor—won
through the long civil rights movement and struggles in the workplace, and through
unionization—has been accompanied by a concomitant rolling out of authoritarian measures of
control and confinement that serve to discipline a devalued labor force, contain factions of the
labor force that have been made redundant, and structure conditions of increasing insecurity and
immiseration that characterize the shift to this new social formation (Gilmore, 2007; Parenti,
1999; Hall, 1978). Others have shown how increased insecurity among working people, around
this crisis, was framed and translated into fear of ‘crime,’ made commonsensical by elites in the

By ‘environmental regulation,’ I am referring to protections that working people have won,
through the state, against the planned premature shortening and devaluing of their lives through
the externalized costs of capitalist production. For a broader discussion of how these externalities
violently devalue life in ways that reinforce and produce racial categories see Pulido (1996,
2000), as well as Nixon (2011). Much of the work that has contributed to the subfield of political
ecology also explores the way that environmental degradation is inherent to capitalist production
and accumulation strategies. For work focusing on agrarian environments in the Global South,
see esp. Blaikie(1985); Blaikie & Brookfield, (1987); Peet & Watts, (1996); Watts & Peet,
(2004); while much of the work in this literature dealing environmental degradation in North
America has been centered on rural areas McCarthy, (2005); Worster, (1979), there is a growing
literature that follows and engages with the agenda set by Pulido (1996) around the racist
violence of capitalist externality and abandonment in urban and highly industrialized areas
Ghertner, (2011); Heynen, (2003); Kosek, (2006); Labban, (2011); McCarthy, (2002);
Schroeder, Martin, & Albert, (2006). Central to this work in critical political ecology is an
understanding that environmental catastrophe, whether spectacular or slow, must be understood
not as an accident born of ignorance of effects, but as a necessary means through which the costs
of capitalist production can be externalized so as to better maximize the accumulation of surplus
value for the owners of the means of production. This is part and necessary—for the circulation
and reproduction of the capital relation—parcel of what Harvey refers to as “accumulation by
dispossession” (Harvey, 2003); the extraction of value from the arena of everyday life, from the
reproductive capacities of labor. This accumulation occurs unevenly across race and gender lines
in a process that is central to how race and gender are produced as categories under capitalism.
17
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political and media spheres in ways that served to fracture class solidarity and facilitate both the
rolling back of social provisions and the rolling out of increased policing and imprisonment
(Beckett, 1997; Stuart Hall, 1978). This was certainly the case in New York State, where
protracted campaigns for more police and longer prison sentences competed with structural
explanations for effects of deindustrialization and increasing poverty, a topic that I will return to
in later chapters. The UDC, a flexible and opaque public authority that enhances the executive
power of the State, ended up playing a key instrumental role in the replacement of social funding
with private incentive and in linking the rolling out of an enhanced carceral state apparatus into
circuits of finance capital in New York State.

At the level of urban development policy, the UDC has played an important role in what David
Harvey (1989) calls the shift from “managerialism to entrepreneurialism.” Harvey highlighted
the ways in which the factions of the bourgeoisie, in control of the political and economic
policies of urbanization, increasingly shifted resources from the management of urban crisis—
through concessions on spending in things like housing—to the purpose of attracting the
investment of private capital into projects such as Baltimore’s HarborView. Central to the
entrepreneurial city, is the public-private partnership, an umbrella term that indicates a variety of
forms but which is generally characterized by the partnering of capital with the state so that
profits will be realized privately, and risk—and losses—will be borne publically. The shift from
managerialism to entrepreneurialism, according to Harvey, facilitated the “opening up of the
urban spaces of advanced capitalist countries to all kinds of new patterns of development
(Harvey, 1989; 11).” Harvey connects a new politics of entrepreneurialism, the form of the
public-private partnership, and inter-urban competition to a shift “from locationally rather rigid
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Fordist production systems backed by Keyensian state welfarism to a much more geographically
open and market based form of flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1989; 12).” The shift from
managerialism to entrepreneurialism as an urban development strategy necessitates a
disinvestment from social spending and the related depression of wages. It also includes a pattern
of facilitating private development of infrastructure—often commercial and spectacular
infrastructure such as stadia, convention centers—where the risk of loss is placed on the public;
on the tax payers and on all of those who bear the costs of such development in the form of lower
wages and in higher costs in housing, etc. In other words, the shift from managrialism to
entrepreneurialism is a redistributive strategy in urban governance that facilitates an increasing
accumulation of wealth by certain factions of the bourgeoisie at the expense of social
reproduction.

David Rockefeller, who was the president of Chase Manhattan bank at the time of his brother
Nelson’s governorship, claims to have invented the term ‘public-private partnership.’ Certainly,
the Urban Development Corporation, created by Nelson in 1968, but considered by many to
show signs of David’s influence, is a powerful instrument for the facilitation of the publicprivate partnership, a super-development agency that for New York, has been used by the State
to direct entrepreneurial urban policy in urban areas, including New York City. After the fiscal
crisis of 1975, however, the UDC became a key instrument of the state for lowering taxes and
redistributing money upwards to business, as part of a general race to the bottom, in competition
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with other states and counties, and as part of efforts to retain and attract industry.18 In recent
years, the UDC (renamed the Empire State Development Corporation, or ESDC, in 1994) has
been the institution through which regional development councils in the state vie for state
funding—funding that in fact consists of tax breaks and grants to private business within the
council regions—as part of annual competitions that pit impoverished upstate communities
against one another and against New York City. The most ‘entrepreneurial’ region in the
competition wins tax breaks and subsidies for private business.

While the UDC may now be New York State’s primary instrument for enacting entrepreneurial
development schemes in upstate New York—and in facilitating spectacular urban development,
such as the recent Barclay Center, in New York City—it was created, ostensibly, for exactly the

This ‘race to the bottom,’ characterized by a lowering of wages and environmental standards,
and enabled by fewer restrictions on the mobility of money and fixed capital and on the imports
and export of commodities, has been thoroughly documented by many scholars of globalization.
For example, see Arrighi, (1989). Industry in New York State, especially after the late 70s, was
using the Urban Development Corporation to offer incentives to industry in an effort to compete
with other regions of the country, and in particular southern and western states (Sunbelt States)
that had fewer labor and environmental protections, fewer unions, and where the cost of labor
was historically lower due to the racist control of wages during the Jim Crow / New Deal Era.
New York State often lost these competitions.
An excerpt from a 1993 letter from the Director of the UDC, Vincent Tese, to the House
Majority Leader, upstate Senator Joseph Bruno (R-Glens Falls), serves as an illustration of
frustration stemming from this process, as well as an example of the sorts of public money that
was offered to private industry by the State through the UDC during this time: “[…] despite a
package of more than $100 million in incentives, depending on what site was to be considered;
despite many phone calls both from our State office in Frankfurt, Germany and here, we never
even had the courtesy of a response from Daimler-Benz. It is everyone’s belief that DaimlerBenz from the beginning was unwilling to consider anything but a right-to-work state. Dixie was
always their choice, with North Carolina the front-runner for a number of months and Alabama
the winner. Short of putting a gun to the automaker’s head and insisting they locate in New
York; I don’t know what else could have been done.” (1993. “Letter to Joseph Bruno from
Vincent Tese,” in New York State Dept. of Economic Development. Executive Office. General
Subject Files, 1970-2011. Box 7. Folder: Vincent Tese Correspondence)
18
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type of ‘managerialism’ that Harvey ascribes to urban policy before the 1973 recession. The
UDC was created to build low-income housing, and to facilitate the growth of light industry in
impoverished neighborhoods, and to generally relieve “blight” in New York City. One way to
view the UDC’s transition is that, as an instrument of the State, the UDC’s mandate simply
changed, from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, with the shifting development priorities of
New York State. Another way to view the shift in the UDC’s focus is to note the key elements
that would go on to enable entrepreneurial urban governance post-recession—a focus on publicprivate partnership. A centralization of power with Albany and the State rather than the New
York City, the ability to offer tax breaks and grants to private business, the ability to ignore local
zoning restrictions in the interest of private development—were written into the original UDC
act in 1968; the elements were already there. Both of these views are correct. The UDC’s shift
was a reflection of a broader shift in governance nationwide. At the same time, the UDC, from
the beginning, was a factor in this broader shift. The UDC’s particular debt-lubricated approach
to managerialism, and its creation by the Rockefellers to reflect their power and interests, pushed
the State and City towards crisis, and helped create the conditions for a restructuring of
governance and development priorities in the 1970s.

The role of prison expansion in New York State was to temporally and spatially resolve, at a
regional level, crises that emerged due to surpluses of labor and finance capital in the wake of the
fiscal crisis and in the transition to neoliberal governance and a more flexible mode of
accumulation resulting from a restructuring of global capitalist production in the 1970s, 80s, and
90s. The story of the State of New York’s use of the UDC for prison expansion is also an
example of what Gilmore (2007), referring to California during this same period, called “surplus
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state capacity.” In both 1968, and then again in 1983, New York State had the technical capacity,
in the form of the UDC, to act on resolving the crisis that confronted it. In the late 1960s, this
crisis was understood as a housing crisis, or the urban crisis; a crisis of social reproduction in
Buffalo, Rochester, and New York City along with a wave or organization and rebellion that
created a crisis of legitimacy for New York State. In the early 1980s, this crisis was a crisis of
‘prison overpopulation,’ and a crisis of legitimacy for the state’s prisons and police in the long
wake of the Attica Rebellion of 1971. In both cases, the State’s capacity to act was curtailed by
democratic controls on public debt, and in both cases these curtailments were overcome through
the use of the UDC.
The re-purposing of the UDC for carceral expansion allowed for the transformation of
much of northern New York into a prison colony. Before that construction could take place,
however, prisons would have to become a commonsensical solution to the social and economic
problems of the region.
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Chapter 3: The Olympics of Prison Expansion
“Whatever official euphemisms are applied, an Olympic Prison is an Olympic Prison.”19

Figure 3: The Ski Jump at Lake Placid

The 45th State Senate District
New York State built 39 new state prisons between 1982 and 2000, all of them in rural counties
(Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 2014). During those years, may
communities in the far-northern region of the state, and in particular the 45th State Senate
District, staked their future on mass incarceration—mass criminalization, lengthened prison
sentences, and an expanded prison system that was meant to be semi-permanent—as a
development strategy. More prisons were built in the 45th senate district than in any other during

19

(Example of Prison Poster, memo. Folder 4).
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the prison construction boom of the past 30 years, and the towns and villages of the district
competed for prisons with the hope and understanding (encouraged by the Department of
Corrections) that prisons would provide economic relief and growth to rural counties and small
towns that had been hemorrhaging jobs and people at increasing rates since the late 1960s
(Huling, 2002; King et al., 2003). By the turn of the millennium there were 14 prisons located in
the district, more than twice the number for any other state senate district, rural or urban. The
45th Senate District was not the only area in non-metropolitan New York suffering the effects of
deindustrialization, and the communities of the region were certainly not the only ones in the
state looking for prisons-as-development in an age of carceral expansion, crime scares, and
shifting patterns of production and trade. Why, then, were more prisons built in this district than
in any other?

While the lines of the district have been redrawn slightly over the decades to account for
population shifts - gerrymandered to satisfy political exigencies, including or leaving out this or
that town on the periphery - the basic shape of the district has remained the same. It consists of
an extensive area north of Albany, bordered on the east by Lake Champlain, and to the north by
the Canadian border and the St. Lawrence River. The district encompasses much of the northern
and eastern Adirondack Mountains, and is characterized by vast rural spaces, dense forests, and
sparsely populated small towns and villages. The economy of the region has been based on,
somewhat in turn, logging, mining, small manufacturing and dairy farming, and tourism. Since
the prison expansion of the 1980s, most of the region’s local employment consists of public
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sector jobs, which mostly means working guard duty in state prisons, working for the state
police, working for the Border Patrol, or, more recently, working as a county sheriff’s deputy.20

The 45th Senate District is also far away from the urban areas from which most prisoners in the
state originate, which is to say that it is a great distance from New York City. The district is also
home to the largest prison in the state, the Clinton Correctional Facility at Dannemora, a town
known locally as ‘Little Siberia’ for its climate, remoteness and function within the archipelago
of carceral infrastructure in New York (Figure 10.1). Nowadays, after the construction of so
many state prisons in the towns surrounding Dannemora, Little Siberia can refer not only to
Dannemora but to the entire region, comprised as it is with of many prison towns. When
Governor Andrew Cuomo announced his first round of prison closures in January 2011, there
was an outpouring of resistance, anxiety, and fear from the communities across northern New
York, highlighting the extent to which the economy of this northern region is perceived to be tied
to mass incarceration (D. Kaplan, 2007; Krieg, 2013). Why are there so many prisons in this
area, and how did prisons become synonymous with progress and development?

In order to address these questions, it is necessary to look back to the 1980 Winter Olympics in
Lake Placid and to highlight the material and political links between the organization of the

Upstate New York counties have been expanding their jail systems significantly since the mid1990s, which has created a not-insignificant increase in employment in this sector at the county
level in this rural district. In the case of Clinton County, the county invested in local jail
expansion in order to gain revenue from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, by
essentially turning the county jail into a detention center, near the Canadian border, for ICE.
Other upstate counties, as is the case with rural counties and small cities across the country, have
expanded their local jail systems in order to rent beds out to the U.S. Marshalls. For more see (D.
Kaplan, 2007; Norton, 2017, 2018; Rahman & Mai, 2017)
20
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Games, and the organization of prison expansion in rural New York more generally in the 1980s
and 1990s. An understanding of the way the Olympics were brought to Lake Placid helps explain
how and why there are so many prisons in the surrounding communities. The history of the 1980
Olympics also shows how a certain model of prison expansion in New York, a model that used
prisons as a developmental solution to economic and social crisis in declining rural areas, came
to exist as such. This model was by no means inevitable, neither in northern New York nor
anywhere else. There is nothing naturally commonsensical in the idea that a prison—an
institution that cages human beings and removes them from civil life and from the labor force—
might be an engine of enhanced social capacity, development, and freedom. The building of a
federal prison in conjunction with the 1980 Winter Olympics is thus a story of how prisons
became synonymous with development in New York, and how the construction of this new
common-sense drew on existing infrastructure while both expanding and shifting existing
political organization toward the formation of mass incarceration. The carceral geography of
New York State was constructed not only through intensified and racialized urban policing
(Kohler-Hausmann, 2010, 2017; Segal, 2012), but also through northern communities drawing
upon a usable past of social infrastructure—hospitals, schools, mines— and repurposing this
toward prison expansion, which was understood as development.

The Olympics of Little Siberia: prison dreams and carceral expansion
To understand how and why so many prisons were built in and around the Adirondacks, it is
useful to draw attention to the ways in which certain structures of feeling (Williams, 1977) were
created through prison expansion in northern New York. These emergent structures of feeling understandings of limits and possibilities - in turn helped to naturalize prisons as a common-

45

sense solution to problems both ‘over there’ (urban, Black, and Latino New York) and ‘over
here’ (rural, White New York). Prison expansion in New York relied heavily on racial fantasies
of purity and uplift, as well as on rural, White understandings of crime as an essentially Black
and Brown—and above all (coded as but not coterminous with) Urban—phenomenon. These
themes, brought up again and again by communities seeking to justify the construction of state
prison facilities in the 1980s and 1990s, were articulated very clearly in the struggle to bring a
federal prison to the Adirondacks in conjunction with the 1980 Winter Olympics.

For example, the plan to build a prison in conjunction with the 1980 Olympics in Lake Placid
was opposed by many who made the claim that the nearly all-White and rural population of the
northern Adirondacks was poorly suited to "guard" a prison population of disproportionately
Black and Brown people, and that the prison would turn these same White Northern New
Yorkers into "the herdsmen of minorities." In response to these criticisms, both the Saranac Lake
and the Lake Placid Clergy associations signed a statement in support of the Olympic Prison,
claiming that not only were residents of northern New York not racist, but that they would draw
upon a tradition of "serving and helping people" in their work as guards ("Local Clergy Backs
Prison," 1978). These caring skills, according to the clergy, were in particular demand given the
then-current over- crowded and "inhumane" prison conditions, a problem whose solution was to
be found in the Olympic prison. According to these local religious leaders, that the prison needed
to be built at all resulted not from structural forces but from "the harsh realities of human evil."
However, that the prison should be built near Lake Placid, according to these same leaders, was
because it would help address "chronic unemployment" in a region for which "the Government
[had] done too little" (Lake Placid News, 1978).
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The story of how the realization of the dream of the Olympics at Lake Placid was made possible
through prison construction is an important moment in the emergence of mass incarceration as a
developmental solution to the problems that faced northern New York, Prisons are carceral
infrastructures, and mass incarceration consists of various physical, political, and judicial
infrastructures that come together to produce a system that cages people to temporarily and
spatially resolve crises at different scales. Focusing on infrastructure aids us in considering what
else could have been done with this social capacity for organization and for development that
was ultimately channeled into the production of mass incarceration as a "catch-all solution to
social and economic problems" (Gilmore, 2008: 5).

The political and material practices that brought the 1980 Winter Olympics to Lake Placid were
transitioned to a project of carceral expansion in the years following the games. Prison expansion
in northern New York was an integral part of the games themselves, as the organizers of the
Winter Olympics in Lake Placid arranged for the athletes' housing to be constructed so that it
could be used as a federal prison immediately following the Olympic competition. Numerous
state prisons were built in close proximity to the Olympic Village in the years following, often
through reuse of the abandoned infrastructure of public schools and hospitals. Unlike many
communities in other states where local resistance often accompanied prison siting, northern
New York towns and villages actively organized to attract prison "investment," as I will explain
in the following chapters. Franklin County, a rural county in the 45th district, to the north of
Lake Placid, saw four new prisons built within its borders between 1986 and 1999—three in the
Town of Malone, and one in the nearby Town of Chateaugay. These prisons, which transformed
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Malone and Chateaugay into prison towns, were built after intensive lobbying on the part of local
small business owners and politicians who saw these prisons as an opportunity for local job
creation. While just one piece in a larger history of mass incarceration in New York, an
understanding of how these local rural growth machines formed and re-formed the carceral
landscape sheds light on the ways in which common sense understandings of race and
development are created and mobilized toward certain material ends (Gramsci, 1971).

Scholars studying mass incarceration in the United States have pointed to the prison expansion of
the past 40 years as a state-led developmentalist solution to social and economic crises in an era
of a neoliberal rolling back of social services and rolling out of increased policing (Bonds, 2006,
2009; Gilmore, 2007; Morrell, 2012a). Prison expansion in rural areas has gone hand in glove
with disinvestment in social spending there, even as prison siting in rural communities was
understood as a way to develop local economies and create jobs (Gilmore, 2007; Hooks, Mosher,
Genter, Rotolo, & Lobao, 2010; Hooks, Mosher, Rotolo, & Lobao, 2004; Lawson, Jarosz, &
Bonds, 2010). New prison construction was often "sold" to rural and deindustrialized
communities as a way to encourage local development, as a way to attract "recession-proof” jobs
funded by the state in an age of ever-widening criminalization (Bonds, 2009; Huling, 2002;
Schlosser, 1998). The evidence suggests, however, that prison siting in rural areas actually slows
down local economic growth even as it reworks the relationship between the urban and rural in
changing patterns of state spending and disinvestment (Besser & Hanson, 2004; Gilmore, 1998;
Hooks et al., 2004; King et al., 2003). Less evident in the unemployment statistics, however, is
the experience of being in a "prison town," on the outside of the walls, a feeling that Fraser
(2000), writing about Susanville, California, described as "a pervasive sense of antagonism..
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While prisons do provide some jobs in northern New York in the midst of still-ongoing
outmigration and economic decline (which may have been spurred by the prisons themselves),
the main streets are often boarded up, and the towns eerie shells of themselves. Malone, NY, a
town where three state prisons were built between 1986 and 1999, recently identified the
outmigration of young people as one the biggest problems posed to the sustainability of the
community. Yet this was exactly the problem that prisons were supposed to solve in this northern
region (Camoin Associates, 2009).

Gilmore (1998, 2002, 2007) explains the buildup in California - the largest expansion of carceral
infrastructure in history - as a spatial "fix" to economic and social crises in an age of "postKeynesian militarism." Gilmore demonstrates how prison construction in rural areas of the state
temporarily resolved surpluses in rural land, urban labor, financial capital, and state capacity.
These four surpluses were "fixed" - both in the sense of physically fixing them to a place, and in
the sense of fixing the problem of lost value that would result from the inability of capital to
disaccumulate - by constructing prisons on an unprecedented scale (Gilmore, 2007; Harvey,
2007 [1982]). As fixed capital in rural landscapes and as places made for and made by "human
sacrifice," prisons become a geographic solution to crises of overaccumulation - uneven crises
whose resolutions are always contingent and determined through struggle (Gilmore & Gilmore,
2008; Harvey, 2006c).

The story of the Olympics in New York is a story of economic development, of people organized
to attract capital - in the form of state investment in spectacle and carceral infrastructure - in a
time of crisis. This is also a story about mass incarceration in New York, about a prison
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construction boom that saw the prisoner population in the state increase nearly six-fold. Finally,
it is a story of the re-valorization of fixed capital in a rural landscape that was in the process of
being forgotten and abandoned (Harvey, 1996). This historical geography of prisons in northern
New York is written from a historical materialist view of the built environment and cultural
change. Our present conjuncture rests upon the outcome of past struggles, and in this sense we
still struggle with the future of the usable past.

Olympic dilemma, prison fix
Lake Placid is a village of just under 3,000 residents, located in the middle of the
Adirondack Mountains in northern New York. Home to the 1936 and the 1980 Winter Olympics,
the village lies within the borders of rural Essex County, and is in the 45th Senate District of
New York State. To reach Lake Placid by car one must drive through some of the highest
mountains in the Adirondacks on a two-lane road. The closest village to Lake Placid is Saranac
Lake, about six miles away. In between Saranac Lake and Lake Placid is the hamlet of Ray
Brook, and at Ray Brook, hidden from view, are two prisons—one federal and one state—as well
as the headquarters of the Adirondack Park Agency. That Lake Placid is a prison town is difficult
to discern if you are not there for the prison. Most visitors to the village come for the mountain
views and for the Olympic facilities—including a ski jump, bobsled run, and the ski slopes.

The Olympic and carceral landscapes of Lake Placid share not only geography but a common
architecture and history. The juxtaposition of the Olympic facilities and prisons is not
coincidental. The leadership of Lake Placid, along with the Bureau of Justice and state officials,
built a prison in conjunction with the games, as a solution to logistical problems posed by the
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games themselves. The prison, like the Olympics, was seen as part of a solution to a local crisis
of social reproduction, brought on by northern New York's shifting relative location in global
circuits of trade and production, and lobbied for by a local growth machine in the absence of
other local paths to growth during a period of decline and reorganization in the capitalist
development of the United States and of the region of northern New York. The crisis was
experienced and described, locally, in terms of high unemployment rates, deindustrialization, and
outmigration. The building of the federal prison at Ray Brook also provided communities across
northern New York with a model of how to deal with such crises, through the construction of
state prisons and employment of guards. Many of these small mining and agricultural towns
transitioned to prison towns in the years following the games.

Lake Placid is a small community, and local community leaders - small business owners, local
politicians, and civic-minded residents - had attempted to attract the Olympics to the village
before I980. They had bid for the 1960 Games in I954, but the Olympic Committee chose Squaw
Valley, California. They tried for the 1968 Games, but they went to Grenoble. They attempted to
convince the United States Olympic Committee to make a bid for Lake Placid to host the 1976
Games, but the Committee chose Denver instead. When Denver backed out, the National
Committee chose Salt Lake City as a replacement, but the 1976 Games were played in
Innsbruck, Austria. By the time Lake Placid won the bid to host the 1980 Games— and they
made and won that bid in 1974— the village's Olympic Games Committee had attempted to lure
the games to their small village seven times in 20 years (Johnson, 1974).21
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The Olympic Task Force that bid for the 1980 Games was thus well versed in the ins and outs of
Olympic politics. In a 1974 article in Sports Illustrated, these "North Country Boys" were
portrayed as a group of determined smalltown men who tenaciously evangelized and organized
for a Lake Placid Olympics, despite being a rather scrappy group from a town that, without the
Olympics, would otherwise be just another "frozen flyspeck on the U.S. map" (Johnson, 1974).
That the 1980 Olympics took place in Lake Placid was remarkable given the town's size, remote
location, and lack of political connectedness. At the same time, the Olympics allowed for the
strengthening and expanding of local political machines, and it served as a national and even
international spotlight for local politicians. Money flowed into the area in the years leading up to
1980, as the Games ended up costing US$168 million, well over the initial estimate of US$30
million (Gish, 2006). In addition to the money, the national and international attention the games
attracted served as an opportunity for talented local politicians to expand their influence in the
state. Not only was this influence used to build a prison in conjunction with the Olympic Games,
but it was also used to direct prison expansion to northern New York when the opportunity
presented itself in the following years. One of the most well-placed, talented, and charismatic
figures in these years was State Senator Ronald Stafford, a man whose origins in Dannemora and
career in the 45th Senate District parallel the transition that the northern Adirondacks made from
the Olympic Games to prison expansion.

Stafford represented the 45th Senate District from 1965 to 2002, becoming an extremely
powerful figure in the State Senate by virtue of his seniority and his considerable political talent
(Dao, 1993). He was a Republican Deputy Majority Leader for a time, and was Chairman of the
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Senate Finance Committee for almost a decade. He was responsible for an enormous amount of
legislation, including New York's Tuition Assistance Program (TAP grants).22 Stafford passed
away in 2005, but the memory of the powerful and personable senator looms large in the
northern Adirondacks. In discussions of the recent prison closures in New York State, many
local politicians and community leaders claim that "if Ron Stafford were alive, [these prison
closures] wouldn't be happening.” Stafford brought in hundreds of millions of dollars of
development money to his beleaguered, deindustrializing district during his four decades of
public service, and in so doing created a powerful and entrenched local political machine.
Stafford also used his influence to turn the northern Adirondacks into a penal colony for the sake
of job creation, a region to which prisoners' families must ride buses from New York City for up
to ten hours at a time to catch glimpses of their loved ones. Where Stafford really began to
assemble the pieces of this political machinery was in bringing the Olympics to Lake Placid.

Stafford was the son of a prison guard, and he grew up in Dannemora, where the houses on one
side of the main street face the prison wall on the other side. The prison at Dannemora, Clinton
Correctional Facility, was built in 1844. As noted above, Dannemora is the original prison town
in northern New York; that is to say, it is a town where the prison provides the majority of the
jobs and is the institution that ultimately structures the life of the community outside of its walls.
The town is located within the Adirondack Park boundary line. The region was once a center of
iron mining, when iron ore was shipped by rail and canal barge to foundries downstate. The
small neighboring village to the west of Dannemora, Lyon Mountain, had been a company
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mining town until Republic Steel closed down in 1967, leaving the abandoned gray mine
buildings looming on a hill above rows of company-constructed houses. The prison at
Dannemora had in fact been built there in order to facilitate the use of convict labor in the nearby
mines. This practice, unprofitable and contested by organized labor (which objected to and
organized against competition from bonded labor), was discontinued in 1877 (Glynn, 1995;
Lewis, 1965; McLennan, 2008). There is no mine at Dannemora now, only a maximum-security
prison, and where mines once existed at nearby Lyon Mountain and Moriah (towns both in the
45th District), prisons were built in the 1980s. Where once prisoners left the prison to work in
the mines, now the sons and daughters of miners go into the prisons to work as guards.

Stafford was first elected to the State Senate in 1965 (M. Thompson, 2005). In the early 1970s,
he began organizing to bring the Olympics to the Lake Placid region, and he was made Chairman
of the New York State 1980 Olympic Winter Games Committee in 1974. Stafford put together
and led a provisional Olympic task force, which then prepared to present their case at the
International Olympic Committee in Austria. The task force comprised local civic leaders and
small business owners. Stafford, the most well-connected member of the Committee in terms of
state politics, was still in the early stages of his political career, and did not yet have the political
power that characterized his later incumbency. Many of the task force members had participated
in the 1936 Lake Placid Olympic Games as young athletes and were eager to bring the
excitement and activity of the Games back to the area (Johnson, 1974). These "North Country

54

Boys," mainly local petit-bourgeoisie and officials, came together to amplify and project their
power for the sake of both the Olympic ideal and economic growth.23

Lake Placid's bid for the games was a long shot; it was a remote, isolated little town in the
middle of the Adirondacks with a population of under 3,000, making it one of the larger villages
in the area but an extremely small venue for such an event. The village had hosted the Games in
1936, when the Games had been smaller and less visible (untelevised), and it still served as a
regional training center for winter athletes. Since 1936 though, the Olympics had become more
of the highly capitalized spectacle that they are today - events backed by large public debts
which can weigh down host communities for years; ephemeral gatherings made possible by
spending on massive and costly infrastructure; projects which often displace local people and
which are just as often underused once the Games have finished. These were some of the
primary reasons that voters in Colorado had rejected the Games in 1972, and members of the
Committee in Lake Placid were also concerned that the Olympics might saddle the area with
debts that would long outlast any benefits derived from the few weeks of activity. It was in this
context that the Ron Stafford's Olympic Task Force, located as it was in a "tiny mountain
village," decided to pitch the Lake Placid Olympics as a return to a purer, more athlete-centered
competition, in contrast to the huge spectator-driven, debt-fueled Olympics of the recent past.24
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The Task Force also saw in the Olympics a solution to an economic crisis; the Olympics could
serve as a tool with which to address the very high levels of unemployment in the region. By the
early 1970s, those northern counties were in the midst of a wave of deindustrialization and were
suffering the effects of mine and factory closures. The unemployment rate in the area in the early
1970s was 16 to 17 percent—19.9 percent in Hamilton County—compared to a state average of
9 percent. The Committee used these economic arguments for the Olympics at Lake Placid to
make their case to New York State and then to the National Olympic Committee, claiming that
preparations for the Olympics would bring "275,000 man-days of work in construction alone" to
the area, providing, in a four-and-a- half-year period, " the equivalent of 250 full-time jobs." The
committee argued that "for the period six months preceding the actual events, 425 new jobs"
would "come into existence.”25

When the decision to award the 1980 Olympics to Lake Placid was made in 1974, the Olympic
Task Force continued on as the organizing committee, with retired postmaster Ronald Mackenzie
as President and Senator Ronald Stafford as a member of the Executive Committee. This
committee was soon faced with certain key challenges to organizing the games, namely the need
to plan, coordinate, and build crucial infrastructure in such a small village. While much of what
was needed for the winter Games already existed in Lake Placid - the ski slopes, a bobsled run the Committee needed to modernize many of the facilities, and to construct a ski jump. In
addition to the sports infrastructure, the Committee was faced with the problem of how to house
all the people who would be coming to the area for the Games. The population of the small
village was expected to briefly double to 6,000 during the Games. Some of this demand could be
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met through existing hospitality infrastructure, and a committee of motel and restaurant owners
was formed to coordinate lodging, not only in Lake Placid but across the region. The
Adirondacks are vast, and housing was also needed for the participating athletes. It was
especially important that these athletes' housing be close to the Games, in Lake Placid, and not a
long commute away in nearby towns over what would be traffic-clogged two-lane mountain
roads.

The Committee's concern was—and had been from the initial meetings—to avoid spending
millions of dollars in public money to build infrastructure that would be abandoned afterwards.
This concern stemmed from the fact that they had made the case for a Lake Placid Olympics
arguing against just this sort of spending, and with recent mine and mill closures the
Adirondacks and surrounding region was already littered with the remains of shifting capital
flows: empty mines, decaying infrastructure, and vacant housing. Deindustrialization resulted in
a proliferation of empty buildings in the rural landscape. In addition, the main impetus for the
Olympic bid, as articulated by the initial Task Force Committee and supported by the population
of Lake Placid, was to develop the area in a way that would benefit the local economy in the
longer term. Development in the area, at a time when unemployment was twice the state average,
meant jobs that would allow people to continue living in the small rural communities in and
around the Adirondack Mountains.

At an organizing committee meeting in January 1976, Ronald Mackenzie presented a possible
solution to the Olympic athletes' housing dilemma. The Ray Brook Sanitarium near Saranac
Lake was slated for closure, just four miles away from Lake Placid. Mackenzie, concerned about
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both where to house the athletes and the looming specter of an abandoned hospital on the
outskirts of town, suggested that they invest money set aside for the athletes' housing in order to
modernize and clean up the Ray Brook sanitarium for that purpose. Mackenzie suggested that the
sanitarium be used to house the visiting athletes with a view toward re-purposing the structure as
a community college post-Olympics. North Country Community College, located in Saranac
Lake, was dispersed in various miscellaneous buildings around town. By consolidating and
expanding the college into a renovated Ray Brook Sanitarium, the problem of the athletes'
housing would be solved in a way that would prevent blight, and in a way that would provide
long-term employment to residents of Saranac Lake and Lake Placid.26 Mackenzie noted,
however, that the buildings at Ray Brook were more spacious than necessary for the community
college, even though the sanitarium was the perfect building, in the best location, for the
Olympic Athletes' Village.

The sanitarium at Ray Brook did end up serving as housing for visiting athletes during the 1980
Olympics, and it was used as a federal prison beginning immediately after the Games and
remains so today. Sometime early in 1976, after talking with various federal agencies about
possible after-uses of the Olympic housing site, the Olympic Organizing Committee began talks
with the Federal Bureau of Justice to explore how the Ray Brook sanitarium might be
re-purposed, first as an Olympic Village, and then as a federal prison post-games.27 The prison at
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Ray Brook was officially proposed at a meeting on June 1, and Norman Carlson, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, toured the site the following day. The deal was finalized by the
autumn of 1976.28 The Department of Commerce contributed US$12 million to improve Ray
Brook to the standards of Olympic athletic housing, and the Department of Justice contributed an
additional US$7 million to renovate it to the specifications appropriate for an after- use as a
federal medium-security prison.29

Assembling this complicated and time-sensitive deal required a level of political connection and
brokerage that the members of the Organizing Committee, with the exception of Ronald
Stafford, did not possess. It is here, during the lead-up and planning stages of the 1980 Olympics
that Stafford's profile and influence expanded. In October 1976, Mario Cuomo, the future
Governor and, in 1976, New York's Secretary of State, assisted the Olympic Organizing
Committee by making a case for the federal prison after-use on the grounds of jobs and
economic development. According to Cuomo, the federal prison at Ray Brook would "provide
much needed benefit to the Essex County area as well as further the important development of
the 1980 Winter Olympics.”30 Cuomo and the Task Force's framing of the Olympic prison as an
economic development issue—and as a move to eliminate blight—would turn out to be
significant in subsequent years as the state struggled to finance prison expansion.
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S.T.O.P. the Olympic Prison
The conversion of the Ray Brook sanitarium to a federal prison that would first be used to house
visiting international athletes was opposed by activists across New York State and across the
country. The opposition was centered with the National Moratorium on Prison Construction, the
New York branch of which (New York Moratorium on Prison Construction) built a campaign to
halt the deal. The coalition, named Stop the Olympic Prison (or S.T.O.P. the Olympic Prison),
was national, with strong presence of clergy in northern and central New York, who opposed the
prison on the grounds that building an infrastructure of incarceration went against the idealistic
spirit of the Olympic Games, and that Lake Placid was too far from the urban centers where most
of the federal prisoners who would populate the facility post-games would come from. The
activists saw the prison, which was to be built in a small, almost entirely white rural town in
remote northern New York, as a clear example of the racial injustice that was United State
carceral system.

The S.T.O.P. campaign was based both in the National Moratorium on Prison Construction
office in D.C. and with the New York Moratorium on Prison Construction, which was formed
around the abolitionist milieu that had begun as a mostly white study group in upstate New York
in the years following the Attica rebellion, and had published the abolitionist handbook, Instead
of Prisons in 1976 (Christianson, 2015; Gangi, 2008; 2009; Knopp, Boward, Morris, &
Schnapper, 1976).
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The National Moratorium on Prison Construction approached the Olympic Prison as both an
outrage that needed to be stopped in the short term, as well as an opportunity to highlight the
injustice of prison in general to a world gearing up for a massive Olympic spectacle. During a
campaign meeting in 1978, members of the New York Moratorium on Prison construction
discussed ways they could use the pairing of the Olympics and federal prison expansion to make
their case to further the cause of abolition, to work to create a new common-sense by drawing on
what would already be very clear to most people. “Olympics and prisons don’t mix well in
people’s minds,” one organizer said, “it’s mixing an international symbol of joy and cooperation
with a repressive social policy.”31

The Attica Rebellion that took place in western New York seven years previous was never far
away. In a memo written in the summer of 1978, organizers of the STOP campaign detailed
talking points that should be used to oppose the Olympic Prison:
Shipping inner-city, mostly poor and minority 18-25 year-old federal prisoners to the
remote North Country of New York State to be guarded by rural white mountain people
promised “recession proof” jobs is preposterous, horrendous, and racist. It rings of
Attica.32
The activists of the S.T.O.P. campaign repeatedly attempted to make an issue of the remoteness
of northern New York, to put the saccharine news coverage of the unlikely little town in the
middle of nowhere, the ‘flyspeck on the map,’ in the broader geographic and political context of
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race relations in New York. At the same time, the characterization of working people in upstate
New York as inherently racist, “rural white mountain people,” was resisted by local Olympic
Committee leaders in Lake Placid, who pointed to the area’s long history of care work and,
implicitly, to the ways in which the area was already in relation to urban centers like New York
and Rochester.

Yet, there were many in upstate New York who opposed the Olympic Prison. Graham Hodges, a
pastor who spent much of his career ministering in rural northern and central New York, wrote to
the Amsterdam News from Watertown, where he was working in the late 1970s, when he was
very involved in the movement to keep prisons out of that part of the state. He was concerned
with the possibility of Lake Placid becoming a prison town, and emphasized the distance of
Adirondacks from New York City. Again, only seven years after the Attica Rebellion, Hodges,
like other STOP activists, used geography as a euphemism, to vary degrees, for the racism of
policing and imprisonment.
STOP has yet been unable to get congress and the Carter Administration to change its
decision to locate a prison near Lake Placid, one of the coldest and bleakest places in the
United States during winter months. […] Unlike other institutions, prisons don’t close or
fade away. Witness the Tombs, Dannemora, Sing Sing, and others. Once the prison opens
at Lake Placid it will be receiving inmates for the next century from New York. Decades
hence poverty-stricken people will board the bus in mid-town Manhattan for a long, cold,
expensive ride just to see somebody for a few minutes.33
In another letter, Hodges was more explicit about the injustice of prison, and of the incongruity
of pairing prison expansion with the Olympic Games:
It would be hard to imagine a scene more filled with injustice, as the elite young athletes
of the Nordic and Japanese world leave for their comfortable houses and the
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underprivileged of our cities take their places, subject to all the indignities and
restrictions of prison life. The contrast is so great that the very situation invites disaster.
Certainly, some of the athletes would not even come if they knew the facts.34

Hodges organized a meeting with members of the Northern New York United Methodist
Conference at St. Lawrence University, in Canton, NY, to discuss a proposal to oppose the
Olympic Prison. Over 250 members of the conference voted by a large majority to oppose the
federal prison at Lake Placid, vowing to “diligently work to ensure that the [Olympic] Village
will be used for another purpose, one which will benefit user and community alike.” The
members of the Conference, Methodists from towns and villages in and around the Adirondack
Park, did not portray themselves as backwards, racist, rural mountain people. Rather, they
accepted that the Olympic Games coming to Lake Placid was predicated on finding a lasting
after-use for the federal investment that would be made in infrastructural development, and
opposed prison as a harm, rather than as a form of social development. Those in the Conference
who did support the Olympic Prison, the minority, made their case in terms of economic
development as well, the case that the prison was the only investment that the federal
government was willing to make, an investment that would bring “much needed jobs to the
area.”35
The coordinators of the National Moratorium on Prison Construction, Andy Hall and Michael
Kroll, were stuck in a situation where to successfully oppose the Olympic Prison, they attempted
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to propose alternative after-uses for the Olympic Village. In a memo to the various coalition
partners, they outlined the problem of not being able to oppose the prison without opposing the
games (and thus alienating any local opposition in upstate New York). “The local people
conditioned acceptance upon assurance of full government funding and upon assurance that
every facility have a permanent after use,” they wrote. “Congress agreed to fund the Olympic
construction, echoing the permanent after-use condition.”36 The campaign proposed that the
Athlete’s Village be reused as an Olympic training center after the games, which was dismissed.

The decision to build a federal prison for the Lake Placid Olympic Games was ultimately made
by Congress and the Bureau of Justice, and Republican Congressman Robert C. McEwan, of
Ogdensburg, NY, was the prison’s champion at the federal level. Like Stafford, who, with
Barclay, was later considered as a possible inheritor to McEwan’s seat, McEwan was invested in
bringing a successful Olympic Games to his district. As the opening ceremonies inched closer,
the federal prison appeared to be the only viable after-use for the necessary investment into
athletes housing in the immediate vicinity of Lake Placid. McEwan, who had made the deal with
BJP at the federal level, stood by the decision on the grounds of economic development and
national security, repeatedly citing the tragedy of Munich 1972 when questioned by international
media on the morality of housing international athletes in a building designed to incarcerate.
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The Olympic model: prisons-as-development in the Empire State
With the conversion of the Ray Brook Sanitarium into the Ray Brook Federal Prison, the
Olympic Task Force, led by Stafford, and with the help of Mario Cuomo, solved the problem of
the athletes' housing, while at the same time addressing the issue of abandoned infrastructure in
the northern landscape. Indeed, the "North Country Boys" of the Olympic Organizing Committee
were able to utilize their new, and ephemeral, position at the center of attention in order to
leverage federal funds to re-valorize about-to-be-abandoned fixed capital in the Adirondack
Mountains. They also made a gesture at addressing unemployment in the region by adding "216
jobs." Through this alchemy of the sanitarium's conversion to athletes' housing with a carceral
after-use, the meaning and goal of the Olympics and incarceration converged as economic and
infrastructural development for the region.

The Olympic Prison at Ray Brook served as a model for prisons-as-solution to both
unemployment and the abandonment of rural areas by capital. Carceral infrastructure provided a
technical solution to political and social problems in both rural and urban areas of the state, even
if these places seemed disconnected. The appearance of their disconnection was, and still is,
fundamental to the ways in which prison expansion was made to appear as a "common-sense"
solution to urban crime and rural unemployment. The Olympics-to-prison model showed how
fixed capital could be re-valorized in the North Country through these new political alignments
between rural growth machines - local boosterism like that of the "hick town" North Country
Boys (Johnson, 1974)- and liberal Democrats looking to expand carceral infrastructure and
capacity through public debt issued through public authorities, without voter controls.
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Locally, the 1980 Olympics also provided Stafford with the means—money, jobs, and
influence—to build an effective political machine locally, and an effective political network in
Albany. This network relied on cooperation with Governor Hugh Carey and Secretary of State
Mario Cuomo, but was also constructed on a foundation of already-existing relationships. This
growth machine—an alliance of local politicians and the rural petit-bourgeoisie—was later on to
be further mobilized toward mass incarceration as a solution to economic decline. It is a political
formation that appears now in northern New York as part of a naturalized order of power, and is
often referred to as "the powers that be" by local residents. The presence of Clinton Correctional
Facility at Dannemora was also central to this emerging local common sense of prisons as
development in the northern Adirondacks, since existing political networks already included men
who had lived within the shadow - and many who had worked within the walls - of the largest
maximum-security prison in the State of New York. In the wake of the decision awarding the
1980 Olympic Games to Lake Placid, Stafford received many letters requesting positions in the
various Olympics-related jobs that were becoming available. For example, the man Stafford
recommended for Director of Contract Services, for his administrative abilities, was Ed
LaValley, who had worked for New York State Corrections for 50 years and who, according to
Stafford, "ran Dannemora," the prison in Stafford's home town, "without any problems.”37 The
local organizing among the petite bourgeoisie of the Adirondacks for the 1980 Olympics, and
then for the Olympic Prison, involved not only a repurposing of a tuberculosis sanitarium, but
the repurposing, or transitioning, of a local growth machine that was formed around an Olympic
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bid, to a growth politics that was focused on prison siting (Molotch, 1976; Surborg,
VanWynsberghe, & Wyly, 2008).

As prison expansion proceeded apace in New York State in the early 1980s, more prisons were
built in and around the northern Adirondacks. At the same time, the process of prison expansion
began to resemble the Olympics-to-prison "program" in Lake Placid in terms of both how and
why new prisons were built in this area. Abandoned rural infrastructure—usually schools,
hospitals, or mining buildings—was converted into carceral infrastructure. In Stafford's 45th
Senate District, the Camp Gabriels tuberculosis sanitarium, in the southern section of Franklin
County, was converted into a prison camp in 1982. Altona, New York, a small village in the
northeast of Stafford's district, near the border with Quebec, was losing population through outmigration. Altona's central school was closed and then re-purposed as a medium-security state
prison in 1983. Lyon Mountain, the company mining town next to Dannemora, continued to lose
population in the wake of the mine closing, and its central school was converted into a minimum
security prison in 1984. The Department of Corrections used the idled mining structures of the
village of Moriah, whose mine had closed in the early 1960s, to create the Moriah Shock prison
in 1989.

Infrastructural development and limits to state capacity
The power of New York to expand the state prison system in the early 1980s was limited by the
electorate's lack of enthusiasm for public debt. The prison population in New York State climbed
steadily in the wake of increased policing in urban communities as well as the mandatory
minimum sentencing laws that had been put in place in the mid-1970s by Governor Nelson
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Rockefeller. As the prison population rose, the Department of Corrections attempted to increase
its capacity to keep people locked up. While many argued that the prison overcrowding problem
could be solved through reforming the parole system and rolling back mandatory minimum
sentencing (Correctional Association of New York, 1982; McDonald, 1980), the New York
Department of Corrections presented Governor Carey with a prison expansion plan in 1980;
technical solutions to political problems. In order to fund this prison expansion program, Carey
put a US$500 million general obligation bond issue to a state-wide referendum, which was
required by the state constitution. The Correctional Association of New York led a campaign
against the bond issue, and the state prison guards' union - the New York State Correctional
Officers and Police Benevolent Association (NYSCOPBA)—as well as the Department of
Corrections itself, also campaigned vigorously in favor (Jacobs & Berkowitz, 1983). As I will
explain in more depth in the following chapter, the bond issue was defeated in 1981, and the
state's capacity to expand the prison system was curtailed.

Mario Cuomo found a way through this limit on state capacity, and he did so, just as he had done
for Lake Placid, by arguing for prisons as a solution to unemployment and deindustrialization.
When Cuomo became Governor of New York in January 1983, he was immediately confronted
with a crisis in the form of a prison rebellion at the Ossining Correctional Facility (Sing Sing)
that lasted four days. In the various inquiries and reports that came out in the wake of this
"disturbance" at Ossining, prison overcrowding was identified as the main cause. Cuomo
responded by announcing his intention to utilize the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) to
finance a massive prison construction boom in the state. Cuomo argued that since prisons would
bring jobs to deindustrialized areas in upstate New York with high unemployment rates,
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financing prison construction fell under the mandate of the public authority to develop blighted
areas. He was granted approval by the State Legislature, and every prison built in the state
between 1983 and 2000 was financed through bonds issued, without voter approval, by the
Urban Development Corporation.

There was never much of a problem finding places to locate prisons in New
York, because there was local, "grassroots" support for prisons-as-development in many
communities in the state (Millard, 1986). This was especially true in the towns and villages of
Ronald Stafford's district. In fact, when one looks at how communities in Stafford's district
actually competed with one another for prison siting, it is clear that they were similarly organized
into ‘task forces’ that utilized local letters of support, including from schoolchildren—and which
were mobilizations of the petit-bourgeoisie in those areas, working with the faction of the
working class that had been organized by NYSCOBPA, the prison guards’ union. These prison
task forces had the same class composition and the same form as the original Olympic task force
from which Stafford built his political organization, and they were used by Stafford as a way of
making a case in Albany for more prisons in his district while also making a case to constituents
that he was providing development money and bringing jobs to northern New York.

Through the mobilization of this political machinery, communities in northern New York
facilitated the expansion of a system designed to immobilize labor, and they did this by trying to
capture increasingly mobile capital and commodity flows. Prison expansion in rural New York
was thus supposed to open up possibilities of development and freedom for some people and
places, to the detriment of others.
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From the vantage of Lake Placid in the 1970s, the Olympics and prison construction converge at
economic development, and both end up being schemes to re-valorize fixed capital, to provide
jobs, and to redirect value (through the state) onto the landscape. While always a small mountain
village, Lake Placid's relative location was shifting along with broader networks of production,
consumption, and transportation at the end of the so-called Fordist period of American
capitalism. Like the infrastructure of the 1980 Olympics—of which the Ray Brook Federal
Prison was part—prisons in the North Country have served as places to dis-accumulate surplus
capital as well as a way to reshape the flows of labor and capital at a regional level.

The prison boom of the 1980s and 1990s takes place within a longer history of public works
under capitalist development, such as New York's canal system (McGreevy, 2009), waterworks
(Gandy, 2002), and parkway and highway network (Caro, 1974). Canals and highways are built
in order to keep capital moving in the commodity form, and to speed up circulation so that
surpluses do not over-accumulate. As Marx explained in the Grundrisse (1993), highways and
canals are state infrastructures that allow such movement and facilitate the "annihilation of space
by time." Prisons, however, are an infrastructure, also directly facilitated by the capitalist state,
that annihilates time by space, and that fixes surpluses of labor and capital in place. And they
also fix, as Gilmore points out in California, surplus land, or surplus infrastructure (Gilmore,
2007). In the case of New York, this surplus land and infrastructure often already appeared as
public or social infrastructure. Thus the re-purposing of Olympic housing, of hospitals, and of
public schools in the North Country, in yet another way and in another place, highlights just how
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wasteful this system of mass incarceration has been in terms of human life and social capacity
for development.
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Chapter 4. Carceral Expansion in the Empire State: Financing the Cuomo Archipelago
He [Mario Cuomo] was a liberal guy in many ways, unlike his son. So, he tried to do a lot
of good and honorable things. And in the process he was responsible for the biggest
prison expansion in state history. – Scott Christianson
Introduction
This chapter explains how the people of New York State circumscribed the state’s ability to
borrow money for prison construction in the early 80s, and how the state then circumvented
these democratic constraints financially while at the same time building upstate and downstate
support for investment in expanded incarceration. Support for prisons in upstate New York is not
an inherent feature of the people and landscape, rather, it was the result of the manufacture of
ideology—an opportunistic building of consent—on the part of the state. The federal prison at
Ray Brook that was built for the 1980 Olympics was contested, but was ultimately built due to a
strong desire among people in Lake Placid to bring the Olympics to their town and to create jobs
in the context of high unemployment. As the New York State looked to build the capacity of the
state prison in the late 70s and early 80s, it also faced opposition, much of it from upstate New
York. To overcome opposition to prison expansion and mass criminalization, the state needed to
depoliticize the human and economic costs of prison expansion, while building support for
incarceration through new class and geographical alliances by tying downstate crime scares to
upstate fears of social dissolution. New York State, in order to undertake the largest prison
expansion in state history, had to make incarceration into a new common sense across the state.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, mandatory sentencing took effect and was broadened,
and as more police were put on the streets of New York City in the years following the austerity
of the post-fiscal crisis, the prison population of New York State began to rise (Correctional
Association of New York, 1982; Gargan, 1983). In December of 1971, almost four months after
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the Attica rebellion, there were 12,525 people in state prison in New York. At the end of 1981,
there were almost 26,000 (Correctional Association of New York, 1982), an increase of 107%.
By 2000, there would be 72,000 people locked up in state prison in New York State. During the
1970s, New York expanded the capacity of the state system mostly by adding beds to existing
prisons, or building annexes onto large facilities like Clinton, at Dannemora. By the late 70s, it
was clear that this approach was insufficient. Those in the state who were in charge of the
department of corrections—NYSDOCS and the executive branch more generally—were faced
with a dilemma of whether to shift people out of prison, to change sentencing back to pre-70s
schemas, or to increase the capacity of the state to put and keep people in cages and dormitories
in state prisons. They chose the latter, and in 1981, put a $500 million bond issue out to state
voters to expand the state prison system, and for the state to subsidize the expansion or
construction of new county jails.

The expansion of the prison system in New York was a state-led development scheme that
spatially resolved social and economic crisis. Mass criminalization and prison expansion was
central and fundamental to the shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism in the 1980s and 90s.
As we began to see in Chapter 1, many of the key infrastructures of governance that were used
for assembling the prison industrial complex of the 1980s and 90s were designed in the mid-60s
and early 70s as Liberal reforms meant to manage the mounting crises of the 60s and 70s—
understood at the time as the Urban Crisis (Beauregard, 2003; Brilliant, 1975; Lavine, 2011;
Reeves, 1968). The institutions created to solve the housing crises of the 60s were the same that
facilitated prison expansion in the 80s.
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In Chapter 3, we saw how the Federal Prison at Ray Brook was constructed from a renovated
sanitarium, in conjunction with the 1980 Winter Olympics at Lake Placid. The Olympic Prison at
Lake Placid served as a model for how the state—whether at the federal or State level—could tie
incarceration to ideas of economic development upstate arguments to justify rural prison
construction, and long-term investment in carceral infrastructure across deindustrialized New
York. In retrospect, the planning, organizing, and campaigning for (and against) the federal
Olympic Prison in the late 1970s in Lake Placid was a test run for the expansion of the state
prison system in the 1980s and 90s, and in particular for state prison expansion in northern New
York. Unsurprisingly, many of the people involved in building and opposing the prison at Ray
Brook—state politicians, local business people in northern New York, urban-based activists—
were involved in building and opposing the state prison archipelago in the north. After the defeat
of the prison bond issue in 1981, state politicians and bureaucrats would turn their attention to
rural areas of the state in order to expand the prison system according to the Olympic Prison
model of the late 1970s. The expansion of the state system in the 1980s would involve building a
common sense of prisons-as-development as a way to remake the carceral and political
geography of New York State.

The 1977 Mayoral Election. The End of the Rikers Island Deal
During the New York City Democratic mayoral primary of 1977, Koch challenged Cuomo
constantly on issues of law-and-order, focusing specifically on Cuomo’s opposition to the death
penalty as a stand-in for what Koch portrayed as Cuomo’s weakness in the face of a need for law
and order. During the power outages of July 13th and 14th that summer, many people in some of
the city’s poorest neighborhoods destroyed local (but often not locally-owned) businesses and
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spontaneously requisitioned stores of commodities. Much of Bushwick, Brooklyn was burned to
the ground. The NYPD countered with the largest mass arrest in the city’s history. This all took
place in the thick of the Democratic primary campaign, and Koch used this as an opportunity to
attack Mario Cuomo’s supposed softness on crime, and to call for more police on the streets of
the city (Mahler, 2007, 2015). Koch used the issue of the death penalty, which Cuomo, a
catholic, opposed on religious and moral grounds, in order to attack Cuomo from the right during
a time of austerity and resultant disorder in the years following the New York City fiscal crisis.
In 2008, Reflecting back on that election and on his success in tying together issues of crime and
economic prosperity, Koch said the following:
Well, some people would say that I won the first election against Mario Cuomo as a
result of that [the death penalty] being one of the issues. I don’t really know. […] I think
that one of the major issues was that supporting the death penalty, supporting bringing in
the National Guard when the police were unable to stop the rioting, and regrettably the
mayor never even contemplated that, Abe Beame, but I would have. Safety is terribly
important. You lose control of the safety of the city, people will leave. In fact, they were
leaving; we lost a million people in New York City before I became mayor (Koch, 2008).
In the years following the New York City fiscal crisis of 1975, the unelected Municipal Control
Board imposed austerity measures that cut the social wage of the working class of the city in the
interests of the finance capitalists who had, for many years, flooded the city with cheap money.
In the context of a decline of the industrial tax base in New York City, and the abandonment of
the city by the federal government, these austerity measures, the model for later austerity
programs forced on the Global South by the IMF, privileged refinancing and debt repayment
over life and well-being in the city. Predictably, there was a sense of disorder as funding cuts to
critical social infrastructure began to take their toll on the city.
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Koch, and the law-and-order New York City politicians that followed him, made the most of—
as they fueled and encouraged—a moral panic around crime and disorder. While the working
class and petit bourgeoisie of New York reeled under neoliberal reforms in the years after
1975—what David Harvey(2006c) calls ‘the restoration of class power’—Koch, the rightwing
Democrats in New York City, and outer-borough Republicans were able to effectively tie fears
of economic insecurity to a moral panic over crime. In other words, the problem of urban
degradation and joblessness, in New York City at least, became a problem of crime, of
insufficient moral rectitude among the Black and brown working classes, and of Liberal
permissiveness on the part of politicians like Cuomo who would shirk, it was implied, his
responsibilities to literally kill those who would harm the emerging FIRE-oriented business
climate in the City (Koch, 2008; Phillips-Fein, 2017; Soffer, 2010; Tabb, 1982).

The Legacy of Attica
The uprising at Attica State Prison in September 1971 is one of the key moments in
understanding the expansion of the New York State prison system in the 1980s and 90s, and had
far-reaching ramifications for the ways in which the state would, post-rebellion, attempt to
depoliticize prison construction through organizing upstate communities around economic
development. The rebellion was a crisis for the State, which was resolved, in the short term,
through the naked violence of the state. The longer-term solution to this crisis, for New York,
was to be found in the expansion of the prison system—meaning the construction of new cells
and new prisons—and in the use of new technologies like Special Housing Units (a euphemism
for solitary confinement). Prison rebellions, and Attica in particular, were used again and again
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by the State of New York to justify a need for new prison space—and for ‘better conditions’—
and for the need for public debt in order to pay for that space.

The implications of Attica for prison expansion in upstate New York in the 1980s are numerous.
Other scholars have detailed the ways in which the Attica Rebellion made visible the
contradictions of the New York State prison system, incarceration in the United States in general,
and the crisis in racial capitalism laid bare by the demands of the insurgents in 1971 (Burton,
2016; Camp, 2016; H. A. Thompson, 2017). Burton’s work is the most thorough and wellresearched account of the meaning of Attica, and the rebellions leading to Attica within the New
York State prison system and New York City jail system, for prison expansion in the decades
after 1971.38

Burton shows how, in the wake of Attica, the New York State Department of Corrections made
concessions through a series of programs, and that prison expansion in the years following Attica
involved classifying and moving prisoners as a strategy of counter-insurgency by the state of
New York. Burton provides convincing evidence for the argument that prison expansion postAttica was part of a strategy of concession and counter-insurgency in the face of prisoner
organization and consciousness-building, and that the machinations of NYSDOCS post-Attica
should be analyzed in terms of war. Likewise, Camp, who is also heavily influenced by
Gramscian conjunctural analysis, sees the buildup of mass incarceration post-Attica as a counterinsurgency strategy on the part of the state, acting in the interest of capital. My research has

I am grateful to Orisanmi Burton for our extensive correspondence about the meaning of the
Attica rebellion for prison expansion in New York State. I will not attempt to repeat his analysis
here.
38
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shown that this was indeed the case, and that prison expansion in New York State in the 1980s
needs to be viewed as a semi-autonomous state acting in the interests of capital, and an ascendant
finance capital, to contain and spatially resolve social and economic crisis (Gilmore, 2007).

The rebellion at Attica was a political movement that was met with technological solutions that
in turn had implications for how prison expansion became a “catch-all solution to social and
economic crisis” in New York. The dominant Liberal interpretation of Attica’s implications for
prison expansion in New York is perhaps epitomized by Thompson’s conclusion in her Pulitzerprize winning book, Blood in the Water. In Thompson’s account, the brutal suppression of
Attica, and the cover-up by the state in the wake of that suppression, including lies that the media
repeated, were enough to turn the voters of New York, and then across the country, towards lawand-order politics. In Thompson’s account, the official, racist state explanations of the causes of
Attica turned public sympathy away from prisoners, and caused them to demand harsher
sentences and more prisons. Thompson, in her epilogue, also intimates that there is a profit
motive built into the New York State prison system, in the form of the CORCRAFT work
program that provided an incentive for New York State to expand the prison system. My
empirical research suggests that neither of these claims is factual. While it is not in the scope of
my work here to focus on the Attica Rebellion, this chapter details a case of the electorate of
New York State, and in particular, upstate New York, rejecting prison expansion as a solution of
social and economic problems. The interpretation of this rejection was struggled over in the
wake of the 1981 bond issue referendum, but it was a rejection that the state was able to both
circumvent and organize around in the years following.
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The rebellion and subsequent mass murder at Attica haunted the state like an increasingly useful
specter in the decades following. The state, time and time again, and especially under the
Governorship of Mario Cuomo, referred to the uprising as what they did not want to happen, and
used the possibility of riots. DOCS, for its part, was able to use the idea of another Attica as a
way to hold the state legislature hostage to demands for more funding, and more prisons. After
the suppression of the rebellion, it is more useful to understand much of prison expansion in New
York as a Liberal response to a selected understanding of the Attica demands; prison expansion
as a way to improve conditions in prison while exerting more control over prisoners. Prison
expansion in New York in the 1980s was more about concession to a depoliticized, liberal
interpretation of the Attica Rebellion than it was about a revanchist, racial hatred of prisoners on
the part of future upstate New York prison towns. The extent to which Thompson’s claim about
revanchism in prison expansion holds true has to do with the influence of upstate prison guards
and their organization—NYSCOBPA—on this process.

Instead of Prisons
Governor Mario Cuomo, one year before his famous 1984 Democratic National Convention
speech where he was hailed as a Liberal foil to President Reagan, used the Urban Development
Corporation to finance prison expansion, in the wake of an uprising at Sing Sing. The causes of
the uprising at Sing Sing, as reported by the state, were overcrowding and poor conditions. The
man who wrote the bulk of the report was Scott Christianson, who was a young journalist from
the Albany area who had begun his career covering the waste and corruption that was rampant in

79

the building of the Empire State Plaza, under Governor Rockefeller.39 His role as a journalist
during Attica, and his complicity in repeating official state lies, turned him toward the study of
imprisonment in the United States. I spoke with him in his home in Great Barrington in the
summer of 2015:
I got out of college in '69. I became a reporter for the Albany Knickerbocker News,
which was the evening, Liberal, writers' paper. […] And I wrote an investigative series
about police corruption and about the building of the South Mall, and wrote some of the
only critical stories about Rockefeller. Rockefeller was never touched by the media. And
Attica happened. And when Attica happened, I wanted to cover Attica, and the editor
said, "we'll let the wire services cover it. And besides, the spokesman from the
Corrections Department is a former reporter here, so we have an in to information." So
the report... that spokesman came out and said, "The hostages’ throats have been slashed!
We had to go in and save the hostages! We saved the day." And I was one of the
reporters that was given this story to rewrite it for the newspaper, which helped to
perpetuate a lie, about Attica (Christianson, 2015).
Christianson enrolled in graduate school at SUNY Albany to study the history of prisons in the
United States, racial disparities in U.S. imprisonment, and the historical connections between
prisons, policing, and slavery. During this time, he became involved with a group of white
upstate faith-based activists who were thinking about prison abolition in the wake of Attica:
So I was involved in starting a group of graduate students, a study group to look at
abolition of prison, and I serendipitously met a Quaker organizer named Fay Honey
Knopp, who was in charge of prison visitation for the Quakers. And we met and realized
that we both had an interest in abolition of prison, and we decided to work on a book
together and call together a collective of people, and we did that, and we published a
book, which I wrote, called Instead of Prisons (Christianson, 2015).

I discuss the Empire State Plaza, and its implications for later lease-purchase financing of New
York State prisons, in chapter 1. Christianson had been one of the only reporters to investigate
corruption around what became a more that $2 billion project routed through the
O’Connell/Corning Albany Political Machine, work that resulted in harassment and death threats
(Kennedy).
39
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Instead of Prisons was written as a ‘handbook for abolition,’ outlining the ways in which prison
failed to increase safety, and detailing alternatives to incarceration that could and should render
prisons obsolete. Published in Syracuse, the book, and the organizing and thinking that led to the
book, informed the anti-prison work that followed around the state, and in particular the rural
counties and small cities north and west of New York City. Many of those involved with the
book’s publication led the organizing around the S.T.O.P. the Olympic prison campaign around
the creation of a federal prison at Ray Book for the 1980 winter Olympics, and would in the
years following go on to challenge the expansion of the state prison system, and in particular the
1981 prison bond issue of 1981. Christianson was one of many who was involved with the
S.T.O.P. the Olympic prison campaign, which started in 1978. The campaign hired Bob Gangi,
who at that time worked in media, selling magazine subscriptions, and who would later go on to
lead the campaign against the 1981 bond issue, and who worked as the Executive Director of the
Correctional Association of New York from 1981 to 2010.
The 1981 Bond Issue
In the late 1970s, as the prison population of New York continued to rise, Governor Hugh Carey
looked to expand the carceral capacity of the state, while continuing to pass more mandatory
sentencing laws presented to him by the state legislature. The state, under Carey, began to
address the increasing state prison population by building up the capacity of existing prisons,
using general funds. In 1975, Judge Lasker declared conditions on Rikers Island, and the Queens
and Brooklyn houses of detention, to be unconstitutional, and New York State and New York
City began plans to reduce the jail population of the city, to build new neighborhood jails closer
to city courts, and to transfer Rikers Island to the State of New York for use as a massive state
prison colony that would be closer to the New York City communities from which a majority of
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prisoners were being incarcerated. The plan was that New York City would lease the island for
99-years, to the state, for $200M, and would have allowed, so the thinking went in the mid-70s,
for New York State to close ageing facilities like Sing Sing (which occupies prime riverfront
land in Westchester County), and Clinton State at Dannemora.40

In 1979, Mayor Koch, under pressure from the NYC guards union and city councilors opposed to
building neighborhood-based jails, killed the Rikers Island transfer, claiming that $200 million
was not enough money (Raab, 1979). Phillip Selig, the president of the Correctional Officers
Benevolent Association of New York City, claimed that the new community jails that were being
planned would lead to “experimental, posh prisons” which would encourage escapes into local
communities. Opposition, combined with the likely intransigent NIMBYism of various NYC
neighborhoods wanting to keep jail construction out, put Koch on the path to rejecting the deal to
transfer the island. New York State was then put in the position of trying to find or create
additional prison beds to keep up with the growing sentenced population coming largely from the
hyper-policed Black and Brown neighborhoods of austerity-era, post-fiscal crisis New York
City. Hanging over all of this was the specter of the Attica revolt, the radicalism of which had
been echoing throughout both the state and city systems in the form of the prisoner takeover of
the Tombs in 1975, and an uprising at Attica, again, in 1976. Carey’s DOC began to look for
abandoned infrastructure around the state that they could use to ease ‘overcrowding,’ a
euphemism for the rising prison population during a time of increasing criminalization and

For more on the history of Rikers Island, see Shanahan and Norton (2017). The plan to transfer
Rikers Island to the state, the plan of the 1970s, looks remarkably similar to the recent plans to
close Rikers Island in order to build massive, new ‘community’ jails, except in this case there is
no parallel plan to transfer the island to the state for carceral use.
40
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police counter-insurgency of the 1970s. DOCS looked to Air Force bases that were closing or
downsizing, in Lockport, in Rome, and in Watertown, and to mental health facilities that were
being shut down or considerably diminished during this period. However, just as Koch
anticipated with the proposed new jails in New York City, the state faced considerable local
community opposition to converting facilities to carceral use, around the state.

Thomas Coughlin III was the New York State Commissioner of Corrections from 1978 to 1994.
Coughlin was from Brooklyn, and had been a state trooper, and had served in the Air Force, after
which he moved to Watertown in the northern part of the state. Coughlin’s daughter was
mentally disabled, and he was active in disability issues in northern New York. In the wake of a
1975 consent decree, which forced the state to transfer the residents of the infamous
Willowbrook State School to community facilities, Carey appointed Coughlin as the head of a
new state office for the developmentally disabled, which became the Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) with Coughin as the commissioner.
Coughlin was then moved to Corrections in 1978 as Commissioner, and would go on to be the
longest serving commissioner in the department’s history. He would oversee the biggest prison
expansion program in state history, with his Associate Commissioner Kevin Travis, who
Coughlin brought with him from OMRDD to DOCS

The state DOC had expanded the capacity of the prison system in the wake of the Attica
rebellion, largely by converting drug treatment centers to prisons, mostly in New York City or
downstate in the Hudson Valley. When Coughlin published the 1980-1985 Correctional Services
Master Plan, in 1981, he outlined the planning goals of the department, goals which included
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professionalizing corrections, improving morale among guards, communicating the department’s
mission ‘outside of the walls,’ and, ‘reducing overcrowding.’ Coughlin also listed ‘major
traumas’ that the department had experienced in the 1970s, all of which “have had short-range
and long-range effects on its [the department’s] operation” (New York State Department of
Correctional Services, 1981). These traumas included the department having received “national
visibility and criticism as the result of the Auburn and Attica riots at the beginning of the
decade,” as well as unrest among prison guards that led to a job action in 1979. The department,
in response to the recommendations of the Attica investigation, as well as to an increased number
of prisoners after the passage of mandatory sentencing laws, had nearly doubled in size—from
6,500 employees to 11,000. It had built gone from running 17 prisons, to 32, many of them
smaller facilities built in light of the investigation’s recommendation to increase services and to
‘reduce overcrowding in large, congregate facilities’ like the one in Attica, NY.

In 1981, facing a burgeoning state prison population, and under pressure from New York City to
take more and more state-sentenced prisoners out of the city jails, Carey and the state legislature
put a $500 million prison and jail construction bond referendum on the ballot. The Legal Aid
Society of New York had brought a suit against the city due to overcrowding and conditions on
Rikers Island, and the outcome was likely to force the state to accept an increasing number of
state-sentenced prisoners more quickly into an already overcrowded state prison system. The
state prison guards union, just a few years after the mass job action referred to in the 1980-85
Corrections Master Plan, was threatening more action over ‘overcrowding,’ demanding that the
state keep the prison population at below 100 percent rated capacity. By 1981, the prison system
was operating around 110% capacity, and there was little political appetite among state

84

legislators, especially in New York City and the surrounding suburbs, to release prisoners from
either the state or the city systems. Commissioner Coughlin, who was on record as being
frustrated by support for mandatory sentencing laws among state legislators, was caught in a
bind (Keeler, 1981).

Officially named the “Security through Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Act,” the
bond issue, if passed, was to provide the Department of Corrections with $375 million for the
expansion of existing prisons and the construction of new facilities in the Hudson Valley. The
remaining $125 million was to go as state subsidies for the expansion of county jails, a provision
added by Republican State Senator Ralph Marino of Long Island, supported by Senate Leader
Warren Anderson, in order to placate suburban voters especially in Long Island. The New York
State constitution requires that all general obligation bonds pass a statewide referendum. During
the 1970s, the piecemeal expansion of the prison system had proceeded, for the most part, using
annual appropriations. The 1981 bond act was the first time that the New York State electorate
was to vote on prison construction in nearly 50 years.

After the announcement of the referendum, an ad hoc upstate-downstate coalition formed which
included remnants of the S.T.O.P. the Olympic Prison campaign, the National Prison
Moratorium Project, and various upstate faith-based organizations. Bob Gangi was the
spokesman for the group, which campaigned around the state. Much of the ‘no’ campaign, called
the ‘Voters Against the Prison Bond Issue,’ was coordinated out of the offices of the New York
State Criminal Justice Coalition, out of Albany, and the New York State Council of Churches,
based in Syracuse. Rev. Graham Hodges, a white pastor from Mississippi who spent his career
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ministering in northern and central New York, dedicated himself to the no campaign, and
especially to shoring up opposition to prison expansion among the churches of central New
York. He wrote letters to the editor across upstate New York decrying investment in carceral
infrastructure as a wasteful, immoral use of resources that could be better spent on alternatives to
incarceration, or on life-giving social infrastructure like schools and hospitals.

Religious leaders across the state echoed his arguments, despite the carrot held out by the
legislature and the Governor of money for improved and expanded county jails. Reverend James
Murphy, who ran the jail ministry for Diocese of Albany, opposed the bond act, and opposed
prison and jail expansion in the state. “It is my belief that the addition of more cells does nothing
positive for the victims, those put in jail or the public at large,” he said. When an interviewer
mentioned that the decrepit Schenectady County Jail, where he ministered, would receive almost
half of the $3 million needed in renovations, Murphy characterized the approach as typical
bureaucratic posturing by the police. “It’s the traditional jailers’ argument,” he said, then
imitating a hypothetical sheriff, or jailer, “I’m overcrowded so build more jails” (Runfola, 1981).

Activists upstate made the bond issue increasingly about money, which, as a bond issue, it was.
The no campaign stressed again and again, in letters to the editor, in pamphlets, in public
appearances, that investment in incarceration was a waste of resources that could be better spent
in other parts of the state, much of which was suffering from high rates of unemployment during
the austere years of the imposition of neoliberal economic and social polies following the fiscal
crisis—first implemented in New York City under Carey, the Municipal Finance Board, and then
under Koch, and then nationally under Volcker and then Reagan. One pamphlet from the no
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campaign claimed that prisons did little to reduce crime, and thus an investment in prison
expansion was a waste of taxpayer money. The pamphlet included excerpts from upstate
newspaper editorials opposing the measure, and quotes from both Kenneth Clark and Tom
Wicker about incarceration not being the answer to crime. “You cannot build out of crisis,” said
Benjamin Ward, who would in a few years become New York City’s first Black Police
Commissioner under Mayor Koch, “if space is there,” he said, “the system adjusts itself to fill
that space.” On the front panel of the pamphlet was a bold headline: VOTE “NO” ON THE
PRISON BOND.” Underneath, in smaller font, a series of questions:
How can they ask us to spend BILLIONS on new prisons when taxes are already too high
and budget cuts are crippling transit, health and educational services? The bonds cost too
much; they won’t prevent crime; and they won’t even relieve overcrowding. They make
no sense!41

Figure 4: Detail from anti-bond pamphlet, 1981. (Graham Hodges Collection).
Mayor Koch, Governor Carey, most of the state legislature, and most of the major downstate
newspapers, including The New York Times, supported the prison expansion bond. The Times, in
their editorial in support of the bond, claimed that arguing about whether or not the state should

41

Graham Hodges Papers, Folder 11. Binghamton University Special Collections.
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build 4,000 new prison cells “misses the point” ("The Time to Pay for Prisons," 1981). Citing the
threat of riots among deteriorating conditions in prison, the Times editorialized that opponents of
the bond were trying to let morale collapse in state prisons to push the system deeper into crisis,
in order to force the release of prisoners. Although Attica was never mentioned, it was ever
present. “Sooner or later,” wrote The Times, “the money will have to be spent” ("The Time to
Pay for Prisons," 1981).

Both Koch and Carey campaigned for the bond issue, insisting that the money was critical to
relieving overcrowding in both the state and city systems in the context of longer sentences. Both
politicians framed the issue in terms of security, appealing to fears of crime and disorder in urban
and suburban areas across the state, particularly in New York City. Carey went on record saying
that the defeat of the bond ''might send a sigh of relief among criminals,” and, he added, “we'd
rather have them issue a cry of pain'' (Haberman, 1981).

Meanwhile, in upstate New York, the idea of prisons as a solution to fear of crime gained less
traction. The ‘No’ campaigned, much of it based in Albany and Syracuse, made up of many of
the same upstate clergy and activists who had opposed the Olympic Prison, turned the prison
bond referendum into a vote on spending priorities, and on whether or not prison was a real
solution to social and economic problems. The No campaign sent out brochures explaining that
prisons, in fact, did not make communities any safer, that there were cheaper alternatives to
incarceration that could be applied across the state, and that the bond issue would end up costing
the state taxpayers well over $500, once interest was calculated, for an unnecessary and immoral
project.
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The most active campaigners for the bond issue, in upstate New York, were the state DOC and
the prison guard union, who did their best to frame the expansion in terms of both safety (more
people locked up) and better conditions for prisoners, an issue that was implicitly, and often
explicitly, understood in terms of preventing another Attica and creating safe working conditions
for guards.42 This last position was pushed primarily by the guards union in New York, who,
throughout the 1980s, would go on to campaign for prisons under the slogan “Build for Safety,”
a slogan referencing the prison rebellions of the 70s and 80s in service of the new common sense
of prison expansion as both a humanitarian program (better conditions for prisoners) and a labor
relations program (better working conditions for guards), and as part of the organizing for the
guards’ ascendency within the working classes of northern New York (Burton, 2016; Feldman &
Benjamin, 2010; Jacobs & Zimmer, 1983).

Defeat of the 1981 Prison Bond Issue
The 1981 Safety through the Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Act was narrowly
defeated in the November election by a margin of 13,699 votes. All of the New York City
boroughs voted in favor of the bond issue, as did the suburban counties surrounding the city. In
NYC, over 60 percent of voters supported borrowing money for prison expansion. The majority
of the opposition to the bond issue was tallied in upstate counties. The only three counties where
the bond issue received more than 50% support were Clinton (where Dannemora is located),
Oneida, and Broome (mostly the City of Binghamton). In the majority of the remaining counties

Security though the Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Task Force. “New York
must remove violent criminals from its communities.” Graham Hodges Papers, Folder 9,
Advocacy for the bond issue, pamphlets. Binghamton University Special Collections.
42
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of the state, the bond issue received less than 40% of the vote (Jacobs & Berkowitz, 1983; Lynn,
1981; "State board certifies defeat of bond issue for building prisons," 1981). The ‘Yes’ votes
came from what have normally been considered the liberal strongholds of New York City and
the surrounding suburbs. The 1981 bond issue was the first state-wide referendum on prison
construction in half a century, and upstate New York voted it down.

Analysis of the bond issue
The defeat of the bond issue did not substantially slow down prison construction in New York
State, although it did reveal a lack of support among the electorate, and served to curb the
capacity of the state to raise money quickly for a rapid building program. The legislature had
increased the capital construction budget from $107M to $310M in fiscal year 1980. After the
bond was defeated, the Democratic Governor Carey and the state legislature appropriated $63M,
and reappointed $179M for prison construction. Both Democrats and Republicans at the state
level moved forward with prison expansion despite a clear rejection from the electorate (Jacobs
& Berkowitz, 1983).

After the bond issue was defeated, liberal politicians attempted to frame upstate opposition in
terms of a conservative, anti-humanist politics on the part of white upstate New York voters. The
bond was defeated, in this interpretation, as part of a wave of tax revolts that was sweeping the
country as part of the turn toward what would later be characterized as Reagan-led neoliberalism.
People upstate, according to media and politicians downstate, didn’t care about prisoners, and
didn’t want to pay for the state to fund the solution to social problems. As Keeler (1981) wrote in
Newsday in the months preceding the vote: “The groups opposed to the bond issue may profit
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from some voters’ conservative feeling that the state shouldn’t be spending more money on
prisons, but should be using the death penalty as the punishment for many crimes” (Keeler,
1981). As The New York Times had argued earlier, prison expansion was viewed downstate as an
inevitable, necessary program to deal with the crisis of overcrowding in the state’s prison and jail
systems. The upstate vote against this program was viewed in the light of upstate opposition to
funding social housing, almost twenty years earlier, opposition that was, as it would be this time
around as well, circumvented by the Governor’s use of a powerful, robust public authority, the
Urban Development Corporation.

The No campaign had had considerable presence in upstate New York, much of it comprised of
the local, NY-based members of the previous campaign to oppose the Olympic Prison. Many of
the activists who worked against the 1981 prison expansion bond were abolitionists who were
based in northern and western New York, religious activists who had come together in the wake
of the Attica Rebellion to think about how they work to end prisons. Part of their strategy, as
outlined in Instead of Prisons, had always been to highlight the way that prisons were designed
to waste resources and lives, and to advocate for life-enhancing social development. Sponsors of
the campaign against the prison bond issue had included the New York State Council of
Churches (22 Protestant denominations), the New York State Coalition for Criminal Justice, and
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. Their campaign had found traction in upstate
New York, where unemployment was high, and where the moral panic around crime was not as
salient an explanation for social problems as in the city.
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Bob Gangi explained the results of the bond issue, and his campaign’s role in its defeat, in an
oral history in 2008.
“I think we did a very good job, and we quickly framed the issue as you don’t need more
prisons because they cost too much money and it won’t stop the overcrowding problem
because the more you build prisons the more you fill prisons. They cost too much money
and there are better ways of dealing with the crime problem than prisons. And it worked,
I mean we also had other things that played for us, but it worked” (Gangi, 2008; 2009).

Gangi, like many others, found the upstate defeat of the bond issue to be “ironic,” given that
upstate was considered to be a conservative, Republican stronghold, and New York City was
considered to be a liberal bastion. This interpretation, which he made decades after the fact, is
somewhat misguided, and diminishes the real work that the No Campaign did to bring together a
moral opposition to prisons as racist and wasteful institutions, and an opposition to more taxes on
the part of an already heavily-taxed upstate working class, a group of people who, more so than
in New York City, owned their own homes in a state with one of the highest property tax rates in
the country. In this sense, there is nothing incongruent about a group of working class white
voters seeking to both retain their share of production while opposing prison expansion
(Gilmore, 2007). A tax revolt and an opposition to prisons (as opposed to other social spending)
makes sense, and this had been the victory of the No campaign.

One person who understood the meaning of the No campaign for upstate New York was
Department of Corrections Commissioner Thomas Coughlin, who had lived much of his life in
Watertown. Although he oversaw the Yes campaign in 1981, since much of it was conducted
from the DOCS offices in the State Building 2 in Albany, the bond issue as a referendum not on
taxes, but on the expansion of prisons in New York State, and on the turn to lengthened,
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mandatory sentencing that New York had taking in 1973. Coughlin, as the DOCS commissioner,
wanted to expand the prison system in order to do his specific job well, in his specific corner of
the state. Coughlin wanted to both keep the NYS prison system out of court orders, and to
manage relations with the guards’ union. At the same time, Coughlin had been somewhat vocal
in his frustrations with the rising prison population, and with the source of this rise, which he
saw as punitive mandatory sentencing legislation as a response to crime in urban areas.
Coughlin, unlike other state officials and New York City-based liberals who talked about prison
expansion as inevitable, viewed the bond issue as a referendum on law-and-order policies. A
month before the No vote, Coughlin was quoted in The New York Times describing the choice
faced by the voters:
''If the people want tougher sentencing, better prosecution and jail to go along with that,
they're going to vote this bond issue in,'' he said. ''If this bond issue goes down, then that's
a clear indication from the people that they want to start looking at social programs to
reduce crime” (Blair, 1981).'
Moving ahead
“This Rural America thing. It’s a joke.” – Ed Koch
After the defeat of the bond issue, Governor Carey and the legislature pushed ahead with prison
expansion, prioritizing the conversion of existing state and federal facilities into prison space,
along the lines of the Olympic Prison model. As Christianson, who had been working at the State
Commission on Correction, later described it to me:
So part of the key element of the prison expansion was, "we're going to convert existing
facilities that we already have. We're not going to rile people up through eminent domain,
we already had this. We own it. There's water there and various things, right? So, that
was done” (Christianson, 2015).
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Still, there was local, NIMBYist opposition to prison siting in communities across the state. In
Watertown, where the state was attempting to convert part of an Air Force facility into a prison,
letters came in from Serious Taxpayers Against Prison Construction, a group of upstate residents
opposed to the project. The Air Force base at Lockport was slated to be converted to prison
space, a project which was successfully opposed in 1982 by residents in western New York. And
in Long Island in 1982, in order to comply with a court order, DOCS quickly converted the
recently shuttered Pilgrim State Hospital to a 1000-bed prison, a move in line with
recommendations that the state keep prison beds close to New York City and its suburbs, as
close as possible to the neighborhoods where most of the city’s prisoners were being arrested and
convicted. The conversion of Pilgrim State was met with furious local protest in Long Island, a
situation that I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter. All this to say that in 1982, the year
after the defeat of the prison bond issue, New York State continued with a program of expanding
prisons by reconverting other state facilities, while facing considerable opposition to prison
siting across the state.

1982 was also a gubernatorial election year in New York. Carey was stepping down, which left
the Democratic field open. In a geographically expanded re-iteration of the NYC mayoral
election of five years earlier, Carey’s Secretary of State, Mario Cuomo, ran in the primary
against Ed Koch, now the Mayor of New York. Koch had defeated Cuomo for the Mayoralty in
the summer of 1977 by tacking to the right and appealing for law-and-order policies in the city,
and attacking Cuomo’s opposition to the death penalty, despite that issue falling completely out
of the control of the Mayor of New York City. During the primary of ’82, the death penalty again
stood in for a larger debate on crime, with Koch running as a Conservative, ‘tough on crime,’
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attempting to portray Cuomo, who was viewed as an arch liberal (and had the endorsement of the
Liberal Party) as soft on crime. In the gubernatorial election, however, the rural counties and
small cities of the Empire State mattered.

Cuomo courted the suburban Long Island vote by promising to shut down the Pilgrim State
prison, newly opened by Carey, if elected. Koch resumed his attack of Cuomo from the right,
and was able to more or less split the vote with Cuomo in New York City and the surrounding
suburbs. During the campaign, in what was to later be considered the decisive factor in Cuomo
having soundly beaten Koch in the primary, and thus winning the election in Democratic New
York, Playboy Magazine published an interview with Koch where he scornfully dismissed the
upstate counties. Koch described Albany as “small town life at its worst.” When the interviewer
asked Koch about people having to waste time in long subway commutes, Koch replied:
''As opposed to wasting time in a car? Or out in the country, wasting time in a pickup
truck? When you have to drive 20 miles to buy a gingham dress or a Sears, Roebuck suit?
This rural America thing—I'm telling you, it's a joke” (Haberman, 1982).'
The Ossining Disturbance
Sing Sing State Prison is located in Westchester County, on the Hudson River, about an hour
north of New York City. Opened in 1826, it is the second maximum security prison constructed
in New York, built about a decade after Auburn. The prison precedes the town that surrounds it,
a town that used to also be called Sing Sing, before city leaders changed the name to Ossining in
1901 in order to provide some conceptual—but not physical—distance between the town and
village, and the prison (Conover, 2000). Then in 1970, the Department of Corrections changed
the name of Sing Sing prison to the Ossining Correctional Facility (OCF). They changed it back
to Sing Sing Correctional Facility in 1985. In 1913, prisoners at Sing Sing rioted and burned two
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prison shops to the ground, one of a series of uprisings against working conditions in the last
years of New York State’s forced prison labor program [the crisis of incarceration].

By the 1970s, calls for the closure of Sing Sing prison had grown louder and more persistent.
Part of this resulted from the broader movement against large, maximum security prisons—of
which Sing Sing was one of the most antiquated—in the years after the Attica Rebellion, and
from the movement against the racial injustice of incarceration in New York State’s prisons
during this time. In the case of Sing Sing, the local county and town leadership was also
supportive of the prison’s closure, given the prime riverfront real estate that the prison occupied
in Westchester County, land with a view of the Hudson River, in the middle of the village, that is
off the tax rolls.

In 1978, the Ossining Chamber of Commerce, along with an Ossining citizens’ committee,
recommended the gradual closure of OCF, a recommendation that was endorsed by Alfred De
Bello, the Westchester County Executive. Governor Carey made a statement in support of
closing the prison, but planned minor renovations in the meantime to keep it running in order to
accommodate the state’s growing prison population (Kurlander, 1983). In 1979, Commissioner
Coughlin stated that Ossining would be the first of the state’s prisons to be closed, after the
transfer of Rikers Island from the City to the State of New York. At the same time, and as a
supposed interim measure, DOCS began a $24.6 million renovation of the prison, renovations
that were plagued with cost overruns, and which took place sporadically, the money coming
from appropriations. Mayor Koch killed the deal for the state takeover of Rikers later that year.
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On January 8, 1983, prisoners at Ossining took over B-Block, holding 15 guards hostage.
Governor Mario Cuomo, who had been in office for 8 days, rushed to Westchester County with
Thomas Coughlin, and negotiated an end to the standoff, which lasted until the 11th. In the years
following the Attica Rebellion of 1971, DOCS had instituted a number of reforms and protocols
in order to minimize the ability of prisoners to politicize struggles on the inside. Much of these
had to do with new systems of classification, and ‘programming’ within the system, as well as a
restructuring and professionalization within DOCS (Burton, 2016, 2018). As well, DOCS now
created Correctional Emergency Response (CERT) teams—paramilitary organizations within the
department, meant to have a high esprit de corps that would respond in disciplined formation to
prison unrest. CERT teams were deployed almost immediately during the Ossining Riot (later
named “The Ossining Disturbance”) in order to contain and intimidate the rebellion. Perhaps
most importantly, in terms of curtailing the political ambitions of the rebellion, the state severely
restricted media access to the prison during the unrest.

Mario Cuomo, having successfully negotiated an end to the hostage situation without any loss of
life, received favorable coverage in the press in the days following the incident. Cuomo had
started his political career as a negotiator in racially-fraught conflict over housing and
development in the outer boroughs of New York City in the 1970s, and he was lauded for his
presence at Ossining, and was contrasted, implicitly and explicitly, with Rockefeller and his
murderous and aloof response to the rebellion at Attica over a decade earlier. Cuomo received
praise for his handling of the Ossining Riot from around the state. He also received letters from
Ossining town leaders, thanking him for his calm, and reiterating their arguments for why the
prison should be shut down.
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The prisoners who took over B-Block made demands for better conditions, which, in the media
coverage and official reports that followed, were recast in the light of ‘overcrowding.’ The
official state report that came out in September of 1983, published under Lawrence Kurlander’s
name but actually written by Scott Christianson, mentions that there was no clear consensus on
what ‘overcrowding’ actually meant, but that conditions in the prison were ‘filthy.’ The report
also focused on the fact that renovation delays, caused by insecure and sporadic funding, had left
much of the facility in a state of half-finished construction, which decimated morale among
guards and prisoners and had contributed to the riot (Christianson, 2015; Kurlander, 1983).

The Ossining Report highlighted the surge in the prison population leading up to the disturbance,
and blamed it on a few factors, including Koch’s “get-tough” policies in New Yok City, meaning
the ways in which Koch had helped to streamline the criminal justice system in New York City
in order to move people from court to jail to state prison more efficiently. The report also blamed
the 1978 Violent Felony Offender Law, signed under Carey, which had increased sentences for a
number of crimes statewide. It noted that in 1976-1977, the median term of imprisonment in the
state system had been 21.4 months, and that by 1980-81, following the passage of the law, it was
32.7 months. Sentences with a maximum of five or more years had increased from 20 percent in
1970, before the Rockefeller Drug Laws and the 1978 mandatory sentencing laws, to 43 percent
by 1980 (Kurlander, 1983).

The New York Times reported that the riot was caused by overcrowding, mentioning that the
failed deal to transfer Rikers Island, and the defeat of the prison bond issue in 1981, had all
contributed to the context of Ossining in January 1983. Larry Kurlander, Cuomo’s criminal
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justice coordinator told the paper that “one of the major purposes of his job was to find
additional space to relieve prison overcrowding,” and thus to relieve stress on prison guards
(Goldman, 1983). The riot, or disturbance, or siege at Ossining, which happened on day 8 of
Mario Cuomo’s governorship, put the issue of the state’s growing prison population at the fore of
the Governor’s agenda.

Cuomo acted swiftly to avoid any substantial media access by the prisoners, and managed to
negotiate an end to the riot while outmaneuvering Republican State Senator Ralph Marino, who
had attempted to take the initiative and be seen at the site of the prison despite the Governor’s
requests that he stay away. The Republican assembly went on to criticize the state’s lack of
“long-range expansion plans” as leading to the riot (Kurlander, 1983)57. The prisoners’ demands
for better conditions within New York State’s growing and racially disparate system of
incarceration were translated, by the state and in the absence of media access to the prisoners,
into a question of overcrowding, of not enough prison. Rikers Island, thanks to Koch, would not
become a NYC-based mega-prison, and Cuomo had promised to close Pilgrim State in Long
Island. And after the failure of the prison bond issue in 1981, renovation delays at Ossining, as
well as a lack of space in the state prison system more generally, could be blamed on upstate
voters by both the liberal media establishment and politicians in New York City. Scott
Christianson, who had been hired to oversee corrections for Larry Kurlander in Cuomo’s early
years as Governor, recalled in 2015 how the Ossining Riot in the early days of the administration
had prompted Cuomo to seek a solution to prison overcrowding:
So, Cuomo comes in, and he says: "We can't allow prison overcrowding to cause another
Attica, another Ossining, and the whole thing can blow up, not on my watch is this going
to happen. We have to overhaul the prison system, and they're beating me up cause I'm a
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Liberal and I'm against the death penalty and so on, and what can we do? (Christianson,
2015)
The UDC and the Resolution
''I'll take care of the prison crisis,'' Mr. Cuomo told Michael Finnerty, the Budget Director. ''You
take care of the budget’” (Barbanel, 1983b).
In the months following the riot at Ossining, Mario Cuomo and the state legislature amended the
UDC Act of 1968 so as to allow the corporation to float bonds to finance prison expansion,
outside of the referendum process. To these ends, Cuomo and his UDC director, Vincent Tese,
set up a shell game wherein the UDC sold bonds in order to raise money to buy land ‘across the
state’ which it then leased to the State Office of General Services, the state agency that acted as
developer, working hand in hand with the Department of Corrections in matters of acquisition,
planning, and construction. After construction of the prisons, the UDC would then sublet the new
prisons to the Department of Corrections for the amount of the bond payments (including
interest), until the bond was paid off, at which point the prison would belong to the Department
of Corrections. Through this intra-governmental sleight of hand, the bonds would be backed by
the revenue of the future payments from DOCS (backed by appropriations), and would be
considered revenue bonds rather than general obligation bonds, and thus would not be required
to pass a statewide referendum.43

See: Lowenstein, Ken. (1983, February 1). “UDC Prison Bond Issue” [Memo from Ken
Lowenstein to Donald Glickman] NYS Division of the Budget Files (Series 16193-04, Box 4,
Folder “UDC, Gov Office, Div of Budget”), New York State Cultural Education Center, Albany,
NY.
43
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Cuomo’s office started seriously exploring the possibility of using the UDC to finance prison
construction within weeks of the uprising at Ossining. The use of a lease-purchase agreement to
circumvent voter controls on public debt had a clear precedent in the Rockefeller’s agreement
with Dan O’Connell’s Albany County political machine to build the Empire State Plaza in the
state capitol. Unlike the Empire State Plaza lease-purchase agreement, which positioned Albany
County as a state actor independent from the Governor and legislature, the UDC prison bond
financing scheme centralized political power within the executive branch of the State, and a
series of memos between the Division of the Budget, the Office of General Services, and the
Urban Development Corporation circulated in the month and a half between the end of the riot
and the drafting of the UDC amendment that passed the legislature in April of 1983.

In a letter to the Governor’s office in March that year, the law firm Waribas Parker Becker
(“Becker”) outlined how the UDC might be used to finance a rapid prison boom, and discussed
the use of a lease-purchase agreement with OGS, as well as the difficulty that the state had been
facing in finding sites on which to build:
[…] Given this environment, it has been proposed to use modular, renovated, converted
and otherwise unconventional facilities for correctional purposes. Also, consideration has
been given to using either annual appropriations or a dedicated source of revenues (i.e. a
proportion of a new tax) to pay debt service on a revenue bond issue the proceeds of
which would be issued by a State Agency, for example, the Urban Development
Corporation (“UDC”). The facilities would be owned for financing purposed by the UDC
which would lease them to the state. The State would in turn sub-lease the facilities to the
Department of Correctional Services (“DCS”) for day-to-day management and operation.
This sub-lease would be for a nominal amount. The lease between UDC and the State
however would have lease rental payments equal to debt service on the revenue bonds
plus appropriate expenses.
The approach to financing outlined above, if undertaken, would greatly speed and
simplify the procurement of needed correctional facilities and we believe it justified on
this basis alone. However, as we have discussed with you, the revenue bond and lease
approach suggest further possible opportunities to reduce the cost of these facilities to the
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State. If a leveraged lease involving equity investment from private sector investors,
institutional or individual, could be structured and implemented, substantial economies
could be realized. This financing approach can be outlined as follows:
-

The facilities would be owned for tax purposes by private sector investors, although
legal title would be vested in UDC during the terms of the financing
Financing would be obtained from equity contributions by the private sector investors
and revenue bonds issued on their behalf by the UDC.
The investors would lease the facilities to the State which in turn would sub-lease
them to the DCS [Department of Correctional Services].
Lease rental payments by the State would equal debt service plus expenses and, if
necessary, a cash return on equity for the investors.44.

In April, the legislature passed an amendment to the UDC Act, allowing the authority to bond
out for $380 million for prison construction across the state. The amendment authorizing the
UDC looked in substance almost identical to the Prison Bond Act of 1981, except stripped of the
funding for local jail expansion which had been included in the previous bond issue as an attempt
to sway voters in counties outside of New York City.

The coalition that had come together to oppose the 1981 act, out of the fight against the Olympic
Prison in the late 70s, again opposed prison expansion in the state. This time, however, they were
unable to appeal directly to voters upstate. They were left with the courts. The Correctional
Association, the Coalition for Criminal Justice, the National Council of Black Lawyers,
NYPIRG, the Fortune Society, the Harlem Restoration Project, the New York State Coalition of
Churches, and individuals including Rev. Graham Hodges filed a lawsuit against DOCS
Commissioner Coughlin and the State, contesting the use of the UDC on the grounds that the

Meeks, Wilson. “Letter to William B. Eimicke, Deputy Secretary to the Governor." (March
31, 1983). Cuomo Central Subject and Correspondence Files, 1983-1994, New York State
Archives (Series 13628, no 46, Folder “Correctional Institutions, General, January 1983 through
April 1983”), New York State Cultural Education Center, Albany, NY.
44
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bonding was a circumvention of the 1981 referendum. New York State Comptroller Ned Reagan,
a Republican who had worked closely with Rockefeller in the 70s, wrote letters against the use
of the UDC, decrying the use of the lease-purchase arrangement as a new version of publicauthority fueled, undemocratic public debt of the sort that had led to the fiscal crisis in 1975. The
lawsuit was dismissed, the judge claiming the state excempt from suits challenging the state’s
ability to issue bonds. The UDC would go on to issue multiple series of bonds to finance prison
construction throughout the 1980s, issuing another $50M in 1985, $350M in 1986, $90M in
1988, and $85M in 1989.

With the lawsuit still open in 1983, the UDC, OGS, and DOCS moved forward with the prison
expansion plan. With the repurposing of the UDC for prison expansion, Cuomo had both
removed formal democratic controls on prison construction below the level of the state
legislature, and formalized the argument for prisons as economic and social development in New
York State. The UDC, chartered in 1968 by Rockefeller during the Johnson administration to
build housing and light industry, included language on community consultation being necessary
for projects meant to address unemployment and infrastructural decline statewide, language
which was transferred into the amendments to the Act. DOCS was now relatively unconstrained
financially, unable to build on Rikers Island, and was absorbing the political lessons of the
protests around the prison at Pilgrim State in Long Island. Kevin Travis, the Associate
Commissioner of DOCS in charge of prison construction, had studied the UDC Act carefully, in
particular the line about establishing “community advisory committees” to advise on new
development (UDC ACT, 7). They looked to the north.
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Chapter 5: The Birth of a Prison Town
Like Chagall, I would like to fix this land,
Into the immobile eye of the bull.45
(Leonardo Sciascia, 1952)
The outskirts of Malone are starting to look like a full-fledged penal colony. (Gonnerman, 1999)
Malone is on the move.
(Malone Evening Telegram, 1985)
Introduction
Malone is a small, rural town on the northern edge of New York State, in Franklin County.
Malone is a prison town. In 2010, according to the census, there were about 14,500 people living
in Malone, one third of them locked up in one of the three state prisons built in the town between
1985 and 1998. Franklin County is in the 45th State Senate District, in which more prisons were
built than in any other during the expansionary period of 1980 to 2000. During these two
decades, the federal government built one prison in the district, and New York State built ten.
Three of the largest of these prisons were built in Malone, another was built ten miles east of
Malone, in Chateaugay, and another was built in southern Franklin County, at Gabriels. In this
chapter, I explore how different levels of government and civil society in rural New York State
organized around and for prison siting and construction in the 1980s, in the aftermath of the New
York fiscal crisis and in the context of increasing unemployment and deindustrialization across
the state. I look at how Malone, a village built around agriculture and small manufacturing,
became a prison town, a place where a third of the inhabitants are locked in cages, a place where

“Come Chagall, vorrei cogliere questa terra // dentro l’mobile ochio del bue.” The first two
lines of first lines of La Sicilia, il suo cuore (Sciascia, 1997).
45
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a significant percentage of those living on the outside work within the walls and razor-wire
fences.

Malone tried to solve a crisis of social reproduction by bringing in prisons, and ended up reproducing itself as a different place; as a prison town. The story of Malone’s transformation into
a prison town in the 1980s is the story of the changing relative location of northern New York in
the midst of shifting regional and global patterns of production and consumption, and local
responses to these changes. As manufacturing left the area, and as shipping patterns changed,
people in Malone found themselves further from capitalist centers of production and
consumption and attempted to respond in order to reproduce the social fabric of their
community.

Malone is not the only town in New York State with a prison, nor is it the only place where
prisons provide a significant percentage of employment. Other towns in the State have two
prisons, although in most of those cases the first facility had been constructed prior to the prison
boom in the 1980s. However, Malone is the only place in the State with three facilities, and
Malone’s transformation to a prison town took place entirely within the exponential increase in
the prison population over the last four decades. Furthermore, the way in which support for the
prison was built in Malone had ramifications for subsequent prison build-up in upstate New
York. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, upstate New York counties were, for the most part,
either ambivalent or opposed to prison construction. By 1985, communities across northern and
western New York were clamoring for correctional facilities. Events in Malone during the mid-
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1980s shed light on how prisons became a common sense solution to problems of economic and
social decline in Northern New York.

Today, upstate New York is often viewed from New York City as a sort of prison colony where
residents (those who are not in cages) organize against prison closures (T. Kaplan, 2011; Krieg,
2013; "Say no to closures," 2013), and where local governments have an overwhelming interest
in hyper-incarceration as a project of post-Keynesian state building (Gilmore, 1998; Wagner,
2002) and local economic development (Huling, 2002). Many have written about the prison
build-up in New York and the attendant Upstate/Downstate cultural and political divisions
(Bryon, 2005; Huling, 2002; King et al., 2003; Morrell, 2012b; Norton, 2015; Schlosser, 1998).
There is also a significant body of scholarship on the siting of rural prisons, and meaning and
consequences of prison construction in marginal areas, or in areas in the process of becoming
marginal to a shifting and globalizing economy (Bonds, 2009; Che, 2005; Eason, 2017; Gilmore,
2007; Morrell, 2012b; Thorpe, 2014). The most grounded and geographically nuanced of this
work is Gilmore’s Golden Gulag (2007), a book which draws on a geographical-materialist
method for understanding the ways in which prison proliferation served as a spatial fix for social
and economic problems at different scales in the State of California in the 1990s. Gilmore’s work
is especially important in that it provides a way to understand rural prisons as part of wider
processes of the reorganization of space during periods of capitalist restructuring. The prisons
built in California and New York in the 1980s and 1990s were constructed in order to resolve
crises of capitalist reproduction through the sacrifice of human life and social resources. One
necessary part of the ideological project that went along with this process was to create a
common sense understanding of prisoners as racially distinct from the rest of the labor force, and

106

of prisons and prison towns as geographically isolated and distinct. The results of my research in
New York, however, strengthen Gilmore’s finding that “the places where prisons are built share
many similarities with the places prisoners come from” (Gilmore, 2007; 247).

Rural counties in Northern New York were experiencing similarly high unemployment rates—
and organized abandonment by capital—that characterized urban neighborhoods in the New
York City area where most of the state’s prisoners were originating in the 1980s and 90s. And
while the majority of prisoners in the state are men of color, Malone and the entire North County
is overwhelmingly white, as classified by the United States census. These contrasts have led
many to misunderstand the prison build-up in the state as being driven by revanchist poor white
people in the rural areas of the state, despite the decidedly suburban, outer-borough, and urban
support for law-and-order legislation and prison expansion during this period. Structural racism
undergirds the edifice of mass incarceration—the laws, the courts, the policing—but to use racial
‘description’ in the place of analysis of the power structure of New York State leads to a
fundamental misunderstanding of a town like Malone’s position in that structure.46

I rely primarily on Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s definition of racism as “the state-sanctioned or
extra-legal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death,”
as I discuss race and racism in this work. In other words, I use a structural analysis of racism,
with a focus on the ways in which difference is produced and exploited in order to reproduce
capitalist social relations. Following from Stuart Hall’s (1980) observation that “race is the
modality through which class is lived ,” I see race and racism as operating at different scales
within New York State. I see race and racism as processes fundamental to the reproduction of
capitalist social relations, and find very little scientific utility in conflating these processes with
seemingly static, and historically specific, descriptive categories.
As John Eason (2017) has gone to great lengths to point out, most prison towns outside
the Northeastern United States are not predominantly white as defined by the U.S. Census
Bureau. Eason argues that states like New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan—with their stark
Black/white divides between watched and watchers—often stand in, misleadingly, for the racial
politics of prison siting nationwide. I argue instead for the importance of a more nuanced and
locally specific class and power analysis of rural areas where prisons are located, along with a
46
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Likewise, in this chapter, I seek to complicate claims that “white, rural, and small-town
Americans benefit economically more than others from correction dollars” (Hernández,
Muhammad, & Thompson, 2015). Americans in rural areas receive money directly from
Departments of Corrections, in the form of wages, because the prisons were built in otherwise
devastated small towns. Nationwide county-level analysis shows that prison expansion in rural
counties does not bring economic development to these places, and most likely slows
employment growth in these counties (Hooks et al., 2010).47

Malone tried to solve a crisis of social reproduction by bringing in prisons, and ended up reproducing itself as a different place; as a prison town. This transition required that the building of
consent precede the construction of the first prison in 1985. To these ends, various state
institutions under the executive branch—notably, the Department of Corrections, the Office of
General Services, and the Urban Development Corporation—worked in tandem with upstate
legislators to organize and empower a local growth machine (Molotch, 1976), made up primarily
of the local petit-bourgeoisie and prison guards, in a process that was to have lasting effects on

geographic-historical materialist approach, following Gilmore, that is capable to tracing out
relationships across scale.
47
The authors of the Journal of American History introduction make the claim about ‘corrections
dollars’ and rural white towns, presumably, based on Departments of Corrections budgets, whose
main outlays are almost always wages. This elides the ways in which many states financed
prison expansion—through public authorities, shell corporations, etc.—as well as the wider
purpose of prisons and policing in post-Keynesian economic development in the United States
more generally. Who benefitted most from the building of the carceral state, in New York, in
terms of prison expansion in the 1980s and 90s? If we measure the benefits in terms of returns on
investment, it was bond holders, all of whom were paid with money that flowed from New
York’s tax base, through various state agencies and public authorities (including the Department
of Corrections).
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both the political economy and political geography of the state. The local effects are visible but
can be more difficult to measure. Over the last twenty years, incarceration rates in Franklin and
neighboring counties have trended upward, exceeding those of New York City. NYSCOPBA,
the state prison guard union, has come to dominate the local political, social, and at times the
physical, landscape. In the summer of 2015, two prisoners, David Sweat and Richard Matt,
escaped from the Clinton County Correctional Facility in neighboring Clinton County. After
weeks of military and police checkpoints and home searches in northern New York, Matt was
shot and killed, and Sweat was shot in the back and recaptured, both in Malone (Scott, 2016).

That August, Malone held a parade honoring law enforcement. The Congressperson and
Assemblyperson from the district rode in the parade, and people lined the streets waving
American flags. In November of 2016, Franklin County, which had voted for Obama by sizeable
margins in the previous two elections, voted for Donald Trump and his law and order rhetoric, by
a margin of over 7 percent. Despite what would otherwise be a Republican sweep, northern New
York also elected a Democrat to the State Assembly, a prison guard who had previously been the
Chairman of the Franklin County Legislature and who had led the opposition to the closing of
the prison in nearby Chateaugay. His father had been a dairy farmer, a union steward, and one of
the Franklin County legislators who was instrumental in getting New York to build a prison in
Chateaugay in 1990.
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Figure 5: The 45th State Senate District of New York, 2013 (not to scale)

The town of Malone came into existence in the early 1800s, not as a place of incarceration and
incubator of support for racist law-and-order policies, but as a center of agriculture and trade; a
node in a network of farming, iron production, and later of small manufacturing in the northern
Adirondacks. Northern New York’s shift from “the Star of the North” to “Little Siberia” is a
story of organization in the face of economic decline, deindustrialization, and of the organized
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abandonment by capital of urban and rural communities across the State of New York being reorganized into new configurations of incarceration and sacrifice, where similarly poor people are
put into relationships of guarders and guarded.48

In the years prior to the state organizing Malone into a prison town, and before Mario Cuomo
and the legislature used the UDC to circumvent voter controls on debt for carceral construction,
New York made various attempts to expand the state prison system by converting psychiatric
hospitals and other de-valued infrastructure into low-security prisons. How this played out in two
of these places—Ogdensburg in northern New York and Pilgrim State in Long Island—is
instructive to an understanding of why the state later looked to upstate New York, and to an
understanding of how the Department of Corrections developed their later strategy of community
organization and common sense building in places like Malone in the years following.

From Hospital to Prison: H. Douglas Barclay and Ogdensburg
In 1981 voters across the state rejected the prison bond issue after a fiercely contested campaign,
led by the Department of Corrections and the prison guards union on the ‘pro’ faction, and a
group of downstate and upstate activists, community organizations, and churches fighting against

In a nod to Malone’s northern position in the state, and to Northern New York’s role in the
abolitionist movement of the mid-1800s, the town is known as “The Star of the North,” a slogan
which can be seen on the signs leading into the village. There is presumably no relationship
between the town’s slogan and the abolitionist paper The North Star, which Frederick Douglas
published out of Rochester, NY in the late 1840s (Sernett, 2002). However, Malone had a strong
abolitionist presence in the mid-1800s. As for other freedom struggles, in 1870 Malone served as
an outpost for Irish nationalists who attacked the British in Canada during the Fenian raids, most
notably during the Battle of Trout River. Nearby Dannemora, home to Clinton Correctional
Facility, is known statewide as “Little Siberia,” a moniker which has come, in the last twenty
years, to refer to much of the northern 45th State Senate District.
48
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the issue, and against prison expansion in general (Jacobs & Berkowitz, 1983). Voters in
Franklin County rejected the bond issue, as did voters in St. Lawrence County.49 New York State
and the Department of Corrections moved ahead with a reduced expansion plan that was to focus
on converting surplus state property—hospitals, schools—following the model of the federal
prison built at Ray Brook for the 1980 Winter Olympics (Norton, 2015).

Meanwhile, the St. Lawrence Psychiatric Hospital in Ogdensburg, 67 miles west of Malone, was
slated to close, part of the trend toward the deinstitutionalization of mental health facilities across
the country. Ogdensburg, a city in economic decline on the St. Lawrence River, was represented
in the State Senate by H. Douglas Barclay, who was, by the late 1970s, the second highest
ranking Republican in the Republican-controlled State Senate, and next in line for the leadership
position.50 When I spoke to Senator Barclay in 2015, he explained the context of the hospital
closing:
I think you have to look at the upstate area from an economic standpoint. It’s always been
somewhat depressed economically, particularly St. Lawrence County. We had the Seaway,
which did a lot. […] agriculture was important, very important, but it wasn’t as strong in St.
Lawrence County as it could have been […] Then you had, because of the Seaway, ALCAN
in Massena, and GM, which did well, but that was the direct result of an electrical power
situation from the Seaway. […] And Ogdensburg for a long time had the mental hospital, and
it employed a lot of people, but through that transition, where they took up the Swedish
thinking—that mental patients should not be incarcerated and that they should be treated with
drugs. So the importance of that diminished very substantially (Barclay, 2015).

49

H. Douglas Barclay was the State Senator of this district from 1964-1982. He was one of the
guiding forces behind the creation of the Urban Development Corporation, which is the subject
of Chapter 1. He also sponsored the first of the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973. He was
born in 1932. His son is State Assemblyman Will Barclay.
50
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“The Seaway” here refers to the Saint Lawrence Seaway, a massive series of projects undertaken
jointly by the U.S. and Canadian federal governments that opened up the Great Lakes to oceangoing vessels in 1959 with a series of dams, deepened channels, and hydroelectric projects.
Ogdensburg, the only port on the American side of the Seaway, experienced subsequent ship
traffic much like one might experience watching a superhighway from a poorly maintained rest
area that has just one parking space. There was a spike in construction jobs in the 1950s, but the
most lasting economic impact for northern New York came in the form of highly-subsidized
electricity for the ALCOA and GM plants, upriver at Massena. The Seaway had preceded
Barclay’s political career, however, and, as he explained to me at his Syracuse office in 2015,
state legislators are judged by what they have done since the last election. After the closure of the
Diamond International Paper Mill in the 1960s, St. Lawrence Psychiatric was the biggest
employer in the City of Ogdensburg, with a staff of 1,400. This would be a catastrophic loss of
employment for the northern city, and a major political problem for Barclay:
Well, perhaps the most important thing a legislator, a State legislator can do is be
concerned about the economic issues of the district and particularly, jobs. And it was a
red flag when there was a problem with the hospital, and so one would look at what other
possibilities there could be (Barclay, 2015).
Barclay found a solution to this problem in the rising prison population, which in his
understanding, he partially created with his 1973 sponsorship of what became the first round of
the Rockefeller Drug Laws:
I did the Rockefeller drug laws, and at that time everybody was concerned about drugs,
and I remember Malcolm Wilson, who was Lieutenant Governor telling me, he said
“we’ve got to go this direction with the drug laws” which was difficult […] we had
thirteen hearings throughout the state on those, and finally they were passed and signed
into law. Now, they were tough. […] all of this came around about the time, when you
had to look for new jobs, new facilities, state facilities […] Fortunately I was in the
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majority in the Senate, and I had more clout obviously, and so where they could have
been located somewhere else, they weren’t. And we got it there.
Barclay said all of this in 2015, decades after the peak of the prison expansion in the state, after
prisons-as-rural development had become common sense in Northern New York. In the early
1980s, however, the idea of a prison at Ogdensburg was resisted, especially by the workers at the
psychiatric hospital who were worried about the impending layoffs and opposed to the
replacement of a hospital with a correctional facility. Barclay then enlisted the help of Chuck
Kelly, an affable and politically influential editor of the local newspaper, who was to, later on,
simultaneously oversee five daily papers in the North Country.

When Kelly, a lifelong Democrat, retired in 2010, The New York Times called him “the center of
gravity in St. Lawrence County” (Sandburg, 2010). When I spoke with him in the summer of
2015, at his modest working-class clapboard home in Ogdensburg, he told me that he had ben
desperate to do anything to help keep the city from caving in after years of economic decline and
falling real estate prices. Barclay’s suggestion of a prison on the psychiatric hospital grounds had
been presented as the only way to avoid a total disaster. Kelly quieted the opposition among the
hospital workers, and worked out a deal with the hospital and DOCS whereby the hospital would
downsize significantly without closing completely, and DOCS would renovate some of the
hospital buildings in order to create a 300-bed medium security prison facility. Barclay made
sure that the legislature earmarked the necessary funds for Ogdensburg, and the small, mediumsecurity state prison became operational in 1982.
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The Robert Moses of the New York State prison system
Kevin Travis started working as an Associate Commissioner with the New York State
Department of Corrections in 1982. Travis, an Air Force veteran from Swansea, Massachusetts,
had previously worked for Thomas Coughlin, during the period when Coughlin had been
commissioner of the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD).
Travis had been in charge of the construction program for OMRDD, which meant, during the
deinstitutionalization of the later 1970s, that he was responsible for contemporaneously building
new, community-based facilities, and closing larger institutions down in the long wake of the
Willowbrook Consent Decree. When Governor Carey appointed Coughlin as Commissioner of
Corrections in 1979, Coughlin brought Travis in from OMRDD in 1982, putting him in charge of
constructing new facilities for DOCS.

Travis went on to oversee, plan, and organize the construction of thirty-six prisons in New York
State during his tenure, from 1982-1994. He was at the center of the largest prison expansion in
State history, at a moment when New York was one of the nation’s leaders in incarceration rates.
He was responsible for finding sites for new prisons, for liaising with local communities, for
liaising with the Office of General Services, for dealing with contractors, and for buying the land
for the new facilities on behalf of the state. He was extraordinarily successful at building state
prisons and in building consent for prison construction in communities in the rural counties.
Prisons in New York State were often completed ahead of schedule. I spoke with him in 2015 at
his home in suburban Florida, where he had retired at the end of his career in 1994.
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“They called me the Robert Moses of the New York State Prison system,” he told me, laughing
as he took down a plaque that was presented to him at his retirement party. The plaque, wooden
with a metallic outline of New York State, showed the name and location of every prison that he
had been responsible for during his career with DOCS. Travis’s position at DOCS had been
created for him and the moment in which he was working, and was dissolved when he retired.
His job was to massively expand the prison system in New York without creating political
blowback for the governor or DOCS in the process. To these ends, he developed a method of
organizing a community task force around each site under consideration, a task force made of
local leadership often identified through local legislators or the governor, local leadership that he
would in turn form and guide through the process, so that people in and from the communities
themselves would serve as public relations teams for the Department of Corrections. These
methods of community organization evolved quickly in the first three years of his career, and
were shaped at first by the debacle of the Pilgrim State Correctional Facility on Long Island, and
then soon after by the funding of the expansion through the Urban Development Corporation,
which began in 1983.
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Figure 6: Plaque presented to Associate Commissioner Kevin Travis

When Thomas Coughlin brought Kevin Travis into DOCS, from OMRDD, in the last year of
Governor Carey’s tenure, he was under enormous pressure to build something quickly to comply
with a court order to relieve overcrowding. There was also pressure to build something cheaply,
given the defeat of the prison bond issue the previous November. Coughlin and Travis, who had
overseen the vacating of mental health facilities during the deinstitutionalization of the previous
decade, looked as a matter of course to places close to New York City, where most prisoners
were from.
Kevin Travis [KT]: At the time there was severe overcrowding in our system. We had a
backlog. The first project I did for DOCS did not use the community planning task force.
Let me tell you what happened. I was ideal for that program cause I knew all the, most of
the people in the mental hygiene system cause I spent 18 years with them. So the
Commissioner said, "We need some buildings on a mental hygiene campus, probably,
that are vacant, that can handle a thousand inmates, ok?”
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I don't know who I talked to, probably Clyde whatever-his-name-is. I can't remember his
last name. I said, "You guys have any vacant buildings in your system?" He said, "We
got a lot but the thing is Pilgrim State has two five-story tower building that are
complete.... we just vacated them." I said, "OK. I'm going to come down. Who's the
director, who's the regional direction," he said "John ___.” I'd known John for years, so I
called John up. I said, "We're going to come down and look at your tower buildings and
convert them into a prison." I said, "we have to do a thousand beds in 60 days. I was
given 60 days. Or the Governor's going to be held in contempt of federal court," I said,
"so you know, John, you gotta cooperate.” […]
So I flew down with my crew, went through the buildings. The buildings were in decent
shape. They were dirty and needed cleaning up, but with some minor modifications, for
security, they would work for medium security—an open bay type medium security. So, I
came back to Albany, called him up, I said "John, I'm going to use those buildings, but I
need cooperation from you." I said, "there's no food service in those buildings, you're
going to have to provide some food service," he said "well I'm going to need more staff."
You got it. "I'm going to need more vehicles." You got it. "What else don't you have?"
[laughs] He said, "Jesus Christ what's going on?!" I said " The Governor is... it's an
emergency situation, let's get with it!" That's what we did. We built a fence. You know
how many days we built that place? Forty-five days. Instead of sixty. We got it built in
forty-five days.
Jack Norton [JN]: You started by saying that that was the one time you didn't set up a
board [Community Task Force].
KT: We didn't. We didn't have the time. And it would have been a waste of time anyway.
Because as soon as that grass was mowed--the fence was put up in like 48 hours, with
lights and the whole thing. […] They were the cheapest thousand beds corrections ever
put together. But the community went apeshit. I mean, totally apeshit. You could look at
the press clippings back in '82. They went apeshit.
In fact, the ‘panicked’ opposition to the Pilgrim State conversion on Long Island was welldocumented. People living near the site organized a group called Citizens Opposed to Pilgrim
State Prison, and picketed the grounds every Saturday afternoon from when the prison was
opened in July of 1982 until at least December of that year. The opposition to the state prison
centered around fears of what the facility might do to lower nearby property values ("Three
arrested in prison protest," 1982).
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In a 1982 editorial, The New York Times derided the opposition to the prison by residents of
Long Island whose fear of crime and demands for tough sentencing, the paper contended, was
driving the rise in the prison population in the first place.
“The foes of conversion have attracted the support of the anti-prison construction lobby,
which argues that instead of sending 1,000 inmates to Pilgrim State, the state should find
ways to let 1,000 go. That argument at least respects reality. The opposition of the Long
Island communities does not. They seem to want stern anticrime policies without any
sense of the consequences. ("Panic Over Pilgrim State," 1982).
Suffolk County went to court to try and block the transfer of the hospital to DOCS. The state
legislature then passed a bill requiring legislative approval of such transfers of property between
state agencies, a bill which Governor Carey then vetoed. Carey lashed out at Long Island
legislators and residents that summer: “All tough crime fighters, when it’s time to build a prison
or put a prison in, they say, ‘Oh, not in my neighborhood. Lock them up, but not here’”
(Omicinski, 1982). Later that summer, Mario Cuomo ran for governor, and wooing suburban
voters, promised to close the prison at Pilgrim State. After he was elected, he kept his promise
and shut the prison down in 1984.

Politically, the conversion of Pilgrim State psychiatric hospital to a prison had been a disaster,
but it had kept Governor Carey from being held in contempt of court. According to Travis, Mario
Cuomo, in power in 1983 after having used the debacle in Long Island as a campaign
opportunity, then created a policy for DOCS whereby they would only consider building prisons
in communities where someone local had reached out to them through a legislator, as had been
the case with Ogdensburg. For his part, Kevin Travis had learned firsthand about the dangers of
relying too heavily on his bureaucratic contacts within the executive branch. For a talented
bureaucrat like Travis, it made little difference whether he was building prisons or mental health
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facilities, but the costs of overlooking community sensitivities around crime and incarceration
could be great. The beds at the Pilgrim State Correctional Facility may have been the cheapest he
ever built, but they were gone only a few years later, and the infrastructure had to be created or
converted somewhere else, all over again.

When Travis heard that the Cuomo administration was thinking about using the Urban
Development Corporation to finance prison expansion, he was pleased. The scheme, however
convoluted, would provide the DOCS construction program with a funding stream. Travis and
his colleagues at the Division of Budget looked over the original 1968 UDC legislation,
attempting to anticipate the challenges they knew they were sure to face from opponents of
prisons across the state and from Ned Reagan, the Republican State Comptroller.51 One area
where they saw a vulnerability was in the way in which the UDC required community input into
what in the late 1960s and early 1970s were low-income housing projects and mixed commercial
and residential developments. The UDC had been chartered in 1968, and while it had never been
particularly committed to community organizing, it was created in the context of the War on
Poverty and as a vehicle with which Rockefeller might launch a successful bid for the White
House. The bureaucrats in New York’s executive branch were fearful, in 1983, that their use of
the corporation for prison expansion might be nixed in the courts. Travis, however, sensed an
opportunity to remedy the mistakes he had made at Pilgrim State while building DOCS policy
around the strengths of community involvement that he had observed in Ogdensburg. Travis

New York State has a split executive—the Attorney General and State Comptroller are elected
separately from the Governor. Ned Reagan was opposed to the use of the UDC to fund prison
construction on the grounds that the scheme was a way to circumvent the New York State
constitution.
51
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helped draft legislation to enable the UDC to finance prison construction, and he included a
program of community organization. As he explained to me in 2015:
They [Division of the Budget] said, "There's a specific requirement in the UDC—
enabling legislation that requires them to have, in any project, to have community input,
throughout, up to, and including construction and dedication.” So what I did was put in a
piece called a CPTF. It's called a Community Planning Task Force. And that's the
meeting that I was doing all over. And what the requirement was, was that monthly, I had
to meet with each community that was either entertaining or was in the process of having
a prison built, which I did.
Travis was not just providing legal cover for the use of the UDC, he was building a community
organization strategy that would prevent another situation like the one at Pilgrim State. To do
this, he would need to travel to each town in which DOCS was considering building a prison,
monthly, from the moment that DOCS received a suggestion from a state legislator, to dedication
of the facility. He was going to move around quite a bit.
One of the things… I remember, Coughlin, when I wrote it he said, "How the hell are you
going to do this?" I said "Well, I'm going to spend a lot of time on the road, and I don't
want you to challenge how I travel." […] So I called up Richmore Aviation down in
Hudson, and told them down there, I said "Look, I'm with the State of New York, I'm
going to be doing a lot of these flights, I have to fly at a rate—with my staff people—that
is equal to or better to the same seats on a commercial flight.” And they did it! [gave the
rate]. Every time.
Kevin Travis, imagining a prison expansion program unfettered by the need for funding through
appropriation, also used the chartered flights as a way to maintain discipline in the organization
he was building within DOCS. Having failed to adequately control the public relations battle in
Long Island, and looking north to small towns like Ogdensburg, Travis looked to control
interactions between his staff and local media and community members:
Now there was a method to my madness behind this, let me tell you what my strategy
was. The one thing I recognized with the level of people I was dealing with—and they
were professionals, professional architects and professional engineers—was that they all
liked to booze it up a little bit and have a good time, OK? Now the worst thing that could
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happen in a community where you're building a prison, is to have an ambivalent
population there that says "Well maybe… maybe not..." and then you go in, you have a
meeting, you tell 'em you're going to do ‘this, this and this.’ Your staff stay overnight, in
a motel, goes to a bar, drinks, and says something different than what you said at the
meeting. Kiss of death. It gets around town. You know, Washington County. I mean,
Kiss. Of. Death. Didn't happen. You fly in, have the meeting, have medical people,
security people, operations people, maintenance people, make a presentation, back on the
flight, out. Back to Albany. Nobody hangs around. Ever. I did that for twelve years.
Never left anybody sitting around. 52
DOCS employed this method to locate every prison built from 1983 onward. Kevin Travis spent
those years flying around the state in a small Gulfstream plane, attending monthly meetings in
over 30 towns across the state, often travelling 4 days a week. In 1994, after Mario Cuomo lost
the governorship to George Pataki, Travis retired to Florida, and tried not to think about prisons,
or meetings, or politics. When I asked him if there were any towns that stayed with him after he
left his job, places that he missed, places that stood out in his memory. He replied:
Malone, I think, especially. Dick LaVigne and his intense attention to what was going on.
Malone was special. It was. You know, when we did Bare Hill I said, "Oh boy, that's
great, you guys..." And then he came back for a second one. I said, "You guys are nuts."
The agrarian myth lives in the North Country.

The glow on the edge of town
The New York State Department of Corrections bus comes into Malone from the east, usually
after a long stretch north on Interstate 87. This is how I first drove into town in 2012. I took a left
turn at Plattsburgh, and then drove up along the northeastern edge of the Adirondack Mountains
before heading due west as the land flattened out on a plateau overlooking the southern expanse

Washington County is a rural county, where I grew up, where Travis built Washington
Correctional Facility in the mid-1980s. Travis knew that I had grown up in Washington County
and was appealing to the fact that I would understand how small-town gossip might work in such
a situation.
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of the St. Lawrence River Valley. Route 11 is Malone’s Main Street, and as it dips into the
village from the east—past the Stewart’s gas station, the center of any Upstate town north of
Albany—it’s clear that many of the wooden Victorian houses have been abandoned. Towards the
center of the village, a large, dilapidated five-story building with a colonnaded façade is covered
in peeling paint and plywood. This, I later learned, is the burned-out remainder of the Flannigan
Hotel, once the social center of the Village.

Nearly every commercial building along the main and adjoining streets of Malone is empty;
many are boarded up. The Salmon River, a small trout stream, flows through the center of the
village. There is a strip of motels, chain drug stores, a Super Wal-Mart, and fast food joints along
Rt. 11. I checked into the Econolodge, one of the first buildings as I went up the hill out of the
village, and was directed to a rickety wooden annex that had once been a restaurant. The sun had
set by the time I left and drove a quarter mile down the road and turned into the Wal-Mart
parking lot. I smelled manure in the humid summer air as I opened the truck door. I looked out
opposite the parking lot, across the corn fields, across a large cow barn, and saw the water towers
in the glow of the prison lights, where thousands of human beings were being caged in the three
prisons on Bare Hill Road at the northwestern edge of town.

The Malone Prison Task Force
“There were three of us. We were the Three Pied Pipers” - Dick LaVigne, 2014
In 1983, Bare Hill Road was a scrubby, rocky area where local people in the know came to pick
blueberries in the late summer. Franklin County, like the rest of Northern New York, was
experiencing some of the highest unemployment rates in the state, and people were leaving to
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find work. Malone’s decline mirrored the economic decline in upstate New York more generally,
but its position at the northern-most edge made it particularly remote in the years following the
closing of the sawmills and iron mines in the 1960s and 1970s. Malone had once been a
crossroads, but the railroad tracks that had connected the town to Ogdensburg and the St.
Lawrence to the West, to Montreal to the North, and to the iron mines and Plattsburgh to the
east, had been ripped off of the ground and scrapped in the late 1950s (Buchanan, 2013).
Interstate 87, connecting Albany to Montreal, had been built 50 miles to the east, and the idea of
a “rooftop” superhighway in the place of route 11 still remains but a dream (Sommerstein, 2014).
As markets for capital and commodities were being forced open around the world, Malone was
drifting further away.

As the seat of an agricultural and timber county, at a former railroad crossing, the town of
Malone had functioned as a small center of commerce. Dick LaVigne, a young man whose
family had owned land in Malone for generations, had stayed in the area and was attempting to
make his fortune as a motel owner, restauranteur, and local impresario. He ran a club and
restaurant at Moira, a nearby hamlet, and had built a motel—with a restaurant annex—outside of
village on route 11, which he ran as an Econolodge franchise. Dick had been on the 1980 U.S.
bobsled team at the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid. A motel owner, he had also been the
Olympics Accommodation Control Corporation, which organized and set prices on lodging
during the games. In Lake Placid, he got to know his State Senator, Ron Stafford, who was also
the chair of the Olympic Organizing Committee ("LaVigne elected president of hospital
association," 1989; Lavigne, 2014a, 2014b).
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As a business and land owner in Malone, LaVigne was concerned about the outmigration from
Malone, and the declining real estate market. He was aware that the federal government had
converted the Ray Brook Sanitarium into a prison, and had watched the State of New York
convert part of the psychiatric hospital into a prison at Ogdensburg. Malone is also close enough
to Dannemora, the site of the largest prison in the state, that a couple of people in town—in the
absence of other work— made the long commute to Clinton Correctional Facility every day
(Maneeley, 2013).

Dick LaVigne knew that New York was going to need to build more prisons, especially if
Cuomo kept his promise to shut down Pilgrim State. He saw a possible future for Malone, and
spoke to his friend, Tony Barber, who had grown up in Dannemora with Ron Stafford and who
was the recruiter for the National Guard in Northern New York. They discussed their idea for a
Malone prison with Molly McKee, the owner of an insurance company in the village and the
President of the Malone Chamber of Commerce. They brought her on board with the idea, and
contacted State Senator Ron Stafford. I spoke to LaVigne in the summer of 2014, in an office
very close to Bare Hill Road.

According to LaVigne, the town was “going downhill fast.” He and his two associates, leaders of
the local petit bourgeoisie, met under the auspices of the Malone Chamber of Commerce, to
think through the problem of population loss in Malone:
We were talking one day, the three of us, and we were saying “what are we going to do to
keep people in this community?” The gal was in the insurance business. The other guy
was in the [Army] Reserves, he was the local commander of the Reserve Center. And, so
he’s having trouble recruiting because people are leaving town, you know? And I was in
a number of businesses, motel and restaurant business, so I mean, I was pro-wanting-toget-something-in-this-town as well, so I guess we can say it was all selfishly done to an
125

extent. But, by and large we’re thinking about our community, we all grew up here, we
all wanted to make this place stay alive because otherwise it’s going downhill fast
(LaVigne, 2014b).
They scheduled a meeting with their state senator, Ron Stafford. He explained that Stafford was
incredulous at first:
So, we went to see Ron Stafford who at that time was our Senator, and who had a soft
spot in his heart for prisons because his dad was in the prison system for years. So, when
we went into his office in Plattsburgh, he thought we were totally nuts, he said ‘no one is
ever looking for prisons, they look to drive them out, because they never want them in
their communities.’ I said, ‘I don’t think that would happen in our community.’ I said,
‘The unemployment situation is terrible, all of our kids are leaving, they can’t find work
unless they’re going to be a gas station attendant or something, there’s just nothing that
makes any economic sense for them…’ (LaVigne, 2014b)
Stafford, who at that point in his career was a senior Republican senator, and who had spent
nearly 20 years working with his mentor and best friend, H. Douglas Barclay, relayed
information from the meeting to the executive branch, most likely DOCS, in Albany. Thomas
Coughlin ordered Kevin Travis to fly up to Malone. Travis told LaVigne, Barber, and McKee
that they would need to form a Community Planning Task Force, and that they, the three friends,
could serve as the nucleus of the group. He advised them to bring local media and elected
officials—the mayor, the town supervisor—on board. Travis would continue to fly to Malone
once a month to meet with the formalized CPTF, named the “Malone Prison Task Force.” He
directed them to announce their intentions to seek a prison in the media, and he helped them to
organize a public forum in town, which Stafford and DOCS staff would attend.

Dick LaVigne announced the formation of the Malone Prison Task Force, and its intention of
seeking a prison for the area, in 1983 in the Malone Evening Telegram. The Task Force held a
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well-attended public forum in the Malone Central School auditorium that year. Ron Stafford was
there, and Kevin Travis came with his staff to answer questions and allay fears and
misconception (LaVigne, 2014b; McKee, 2014; Travis, 2015). Travis, at the time, claimed that a
correctional facility would not only provide jobs, but would have a local economic multiplier
effect of 4, meaning that for every dollar that flowed into Malone for prison construction and
subsequent wages, four dollars would be generated in the local economy. This is how LaVigne,
in 2014, remembered the forum:
And we didn’t know what the hell to expect, I mean what was the reaction of the people
going to be? And at that time I was wearing two hats because I was also president of the
hospital board, and of course all the medical staff was totally opposed to it. “You’re
going to bring AIDS to town, you’re going to do this, you’re going to do that’ and all
these other things. Well those guys were making big bucks, they didn’t give a damn,
You, know? For the little guy. Well anyway, I was on their list for a while. But, what
happened at that meeting was that the medical staff sat right in the front row, and the first
ones when, I was the emcee, and I had different superintendents here from various area
prisons, and had the Senator here, had different people here, uh, to say ‘hey, this isn’t
bad.’ I had the mayors, the town supervisors from those communities all say ‘hey, it’s a
clean business, it’s great, blah blah blah.’ So we tried to stack the deck in that way, ok?
The Task Force, under the guidance of Travis and Stafford, had ensured the participation and
support of local officials and of the people in the area who already worked for the Department of
Corrections. There was some paltry and scattered resistance to the idea of a prison in Malone,
mostly stemming from fear of escapees and fear of AIDS. The objections that arose during the
community meeting came from people who worked at the Alice Hyde Memorial Hospital.
Privately, LaVigne and Travis dismissed these concerns as small-town racism and ignorance, as
well as resistance to change from people whose futures were relatively secure within the context
of the ongoing decline of Malone. Publically, Travis had his staff of experts patiently explain
that neither escapees nor AIDS posed a threat to communities hosting correctional facilities. At
some point in the meeting, prison guards in the audience began to speak in support for a large
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prison in Malone. While LaVigne insists to this day that he did not foresee this, it is difficult to
believe that the guards’ presence at the meeting was unorganized. Travis, when I interviewed
him, maintained that having guards from local communities come back and participate at these
public fora was integral to the success of local support and prison siting in upstate New York.
This is how LaVigne remembered the events, thirty years later:
And then lo and behold, and this was not at all staged, but we had mics set up in the
auditorium so that people could walk up to the mic and ask a question, and all of a
sudden we started getting a parade of young guys saying, ‘we want to come home. I’m in
the prison system now, I’m in Sing Sing, I’m in’ wherever it may happen to be, ‘and I
want to come home, I want to raise my family here, I don’t want to have to leave this
community, I’m born and brought up here. Please, please do something’.’ You know?
And there had to be twenty of those guys in a row, and I’m going ‘holy shit’, I didn’t
even know that they were going to be there but thank God they were (LaVigne, 2014b)
LaVigne, reading the momentum in the room, asked for a voice vote, and received support in the
room for a prison in Malone. The Malone Telegram, whose editor and columnists had been
brought onto the pro-prison side early in the process, ran glowing reports of the widespread
desire for prisons in Malone.

The Malone Prison Task force, on the advice of Kevin Travis, then organized a sustained
campaign to pressure the governor and legislature to allocate UDC funds for a prison in Malone.
Much of this work—tables set up with petitions at the grocery store, letter-writing campaigns,
letters from local businesses, and town and county resolutions—was organized by Molly McKee.

Speaking to me in 2014, McKee emphasized the importance of local media support for the
prison:
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We persevered. We had letter writing. We wrote. We sent over eleven, twelve hundred
letters to our elected officials. We actually had the newspaper and the radio behind us.
The Malone Telegram: At the time the publisher was Joyce Taverney, and the radio
station was Mike Tackley. And they both supported us wholeheartedly (McKee, 2014).
Molly McKee was not in any way predisposed towards prisons as a development strategy. She
was, however, the president of the Malone Chamber of Commerce, and she worked in an
organized way for her community, which is to say that she worked for her class (acting as a
class). She made it clear, however, that their capacity to act was both made possible and
circumscribed by the state, and that prisons were the only institution on offer:
Would we have rather had a college, a university? Yeah. But that’s not going to happen
here. We’re very fortunate we have North Country [Community College], they’re trying
to get bigger, and it would be nice to be a college town, but I guess we’re a prison town
(McKee, 2014).
The petit bourgeoisie—small business owners, small government officials—played the central
role in this prison quest as it was organized locally. In contrast to an actual bourgeoisie, whose
power derives from ownership of the means of production (and who would presumably have
access to higher levels of the state), or the regional working class, whose political power derives
from its numbers and level of organization, the petit bourgeoisie in northern New York derived
its power from access and personal connection to the state at the local level. In this sense, the
Malone Prison Task Force was composed of intellectual leadership that acted organically in the
interest of their class faction, while attempting to resolve a crisis of social reproduction
experienced as deindustrialization, outmigration, and the deterioration of the built infrastructure
around them (abandonment of houses, businesses, and land).
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Ron Stafford, a State Senator, represented the highest level of political power accessible to these
intellectuals of this rural petite and medium bourgeoisie, and the role that he played in
facilitating Malone’s quest for a prison tells us more about how consent around white
supremacist and law-and-order policies are built into the landscape than it does about the socalled benefits of such policies for impoverished rural areas. As one interviewee in the nearby
iron mining town of Lyon Mountain (a company-town-turned-small-prison-town) told me:
“After the mines left, the state became the only employer here, and Ron Stafford became the new
jobs agent” (interview with WL).

Malone is on the move
The campaign for a prison in Malone intensified in 1984, continuing into 1985. The proponents
of a Malone prison were dismayed when Governor Mario Cuomo did not include plans to build
in the area in his 1984 budget. Ron Stafford, however, reassured his constituents that he would
make sure the prison was added to the budget during negotiations later that spring. In an
interview with the Ottaway News Service in the first days of 1984, Cuomo indicated his
willingness to engage in ‘horse trading’ with the Republicans over the matter of where new
prisons might be located, but was concerned about the distance of Malone from New York City,
and the difficulties that that would create for family members who would want to visit their
incarcerated loved ones. However, he added:
What I’ve told (Corrections Commissioner) Coughlin is that whenever we get a
community that indicated it has an interest in a facility, that’s gold. And that’s unusual.
Very few things are completely prohibitive. If the (legislative leaders) put it in, how
much do they want it?53
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Wessling, Mary. “Cuomo Looks Askance at Malone Prison.” [undated newspaper
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While it is not clear how much Ron Stafford wanted a prison in Malone, it is evident that he had
few other viable issues to deliver on in the context of increasing layoffs and outmigration from
the North Country. Stafford, a high-ranking Republican, and in the majority, undoubtedly was in
a position to leverage the governor during the budget negotiations. There were, however, no new
prisons planned for the budget of 1984. What is also notable in the aforementioned quote is that
Governor Cuomo found it unusual, as late as 1984, for a community to want a prison. In the
years following the Malone campaign, communities from across Upstate New York would be
lobbying the governor and the legislature for prison construction.

In the wake of statements that Cuomo made to various media outlets in the North Country about
a possible Malone prison, the Mayor of Malone wrote a letter to the Governor, outlining the
support for a facility in the town:
It seems as though there is a misunderstanding here, because over year ago [sic] a panel
was selected to find out if there were any objections to placing a prison in Malone at our
local high school. A real large crowd attended and a very few voices were heard
objecting to locating a prison in Malone. In fact it was about 95% of that crowd were in
favor of it. I understand this was not so in Watertown or in Ogdensburg.54
So we went from there, asking the State to locate the prisons in Malone, because it would
anchor your chain of prisons that come from Watertown, Ogdensburg, (Malone), Lyon
Mountain, Dannemora, Altona, N.Y. Sure we are interested in the benefits financially,
but this isn’t the only reason it would benefit the State more because it’s a perfect place
for it.55
clipping]. Cuomo Central Subject and Correspondence Files, 1983-1994, New York State
Archives (Series 13628, Box 28, Folder “Correctional Institutions, Construction, General,
1/1/1985—6/30/1985”), New York State Cultural Education Center, Albany, NY.
54
Ogdensburg and Watertown are both towns in Northern New York where prisons were built in
the years preceding the construction of Franklin CF at Malone. In Ogdensburg, a prison was built
in a section of the St. Lawrence Psychiatric Hospital. In Watertown, where Thomas Coughlin
(DOCS Commissioner) was from, a prison was built on the grounds of the shuttered Air Force
base.
55
Auger, James A. (1984, January 4). [Letter to Mario Cuomo].
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The Mayor of Malone articulated a regional, geopolitical vision for the carceral system in New
York. He took umbrage at the Governor’s suggestion that the leaders of Malone would be so
provincial or narrow-minded as to see no good in the prison, external from the economic benefit
that a facility might bring their town. He envisioned a facility in Malone as a component part in a
carceral system, a system that had already transformed, and would continue to remake, northern
New York. It is interesting that the Mayor of Malone attempted to appeal to Cuomo-as-prisonbuilder at this point in time, and also that he refers to the community support in Malone’s for a
prison as being qualitatively different than what was the case for neighboring cities where
prisons had been built in the immediately preceding years. The carceral arc that was being
constructed along the St. Lawrence River and New York State’s border with Quebec is referred
to “your chain of prisons,” and Malone was to be the keystone in this arch. Indeed, within the
New York State prison system today, the facilities in Malone are often referred to as “up top.”

Auger’s explanation of Malone’s then-proposed place in the expanded carceral state makes very
little sense outside of metaphor. It is an essentially aesthetic and abstracted vision of
infrastructural development and geopolitics that relies on a peculiar way of looking at the map of
New York State. Auguer’s vision was of a carceral archipelago that would ring the northern edge
of the Adirondack Park. Auger is also responding to Cuomo’s publicly stated reluctance to build
a prison in Malone, so far from New York City, the distance between the two places very visible

Cuomo Central Subject and Correspondence Files, 1983-1994, New York State Archives
(Series 13628, Box 28, Folder “Correctional Institutions, Construction, General,
1/1/1985—6/30/1985”), New York State Cultural Education Center, Albany, NY.
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on a map of the state. Malone, the Mayor argues, makes sense in the context of the expanding
carceral state. A prison in Malone would tie the infrastructure of the state together, and would fill
in a glaring blank space on the carceral map.

After the budget negotiations of 1985, after a year and a half of letter writing campaigns and
meetings with Kevin Travis and Department of Corrections staff in Franklin County, the state
legislature announced that a new prison would be built in Malone, funded by bonds sold through
the Urban Development Corporation. On April 4th, Ron Stafford’s aid told the The Malone
Telegram that the state would begin constructing a prison in Malone in July, with the costs
ranging anywhere from $25 million to $30 million. The prison (named Franklin Correctional
Facility, or FCF) was expected to have an annual budget of $10 million, which, according to the
Franklin County Industrial Development Agency Board, echoing Travis’s earlier assertions,
would have a multiplier effect of 4, or would “generate $40 million in ‘turnover’” (Boyer,
1985e). The Malone Chamber of Commerce held a reception in Senator Ronald Stafford’s honor
in early April of 1985, to celebrate Stafford’s role in “keeping alive in Albany” for the preceding
two years the idea of a prison in Malone ("Reception for Stafford," 1985).

In the summer and fall of 1985, The Malone Evening Telegram ran at least one prison-related
story almost every single day. This continued for years, through the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Every aspect of the construction was covered, from the bidding and subcontracting, to the type of
coating used on Bare Hill road to allow the heavy machinery to travel to the site, to the types of
inmates that the new facility would be required to accept (Boyer, 1985b, 1985d; Clayton, 1985,
1986c; Durr, 1989; "Inmates for Malone prison arriving here on Aug. 22," 1986). In September
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of 1985, the Malone Prison Task Force, along with the Malone Town Supervisor and DOCS
Assistant Commissioner Kevin Travis, toured the Ogdensburg Prison that had been built in 1982.
The minutiae of the visit—what was said, what was eaten, the programming available in the
facility—were covered by the Telegram (Boyer, 1985a).

After the announcement that the Malone area would get a prison, there were still four sites under
consideration, and one of them was in Chateaugay, the adjacent town to the east of Malone. Two
of the sites were along Rt. 11, at Bare Hill road, where the two prisons ended up being built in
the subsequent years. One of the sites under consideration was on “Whitten Road,” just north of
the Village proper and within view of some of the village residences in Malone. Another of the
sites was just outside of the Village of Chateaugay (Boyer, 1985f). News of the possibility of the
Whitten Road site provoked about 120 residents of Malone to deliver a petition to state officials
in Albany, protesting the site’s proximity to the Village and the future traffic that the residents
imagined that the construction might bring. People living near the site complained that the prison
would bring their property values down, and wrote that they had not been properly informed of
the site as a potential location for the prison in Malone.

The leaders of the prison Task Force responded immediately, downplaying the concerns of those
who signed the petition, while reminding Malone residents of the widespread support that the
prison idea had had in the town over the preceding two years. The Malone Evening Telegram,
true to their position as organ of the pro-prison petit bourgeoisie, published responses from
LaVigne and McKee. “I can’t see it (Whitten Road) affecting anybody else,” wrote LaVigne,
“it’s not highly revealed” and would be “out of sight, which is what we want.” LaVigne went on
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to remind the readers of The Telegram of the results of the 1983 poll, conducted by the paper that
showed overwhelming support for a state prison in Malone. McKee countered that “A lot more
people in the area did not sign the petition than those who did,” and that a prison on Whitten
Road, “would not stop [her] from buying a home [she] wanted in the area” (Boyer, 1985f).

The most forceful argument for silencing the Witten Road site protesters, however, was the
Telegram’s headline, “New Prison Could Be Located in Chateaugay,” which they ran above the
article explaining the petition—an article which included the rebuttals from the prison task force.
That same day, the Town and Village Boards of Malone sent another resolution to Albany,
emphasizing that they wanted a prison not only in Northern Franklin County, but “within our
community,” by which they meant within the Town boundary of Malone and not in Chateaugay,
a mere 12 miles away (Boyer, 1985c).

Chateaugay is very close to Malone. It is the neighboring town. From the point of view of those
working in the prison system, many of whom were already driving substantial distances and
moving around the state as part of the normal arc of a career in corrections, the distance between
Malone and Chateaugay would not have been all that meaningful; a matter of ten minutes in one
direction or the other. For the interests represented by the prison task force, however, it was very
important that the prison not just be in Northern Franklin County, but that it be constructed
within the boundaries of their town. Some of this had to do, undoubtedly, with the aesthetic
understanding of the prison and its role in developing the place of Malone. For the landowners,
business owners, and local insurance interests on the task force, however, it was important that
the prison link to the town’s infrastructure in order to lower costs associated with property
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ownership and to increase real estate value. The language of the Town Board’s resolution
reflected these interests:
The potential income to the village in the form of sewer rents will substantially relieve a
tax burden to village property owners. The construction of homes in the village and the
town, as a result of 400 new jobs, plus the influx of new students to our declining school
population, can only act to justify our position of 100 percent support for this project
(Boyer, 1985c).

When I interviewed Molly McKee nearly thirty years later, she told me that the task force was
walking a fine line between not wanting a prison to be too central or visible, while insisting that
it be in Malone. “We wanted out of sight out of mind, but we wanted it in the Town of Malone,”
she said, and emphasized to DOCS that they needed a place that was out of the village, more on
the edge of the town than in the village proper. “We didn’t want to be Dannemora,” she said.
Dannemora, where Clinton Correctional Facility is located, is the quintessential prison town in
the state where the main street abuts the high wall of the prison. Tony Barber, one the founding
Malone Prison Task Force members, grew up in Dannemora, as did Ron Stafford, and as did
John Egan, the head of the Office of General Services in the 1980s. McKee, the president of the
Malone Chamber of Commerce, wanted to make sure that the new facility would be associated
with Malone, but that Malone wouldn’t be defined by the prison. She wanted “out of sight, out of
mind,” and while she was willing to vouch for the Whitten Road site if it meant the difference
between a prison in Malone or a prison in Chateaugay, she preferred the Bare Hill Road location
out on the western edge of the town.

That summer, Kevin Travis took some of his staff, at the request of the Task Force, to look at
Bare Hill Road:
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We took a look at their site. It was beautiful, sandy.... the only problem was, it was full of
blueberries. And we were there, and the blueberries were out, and my guys said, "Look at
all these blueberries!" And the mayor said, "Oh shit. This is where all the people come to
pick blueberries." I said, “Look. You gotta handle that. I can't handle blueberries. You
handle the blueberries, I'll build the jail (Travis, 2015).

Movement, mobility, location
The aesthetic explanations of a Malone prison’s place in the State also continued to shape local
and popular understandings of incarceration, and the use of extended and mixed metaphors to
explain what a prison would do for the community was often articulated in terms of mobility. For
example, the new prison was going “start the economy of Franklin County on the move
forward,” as John Johnson, the county manager, gratefully told Governor Cuomo’s office after
the April announcement of the Malone prison’s inclusion in the budget.56 After the official
announcement of the prison’s coming, The Malone Telegraph ran an editorial about the
prospects for the town, which proclaimed that “Malone is on the move (Boyer, 1986b; "Malone
farm sold; may be new shopping center" 1989).

For Malone’s property-owning classes, the prison was meant to be a way to take some control
over the town’s shifting relative location in the context of deindustrialization and economic
downturn. David Harvey, in his exquisite essay “Space as a Key Word,” (Harvey, 2006b) gives
us a scheme through which to better understand and approach questions of location and
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Johnson, John W. (1985, April 12). [Letter to Mario Cuomo].
Cuomo Central Subject and Correspondence Files, 1983-1994, New York State Archives
(Series 13628, Box 28, Folder “Correctional Institutions, Construction, General,
1/1/1985—6/30/1985”), New York State Cultural Education Center, Albany, NY.
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geography in the context of capitalist development and underdevelopment. Absolute location,
which has a correspondence in Marx’s concept of use value, is the location on the earth, as might
be expressed on a Cartesian grid. In this sense, Malone’s absolute location could be expressed as
44 degrees, 50 minutes, and 56 seconds North; 74 degrees, 17 minutes, and 29 seconds West. For
someone living, working, or incarcerated in Malone, their absolute location would be the ground
they are standing on, the bed they are sleeping on, the floor and bars of a prison cell. Like use
value in Marx’s schema, absolute location is the place of consumption, of daily life, of social
reproduction at the individual and local scale. Also, like use value in Marx’s schema, absolute
location cannot be reduced to itself (Harvey, 2006b).

Relative location, which in Harvey’s schema corresponds to exchange value, can only be
expressed in relation to other places. In this sense, Malone’s relative location might be expressed
in terms of the distance to New York City from Malone, or the time it might take to travel to
Ogdensburg from Malone by car. These distances express a relationship in space and time, and
the time that it would take to travel from Malone to New York City, or from Malone to Montreal.
Relative location is historically specific, changing over time due to advances in transportation as
well as shifting investment in state transportation infrastructures, not to mention the imposition
of the international boundary in the case of Malone and Montreal. Malone’s location in global
and regional economies is also relative, and shifting. Where once certain commodities or
information might have been available, or unattainable as the case might be, in Franklin County,
now they might be nowhere to be found (in the wake of deindustrialization and as department
stores shut down), whereas other things might be available in Malone at the Walmart or through
the post office via the internet.
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Just as with a commodity there can be no use value without exchange value (for a commodity to
be socially useful it will be able to be expressed in terms of other commodities), there is no
absolute location without relative location, and vice versa. Absolute location is experienced in
daily life, but its expression is always in relation to somewhere else. This is the case even with
longitude and latitude (north or south of the equator, east or west of the prime meridian).
Absolute location does not exist without relative location, nor can relative location be completely
separate from absolute location. Malone’s place in the geography of automobile manufacturing
in 1980—as a bedroom community for workers commuting to Massena—was both absolute and
relative. As the relative location of Northern New York shifted vis-à-vis patterns of production—
the factories left or shut down—the absolute location of Malone (the way it existed on a grid,
what was there, the use value and material experience of the place) changed. Malone was created
in a certain moment and has always existed in relation to other places. Capitalist social relations
created Malone, and while Malone’s absolute location has remained the same, it’s absolute
location doesn’t actually make sense on its own, and its relative location has changed with
changing patterns of consumption and production as capitalist social relations have been
reproduced and reiterated.

The third space in Harvey’s typology is relational space, which corresponds to value in Marx’s
chapter on commodities in Capital (Marx, 1990 [1867]). Relational place has to do with how a
place is experienced, thought of, and explained. As a concept, it cannot exist without either
absolute or relative place, and is in dialectical relation to both of these. How, sitting here in front
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of my computer, typing, do I imagine Malone? How did the Malone Chamber of Commerce
understand their village in the summer of 1984? How did steady loss of manufacturing jobs in
Malone—which shifted Malone’s relative place in the geography of the regional and world
economy, as well as the absolute place itself, as buildings were shut down and/or abandoned—
change the way Malone was understood by the Malone Prison Task Force? Or by wage earners
in nearby towns? These are all questions of relational place.

As Malone’s relative place was shifting in the wake of changes in global capitalism, various
class factions attempted to organize and intervene. Malone’s local petit bourgeoisie was, perhaps
the most successful, as they aligned themselves with the ascendant carceral bureaucracy in the
State of New York. This class faction also had Ronald Stafford as their representative at the State
level, a representative who had grown up in and around the carceral bureaucracy of the state, and
who was well positioned to enhance the Task Force’s efforts to bring prisons to Malone. The
members of the Malone Prison Task Force, as they explained to me thirty years later, were trying
to navigate the town’s place in the shifting winds of global capitalism. They were trying to keep
Malone ‘on the map,’ and to allow for the social reproduction of the community. Young people
were leaving, as was capital. This was the crisis that they were responding to. In order to
maintain Malone in absolute space, they needed to organize proactively around Malone’s
shifting relative location. This involved a new relational understanding of Malone as a place
where prisons might be located, a process that recreated Malone as an absolute, relative, and
relational place. In an absolute sense, Bare Hill Road is now paved, and lined with enormous
prison complexes surrounded by razor wire. In a relative sense, Malone’s place in the state has
changed as it has become a central and northern node in a carceral archipelago that stretches up
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the Hudson and along the St. Lawrence Rivers, just as the Mayor of the Village had envisioned
in 1984. Malone became a prison town.

The struggle to have the state build a prison in Malone was expressed and understood in terms of
mobility as well as location. This points to how we might understand the function of the new
prisons in this time and place of capitalist development. The assertion that “Malone is on the
Move” reflects an understanding of development as progressive and teological: Malone is
moving forward along a track. The campaign to get a prison built in Malone involved a framing
of state prison construction as development. What does development mean in this case? New
York’s prison boom—the build-up of the carceral state and fixing of surplus population,
infrastructure (revalorization of investment in land), state capacity—addressed a crisis of
reproduction for capitalist social relations, in a way that attended to crises of social reproduction
as experienced differently in different regions and groups of people within the boundaries of the
state. This ‘fix’ involved an active differentiation of people and places in order to solve one
localized crisis of reproduction through the accentuation and intensification of another. In other
words, it was mostly urban Black New York that was differentiated from the rural, white areas of
the state through the relation of the prison. The result was a wealth transfer among poor people
within the state that helped create the conditions for the more significant transfer of wealth from
the working classes to the bourgeoisie (nationally) during this period of economic and social
transformation.

For the class factions represented by the Malone Prison Task force, state investment in carceral
infrastructure equaled increased mobility, both for capital and for them personally. For home
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owners, increased or steadied property values would mean the ability to sell, and to move. For
prison guards from Malone, the new prison would mean the ability to move home, and to buy
and sell land. For small business owners and developers like Dick LaVigne, the prison would
mean that Malone would be connected to flows of capital and commodities—more in-stream
after decades of capitalist course-shifting away from the area.

Mobility in Malone was understood as the ability to leave, to come back, to choose where to live,
to have enough money (social power) to change class and physical location. For Malone to be
“on the move” meant that the town was attracting development, that is to say that the town was
getting the infrastructure to allow it to stay in the shifting stream of capitalist social relations, or
to at least move closer towards the receding bank of the stream.

As Marx explained in the Grundrisse, the state invests in public infrastructure, such as roads, in
order to allow for the circulation of commodities, labor, and hence value (Marx, 1993). Statebuilt, state-finance, or state-organized infrastructure is created, as David Harvey explains,
expanding on Marx’s argument in Limits to Capital, in order that capital can overcome
geographical limits to its reproduction, which is to say its growth (Harvey, 2007 [1982]). Harvey
goes on to explain that capitalist development requires a spatial fix, which in turn creates
material limits that must be overcome in successive rounds of destruction and investment.

For example, the Erie Canal, which was created in 1812 and funded by bonds issued by the State
of New York, was a project meant to overcome the geographical limits to the expansion of
capitalist social relations. The limits, of course, were the Appalachian Mountains, and the
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opening of the Great Lakes region, via Lake Erie and the Buffalo to the West, and Troy and Lake
Champlain to the North, provided the necessary infrastructure for the industrialization of upstate
New York. This investment in public infrastructure also directed flows of commodities, and
capital, to New York City, at the mouth of the Hudson River, thereby solidifying the dominance
of New York as the primary city of the United States and as as a center of finance and industry
on the Eastern Seaboard (McGreevy, 2009). The Erie Canal, financed by the State of New York,
changed the geography of New York State and New York City, in absolute, relative, and
relational terms.

As both Marx and Harvey show, this sort of infrastructural investment is state-led, which is to
say public, because it would not be rational for any one member or small faction of the
bourgeoisie to outlay capital for such a project whose benefits would be generalized. The state
acts on behalf of capital, but the relationship is not one to one. Rather, bourgeoise interests vie
for control of the state in order to use it to carry out their class interests, in a process that is
fought over and contested. In other words, capital needs state organization, but the way that this
plays out is political, the result of class struggle. Different classes or factions within classes vie
for control of the state, and struggle over how the state will be used to advance their interests.

Capital requires infrastructure in order to reproduce itself and expand, and those needs change in
a process that is always contested, and through competition between different factions of the
bourgeoisie whether intra- or international. The requirements for this infrastructure, which is to
say the definition of the limits to capital, are also geographical, or material. To continue with the
example of the Erie Canal and New York State; the Erie Canal was to some extent eclipsed or
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made partially obsolete by creation of the railroads (made possible through financial capital’s
capture of the state and the state’s use of eminent domain). At the same time, the physical
properties of commodities still determine, to some extent, energy use in their transport, and so
barge transport continued for weightier commodities and bulk shipment much as it does today. In
other words, as public (federal) investment in interstate highways took some of the railroad
traffic away in the 1950s, shipments still continued along the Erie Canal. The Canal, which was
financed through New York State and supported by a regional bourgeoisie in competition with
other regional factions (such as those in Philadelphia) as well as other national or imperial
bourgeoisies (such as those of Canada or Britain), continued to define, to some extent, upstate
New York’s place in the world.

When the St. Lawrence Seaway was completed in 1959 as a joint U.S.-Canadian project, the
Great Lakes were opened for the first time to ocean-going vessels, the Erie Canal was rendered
more or less obsolete. Upstate New York’s location relative to the industrial and agricultural
Midwest, and to the financial and industrial center of New York City, shifted dramatically. No
longer in the center of flows of capital and commodities between Western North American and
the Eastern Seaboard and Western Europe, Upstate New York was now on the periphery. The
Seaway was made possible by cooperation among the Canadian and the U.S. national and
regional bourgeoisies, along with the federal and state governments from the respective
countries. At a regional level, in New York, the St. Lawrence Seaway Power Corporation was
chartered to provide cheap hydroelectricity to major national industries which promised to
relocate to northern New York, in Massena (Alexander, 2009; Chevrier, 1959; Parham, 2009).
This is how Alcoa and GM came to have (highly subsidized) plants in Northern New York.
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These costs of these subsidies were externalized and borne disproportionately by the Mohawk
who live at Kahnawake, across the river from Montreal, and at Akwesasne, just downriver from
Massena. These Mohawk communities lost riverfront, access to fish and wildlife and to
traditional means of reproduction and livelihood. At Akwesasne, flooding and industrialization
led to high rates of mercury poisoning and concentrations of other heavy metals in the water and
bodies of the community (Alfred, 1995; Hauptman, 1986; Phillips, 2000; Simpson, 2003). The
subsidies were also borne by the people of the United States and Canada, from whom the
subsidies were drawn, and for whom the project was justified in terms of, depending on the scale
or region; jobs, development, strategic interest vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Infrastructural development then—capital fixed into the landscape—is necessary to overcome
limits to the reproduction of capitalist social relations (the circulation and accumulation of
capital, the reproduction of socially necessary labor). It is a spatial fix, as Harvey points out, in
that it provides a ‘place’ for surplus capital, thereby spatially resolving a tendency towards overaccumulation; but it also allows for the overcoming of limits to the circulation, reproduction and
growth of capital through investment in the built landscape. These investments in land then
become limits to growth in successive capitalist development, much as the Erie Canal and the
industrial buildings and urban patterns around the canal have lost value with their new relative
location, and now serve as impediments to the accumulation of capital through possible
exploitation of labor or land in these same (absolute) places.
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Ruth Wilson Gilmore has shown how the prison build up in California in the 1990s served as just
such a fix; what Gilmore calls “the prison fix,” a massive state-led infrastructural project that
fixed, or resolved, crises of surplus land surplus labor, surplus finance capital, and surplus state
capacity (Gilmore, 2007). The surplus labor—unemployed workers, defined by racialization and
criminalization, by automation and shifting global patterns of trade and production—were caged
in the newly built prisons, or circulated through the cages and marked for premature death as
criminal and unemployable. The surplus land—devalued farmland in which the state,
representing the class interests of capitalist farmers, had invested significant capital in the form
of irrigation infrastructure and other land improvements—was sold to the state by big
landowners for prison construction. Finance capital, unable to profit from lending to new
industry or to large state-led infrastructural projects, found a place to go in the bonds sold for
prison construction.

New York, as we have seen, proceeded along a similar route. In the context of ongoing
deindustrialization, and in the wake of the 1975 fiscal crisis, prisons served a spatial fix. Surplus
labor, mostly young Black and brown men, was sacrificed—made unemployable, caged, killed—
through criminalization, as the target of a metastasizing criminal justice system (KohlerHausmann, 2010; Mauer, 2006; Morrell, 2012b). Large banks could safely buy municipal bonds
in New York again, this time for prison expansion and for real estate development, backed by the
State Legislature and its taxing abilities (Barbanel, 1983a; Norton, 2015; Siener, 2012). Surplus
infrastructure—buildings and land, tuberculosis sanitaria, that had served past regimes of
exploitation and accumulation but which had been abandoned—were revalorized by the State
through conversion to prisons (Barclay, 2015; Norton, 2015; Travis, 2015). And the state, whose
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ability to sell debt and to act in order to manage social reproduction had been curtailed in the
wake of the 1975 fiscal crisis, could move ahead with the massive infrastructural program of
prison construction outside of many of the former democratic controls (Brilliant, 1975; Coughlin
III, 1980). This is the prison fix thesis that Gilmore wrote about for the case of California in the
1990s. The concept works very well for understanding New York State’s prison expansion
program of the last four decades.

In this way, the expansion of carceral infrastructure in New York State over the last four decades
can be understood as a state-led fix to crisis in the reproduction of capitalist social relations; to
crises of social reproduction at different scales, and in different regions of the state. And it is this
way that we might understand Malone’s obsession with mobility and its connection to prisons.
Prisons may not seem to be very similar to canals or roads, but as social infrastructure, they serve
a similar purpose for capital, namely, to resolve crisis of the reproduction of capitalist social
relations in different moments and places in capitalist development, and to serve as spatial
resolutions to capitalist crises.

Roads and canals increase the mobility of labor and commodities; they are a fix created to
overcome limits to the circulation of capital. Prisons, on the other hand, immobilize labor (and
thereby sacrifice it, take it out of circulation) and in doing so both discipline labor outside of
prison to accept conditions of increasing exploitability, and help to overcome limits to the
circulation and reproduction of capital imposed by previous material landscapes of political and
industrial development. In other words, as New York City, Buffalo, and the Erie Canal corridor
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deindustrialized, the immobilizing function of carceral infrastructure became a central part of a
state strategy to dampen wages and shift to a service economy.

Many scholars and journalists have detailed the ways in which the prison boom in the United
States during the 1980s and 1990s was fueled by increasing arrest and conviction rates of people
of color in poor urban areas that were being abandoned by the state and capital as a central part
of the shift to a neoliberal economic regime (Kohler-Hausmann, 2010; Parenti, 1999; Perkinson,
2010; Prashad, 2003). Still others have pointed to the fact that much of this prison boom was
located in rural counties, and have shown that by locking people up in rural areas far from their
homes, that the state (whether federal or state) orchestrated wealth transfers between urban
ghettos and poor rural areas, in the context of decreases in social spending in rural and urban
areas alike (Eason, 2017; Gilmore, 2007; Huling, 2002; Morrell, 2012b). Prisons in New York
State—built by DOCS and financed by the Urban Development Corporation—were an
infrastructural resolution to crises of social reproduction in the city and the countryside that
reworked the relationship between these areas.

Social Reproduction
Social reproduction is a term that “encompasses the daily and long-term reproduction of the
means of production, the labor power to make them work, and the social relations that hold them
in place” (Katz, 2009)696. Social reproduction is the reproduction of social relations—whatever
the dominant mode of production--at different geographical and temporal scales. Under
capitalism, social reproduction then refers to the production and reproduction of the capitalist
and laboring classes as such, the means and arenas of capital recirculation, and the physical and
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discursive conditions to maintain the production and reproduction process. It is both the
reproduction of capitalist social relations as a whole, as well as the sphere of everyday life that
appears outside of--yet is fundamental to--the relationship between waged labor and capital.
Social reproduction entails the production and reproduction of a differentiated labor force and
the cultural forms and practices that maintain and rationalize these differences across space and
sector. These differences may be understood as sectoral, or related to skill, education, and
training, but they produce and also mobilize difference associated with gender, race, sexuality,
and nation. These productions of difference reproduce inequalities that enable and enhance
capital accumulation, racial capitalism, and patriarchy among other means of uneven
development (Mitchell, Marston, & Katz, 2003).

Social reproduction is at once the ‘fleshy, messy diffuse stuff of everyday life’ and the
“structured material social practices that unfold in dialectical relation to production, which take
place across geographic and temporal scales encompassing daily and generational relations and
practices from the intimate to the global scale” (Katz, 2009). Its form and content, as much as the
means of its provision, are forged through struggle, making social reproduction a contradictory
realm of both the continuation of capitalist social relations and the possibility of their
transformation. Geographers have been attentive to geographical variations in what constitutes
social reproduction, and marked the environment as part of the means of production and thus
have recognized environmental care and rehabilitation as part of social reproduction. Production
and social reproduction are historically as well as geographically contingent. What is required of
a labor force—and what is considered socially necessary labor—varies by time and place.
Likewise, the work of social reproduction, the work required to reproduce the labor force on a
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daily, monthly, yearly, and generational basis, varies depending on material social relations in a
given historical and geographical context. What may be required of a worker in New York City
will differ from what is required for the daily reproduction of a worker in rural India. The cost of
living will differ, the clothes she is expected to wear will be different, the education necessary to
secure waged employment will vary, and so on. What is considered necessary for the production
of any given labor force is a social and political economic question, and changes with and
alongside the shifting ground of capitalist social relations in any given time and place. This
dialectical relationship between reproduction and production is determined through both intraand inter class struggle, and encompasses such things as education, health care, child-care, and
so-called benefits packages, or what is conceived of more broadly as the social wage (Norton &
Katz, 2017).

Globalized capitalist production brings geographically disparate labor pools in competition with
each other, exerting a homogenizing influence on the conditions of production and social
reproduction. Through the expansion of capitalist social relations and the loosening of barriers to
investment and trade, foundry workers in Ohio are put into competition with workers in Gujarat.
Commodities whose consumption is central to the production of socially necessary labor (the
definition of which continues to converge across space) become more and more available at
geographically disparate places. Yet even as ever widening networks of capitalist production and
consumption bring people and places together, capitalist accumulation is predicated on uneven
development and labor differentiation. Social reproduction under capitalism necessarily entails
the reproduction of inequality through constructions of difference around race, gender, class,
sexuality, and location. In the context of such a crisis of social reproduction in Malone—
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unemployment was rising, property values falling, young people leaving—the local petitbourgeoisie worked with the state, and finance capital (via the UDC) in order to reproduce their
town, as a prison town.

Prison announced for Malone
During the budget negotiations in the spring of 1985, the people of Malone learned that they
would get a prison. That summer, the New York State legislature gave the final approval, voting
105-26, to approve a bill authorizing the construction of two 500-bed maximum security
facilities in upstate New York. One of the prisons would be built in Ulster County, at Wallkill.57
The other was to be built in Franklin County, in Malone. There was almost no opposition in the
legislature, save for that from the Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, who debated for two and a
half hours, and “made it clear that they didn’t want to see any more money spent to build
prisons.” Larry Seabrook, at that time a young Assemblyman representing the Bronx, voiced his
opposition to spending money on the new prisons: “When there’s no housing, no economic
development… Then there’s crime” ("Final OK for Malone prison," 1985).58

Shawangunk Correctional Facility was operational in Ulster County by 1986, near the existing
Wallkill Correctional Facility.
58
Larry Seabrook served in the New York State Assembly from 1985 to 1996, and then later
represented District 12 on the New York City Council. Seabrook defeated incumbent Vincent
Marchiselli for the seat. Marschelli, a Democrat, later went on to run for Congress. He crossed
party lines to support Rudolf Giuliani’s bid for Mayor in 1989, and again in 1993. During his
time in the State Assembly, Seabrook created the Drug Trader Arrests and Conviction Program
(DTAC), which, according to Seabrook’s campaign literature in 2005,” resulted in over one
thousand drug-related arrests.” In 2012, Seabrook was convicted of money laundering, removed
from the City Council, and sentenced to five years in prison.
57
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Malone, however, was looking forward to a future of economic development in the form of
construction money and jobs. Construction costs for the new prison were estimated by DOCS,
that spring, at somewhere between 25 and 30 million dollars. $500,000 of that would come from
the capital construction fund in the state budget, and the rest would be raised by the Urban
Development Corporation through the sale of 30-year bonds, a sale of which was approved by
the state legislature in the months following the announcement. A member of the Franklin
County Industrial Board repeated the claim that the multiplier effect for prison construction
would be four.59

Malone community leaders—small business owners and property owners—expected the $10
million annual operations budget for the prison to generate upwards of $40 million dollars a year
in the local economy (Boyer, 1985e). Malone Town Supervisor, Bernard Burns, emphasized
what a huge project this would be in such a small community: “’Our total assessed value is only
$18 million,’ Burns said. ‘Compare that with the construction dollars [$25-$30 million] and you
can see what a major project this is for Malone’” ("Top Malone leaders have rosy outlook,"
1985). “We’re ecstatic,” Dick Lavigne said, the day after the announcement, “it shows what a
grass roots effort can do” (Boyer, 1985e).

In 2014, When I asked Dick LaVigne, who had been a restauranteur and motel owner at the time,
whether local Malone business experienced a significant economic uptick during the prison

The winning bids for construction for the Franklin Correctional Facility were as follows:
Armani Plumbing and Mechanical of Syracuse for heating ($3.68 million) and plumbing ($1.12
million); Matco of Johnson City for electrical ($4.96 million); and Cowper Construction of
Buffalo for general construction ($19.38 million). Much of that work was then subcontracted out
(Boyer, 1985d).
59
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construction period, he told me besides increased sales for fast food chains, that there was little
discernable economic effect:
It wasn’t that big a boom. I didn’t really feel it. A lot of it [the construction] was done
from Plattsburgh, you know, and guys did a lot of commuting back and forth so I didn’t
really feel it that much. But some people did. And all the restaurants of course. Pizza Hut
made their millions there, cause that’s what these guys would do all the time. They
weren’t going out for fine dining every night, they were in McDonalds, you know, and
the rest of it.
As the prison opened, North Country Community College [in Malone] and the Malone Central
Schools began presenting workshops to students about the workings of the prison system in New
York State. The schools partnered with the Department of Civil Service, the Malone Chamber of
Commerce, and with DOCS. Joseph Murphy, the director of the Bureau of Personnel for the state
Department of Correctional Services, and the featured speaker at one of the workshops, told
students from five local high schools that prisons in New York State represent a real “growth
industry” (Clayton, 1985).

1986: Becoming a Prison Town
The Franklin County Correctional facility was completed in 1986. In terms of political
organization however, Malone had become a prison town before the first postholes were dug.
The Malone Prison Task Force, under the guidance of Kevin Travis and DOCS, continued to
promote prison development as a common sense solution to the economic and social decline that
Malone and Northern New York was experiencing during Reagan’s presidency.

Nineteen eighty-six was a big year for the pro-prison factions of Malone. On June 14th, the
Malone Chamber of Commerce helped to organize a “Welcome to Malone” event, held for
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potential prison staff who might want to move to Malone to work at the new correctional facility.
The chamber, working with local real estate agents, hoped that the new prison would attract
buyers to the declining Malone housing market, and the welcome committee for the event, made
up of the chamber, the task force, and real estate interests (often the same people), sent out
invitations to potential home buyers—prison guards who might want to relocate to Malone to
work in the new facility. It is unclear how the committee acquired the addresses, but since both
Tony Barber and Molly McKee (still the president of the Chamber of Commerce) were involved,
we can surmise that the committee would have received the contact information from the
Department of Correctional Services, facilitated by their frequent contact with Kevin Travis and
Thomas Coughlin’s offices (Egner, 1986b). The full-day event was held at the Malone Junior
High School, and included talks about area schools, social services, and real estate financing.
Area motel owners offered accommodation discounts to guards travelling in from other parts of
the state ("Malone welcome planned for potential staff" 1986).

The Department of Corrections opened the administrative offices of Franklin CF on July 21,
1986. The first prisoners were transferred into the new prison on August 15th. The Community
Planning Task Force was given a tour of the facility that same week. Kevin Travis came to
Malone for the tour, as did journalists from The Malone Evening Telegram. Travis told the
Telegram that “the prison, when construction is completed, will have cost $35 million. The last
major public-building construction project in Malone, the building of Franklin Academy 16
years ago, was completed for under $2 million.” As Task Force member Thomas Burton walked
through the new prison and looked at the “elaborate containment measures […] he was moved to
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recall his experiences in World War II, guarding enemy soldiers in a prisoner of war camp”
(Clayton, 1986b).

The prisoners that went on to fill Franklin CF were casualties of a different kind of war, and
were to come mostly from New York City, as well as deindustrializing cities such as Buffalo and
Rochester. Earlier that summer, the State University of New York’s Rockefeller Institute
released a report wherein they found that the State needed to find alternative to incarceration or
else the prison population was going to increase by another 13,000 people by the turn of the
millennium. The state prison population was at 37,000 people at the time of the report’s release,
in 1986. It would turn out that the report’s estimate, while seemingly alarmist at the time, was off
by more than 22,000, as the state prison population went on to peak at over 72,000 prisoners, in
1999 (DOCCS Fact Sheet, 2017).

The Rockefeller Institute’s 1986 Study, reported on in the Northern New York media market,
found that the state had been imprisoning more people just as the crime rate had been falling,
dropping by more than 19 percent from 1981 to 1985. The study also asserted that “much of the
growth in the state’s prison population [was] due to mandatory imprisonment policies” that had
been put in place in recent years as part of legislation meant to get tough on crime.60 Nationally,
prison populations in state and federal correctional facilities had risen 40.6 percent between 1980
and 1984, while in New York, “the prison population rose 52 percent in the same period” (Egner,
1986a). Those who advocated for prisons in Malone did not see their community as the cause of

The study did not explicitly blame the Rockefeller Drug Laws for the rise in the prison
population, but rather, the mandatory minimums that had been enacted across the board for most
crimes in New York State.
60
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these trends. For the most part, they rather correctly considered these trends at the state-level to
be driven by urban arrests, and urban courts, mostly in New York City. Those who sought
prisons in Malone, and later across the North Country, were, in their version, just trying to see
which way the wind was blowing in terms of state spending on development. They read the news
reports about crime and rising prison populations, they saw that urban and suburban places were
rejecting prisons, and they saw an opportunity. As Hugh Hill, the President of the Malone
Chamber of Commerce at the time of my research, told me in 2015:
Remember, the people who were incarcerated, the vast majority of them come from the
justice system and culture of New York City and those environs. So the incarcerated
population is not the product of North Country culture, it’s the product of urban culture.
And you know, the sophisticated and urban populations of the southern part of the state.
They’re the ones who produced it, not us. It wasn’t our juries, it wasn’t our judges, it was
theirs.
It might make them feel better to think that a bunch of redneck Northern New Yorkers
are trying to imprison people unfairly just so they can have jobs, but that’s not how it
works; it’s not the reality. […] Having lived in both ends of the State, I understand that
logic. And it’s more comfortable, as a resident of urban or suburban New York, to think
that, you know, “We’re very progressive in our attitudes about crime and punishment.”
The fact is that that’s not true at all (Hill, 2014).

Hugh Hill was voicing a sentiment and interpretation that I heard many times in Northern New
York during the course of this research. His version, to my mind is one of the more succinctly
and compellingly articulated. Franklin County, of which Malone is the seat, had rejected the
1981 prison bond issue. The common sense around crime was that it was an urban problem,
caused by ‘an urban environment.’

This environmentally deterministic common sense around crime and criminality also influenced
the way in which community leaders and corrections officers privately justified their opposition
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to prison closures in 2013-15. I was told repeatedly that prisons in northern New York offered a
‘clean environment’ for people who had grown up in ‘urban environments,’ environments
infested, as it was implied, by crime. This Progressive view of urban decay and rural renewal
reveals threads of interpretation that run from earlier understandings of contagion and disease.
Community leaders would tell me of how the North Country had people in the North Country
‘had a history of caring for people,’ referencing the tuberculosis sanatoria that had dotted the
mountainous landscape at the turn of the last century. That many of these sanatoria had been
converted to state prisons, according to this view, seemed natural. Urban environments caused
people to be sick, and they were sent to the North Country to get well, away from the corrupting
and degenerative neighborhoods of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. While there are many
contradictions, this is a common sense that merges almost seamlessly with Progressive
understandings of racial hierarchy and biological determinacy, and allows for a common
language between race liberals and racist conservatives around prison development in northern
New York.

This environmental discourse includes another, contradictory, understanding of prison expansion
as having been caused by racist fears of crime in urban and suburban areas downstate. Hugh Hill
articulates an understanding of ‘that (urban) environment’ as one where the political dynamics
led to the creation of mandatory sentencing laws and prison expansion to resolve social and
economic problems. Prison expansion, in other words, was not chosen by Upstate communities,
but by urban and suburban communities around New York City who did not themselves want
prisons in the proximity of their property holdings or daily routines. Upstate communities had
looked to hold onto the status quo, through the importation of corrections jobs in the context of a
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political and economic situation not of their own making. Franklin County had voted against the
bond issue for prison expansion in 1981. Two years later, in the context of an ongoing economic
decline, the leadership of the petit bourgeoisie in the county saw that New York State was
determined to build new prisons in spite of the failure of that referendum, and that downstate
communities, such as was the case with Pilgrim State on Long Island, were opposed to having
those prisons in their backyards. With nothing else on offer from the State, they seized what they
perceived as a golden opportunity.

Franklin Correctional Facility opened on Bare Hill Road on August 22, 1986, while work on the
155-acre site was ongoing. The first thirty prisoners to be caged at Franklin were shipped by bus
from the Fishkill Correctional Facility in Ulster County. U.S. Representative Stanley Lundine,
who was at the time a Democratic candidate for Lieutenant Governor, was given a tour of the
facility that morning as part of a campaign stop.

After nearly three years of continuous propagandizing and organizing to get the state to build a
facility in Malone, local political and business leaders were closer to Ron Stafford than they had
ever been, and were on a first name basis with the top Department of Corrections staff, including
the commissioner. Local media had been reporting favorably on prison expansion and on the
minutiae of the carceral system for years, at that point. Kevin Travis had helped the Malone
Prison Task force into a formidable local growth machine; focused on carceral development,
aligned with Ron Stafford. Members of the Office of General Services and the Department of
Corrections made frequent trips from Albany to Malone in order to plan and execute the
construction, as well as to attend the monthly Prison Task Force meetings and liaise with the
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leadership that they (DOCS) had identified and propped up in the community. It was in this
context that the leaders of the Task Force began to immediately lobby for a second facility.

Three decades later, Dick LaVigne tells the story as if the process had taken place over the
course of one evening, after the completion of the first prison in Malone:
Yeah, it must have been about that time [when the first prison was being constructed].
And we got it done. The guys from OGS were up here all the time. Terrific bunch of
guys. And they thought that they were in Utopia because they were in a community that
wanted them. Everywhere they went they were heroes. You know: ‘it’s amazing.’
So when it [Franklin CF] was completed we went out to my restaurant, and we were
having dinner, you know, some of the people that were the movers and shakers of trying
to get this in. We were all sitting there, probably about twenty of us. Kevin Travis, who
was the assistant commissioner at the time […] He leans over to me and he says, ‘hey
Dick,’ he said. ‘I can’t even thank you enough for the experience we’ve had here,’ he
said. ‘It’s been terrific. I want to reward you.’ I said ‘oh yeah, how you gonna do that?’
He said, ‘I got another prison for you if you want it.’ I said, ‘You gotta be kidding me.’
He said, ‘nope.’ He said, ‘If you want it you got it. It’s yours. Everybody in the office
feels the same way. You were so good to us that we want to do it again.’ So I said ‘Give
me a minute.’
So I got my two compatriots and we went into the bar and […] I said, to them, I said,
“We got any balls or what? You think we can get away with doing this again?” And they
said “Let’s go for it. Shit. Right now everybody thinks we’re great, so, why not try it?”
So I said, “Alright.” And I went back out, and I put my hand out and I said, “You got a
deal.” And about two months after that the second one started. So that’s how we got
going.
When I asked Kevin Travis about these events, in September of 2015, he laughed and
assured me that it was LaVigne, McKee, and Barber who had approached him to build a
second prison, and not the other way around:
JN: His [LaVigne’s] version of the story is that they got Bare Hill [sic--Franklin CF], and
then you and he and Molly McKee and Tony Barber, you all went out for dinner at his
restaurant--that club place--and that you approached him and said it was possible to have
a second place.
KT: No, he asked me! [laughs] He asked me, "Can we get a second jail!" I mean, why
would I offer it, we had never done a second one. He asked me, "Can we get another
prison here?" I said, "You'll never know until you ask. So, ask.”
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Whichever the case, what it is clear is that the local petit bourgeois leadership of Malone,
organized into the Malone Prison Task Force, was on very friendly terms with DOCS and OGS
by the time the first prison was being completed in 1986. The members of the Task Force had
also strengthened their relationships with their legislators—Stafford in the Senate and Ortloff in
the assembly—and had firmed up their position as the leadership of Malone; “the movers and
shakers,” as LaVigne referred to himself and his colleagues.61 As the construction of the Franklin
Correctional Facility proceeded, local elites in Malone used their experience from the previous
three years in order to lobby for a second prison. Malone was transitioning; from a small town
adrift and in decline, it was becoming a prison town.

In early September of 1986, the Malone Chamber of Commerce voted unanimously to “support
all efforts that might result in a second state prison being built in the Malone area.” Molly
McKee indicated that private discussions had taken place with members of state agencies. In
other words, the “three pied pipers” had talked about the possibility of another prison with Kevin
Travis, and had decided to move ahead with a second campaign. McKee stressed that the parts

Chris Ortloff, a Republican, was elected to the New York State assembly in February of 1986
to fill the vacancy caused by the election of Andrew Ryan as District Attorney of Clinton
County. He was reelected many times and remained in the assembly until 2006. He was then
appointed to the New York State Board of Parole by Governor George Pataki, in Pataki’s last
year in that office. He was sentenced in 2008 to over 12 years in federal prison for online
enticement of minors (Blain, 2008). Molly McKee, member of the Malone Prison Task Force,
identified Ortloff as a figure who was very amenable and helpful to the campaign to bring a
second and third prison to Malone. Ortloff was born and grew up in Lake Placid, New York, and
began his career as a news anchor and journalist in the North County. He served as the Chief of
Ceremonies and Awards for the Lake Placid Olympic Organizing Committee for the 1980
Winter Olympics in Lake Placid. In 1985, Ortloff was picked over a competitor to run for the
assembly seat on the Republican ticket (in an overwhelmingly Republican district), a decision
that was widely understood to have been made by Senator Ronald Stafford (Bergin, 1985).
61
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for a second prison were already in place: “The current water tower is oversized, and expansion
was contemplated when it was built, according to McKee. The state has also purchased enough
adjacent land to the Bare Hill facility to accommodate another prison, McKee and other prison
supporters feel” (Boyer, 1986a). “The first prison took three years of planning before state
approval was received, according to McKee.”

Mario Cuomo arrived by helicopter in Malone on September 18, 1986 and was greeted by high
school bands from Malone and Chateaugay. He toured the newly opened Franklin Correctional
Facility with Peter Lacey, the superintendent, Senator Ron Stafford, and other officials. LaVigne,
Barber, and McKee were there to greet Cuomo at the airport. The crowd in Malone included
farmers who were holding banners protesting low milk prices. Stafford talked to the press about
the possibility of Malone getting a second prison: “The state has a history of putting a second
facility next to an existing one,” the Senator said, “They [the task force] did the job before, I’d
say they’re in as strong a position as before, if not stronger.” (Clayton, 1986f).

September 23, 1986: The Malone Town Board gives its unanimous support to the Malone
Chamber of Commerce’s proposal, made by Molly McKee at a board meeting, to formally ask
the state for a second prison. (Carter, 1986)

On September 25, 1986, Dick Lavigne made a formal proposal for a second prison in Malone, to
Kevin Travis at a community task force meeting. The proposal was written on Malone Chamber
of Commerce stationary. Travis told everyone that New York was all caught up on prison
building for the moment, but would keep Malone in mind. Lavigne asked: “Now that crack has
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entered society, would you feel that the odds are quite heavy in favor of stiffer penalties; would
you expect that the Legislature would want to add a lot more beds?” Travis answered: “I have
seen a trend in that direction, but it’s entirely up to the state Legislature.” (Clayton, 1986g)

The Telegram reported the arrival of the prisons as the end of a nearly three-year, successful
adventure that had begun when Dick LaVigne announced his, Tony Barber, and Molly McKee’s
intention of seeking a prison in Malone. The Telegram reported that Senator Stafford then “took
up the fight;” and that the facility had been approved as part of a legislative package at the end of
June, 1985. The future of the town, however, remained to be seen. That summer, many residents
and businesses had hung signs in their front windows, welcoming “Franklin Correctional Facility
Staff and Families,” but it was unclear if the new workers were going to guide Malone towards
the future or merely bail enough water to keep it afloat. […] “Adding to area employment,” the
Telegram reporter opined, was originally believed to be one of the boons of the new prison but
many residents are now hoping it will help maintain the status quo” (McKinstry, 1986).

The first superintendent hired for Franklin CF was Peter Lacy, of Dannemora. The three new
deputy superintendents were also from the North Country: Warren Barkley of Canton, Carol
Leary of Chateaugay, and Armond Trudo of Altona (Clayton, 1986e). There were a total of 389
staff positions at the new prison, and the annual budget was $14.5 million, of which $12.2
million was in salaries. New York State was creating a density of police and correctional
employment in the northern part of the state, as the power of organized labor and small
agriculture was fading.
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Figure 7: Clipping from the Malone Evening Telegram, April 1985

The diminishing power of labor and agriculture
The workers at the Tru-Stitch boot plant in Malone, voted to authorize a strike in the spring of
1986. There were divergent views about this vote among the rank and file. Many workers were
angry at the company’s failure to offer an acceptable contract, and wanted to walk out
immediately. Others were fearful that their increased demands and their militant posture would
prompt the company to relocate out of the area. One union member voiced her concerns, which
were quoted in the local paper, saying “What’s stopping the company from closing the plants?
They do that, and we’re all done” (Clayton, 1986j).
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It was reasonable fear. In 1986, Northern New York had experienced an almost continuous loss
of industrial, mining, and forestry jobs since the 1960s. In fact, a few months after this Tru-Stich
meeting, in 1986, the nearby ALCOA plant in Massena—commuting distance from Malone, laid
off 325 workers. That same August, the General Motors foundry in Massena announced that they
would be shutting down most operations, phasing out 1,100 employees over the next two years
(Clayton, 1986d). The strike at Tru-Stitch was averted that year, after prolonged negotiations,
and the workers accepted a new contract, voting 441 to 225 in favor (Clayton, 1986h). After the
strike vote in 1986, the spokesman of United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1, the union
local representing the workers at Tru-Stitch, announced that the proletariat of Northern New
York had demonstrated their influence in Franklin County. “This shows Tru-Stitch now where
the true power really lies,” he said, “It lies with the workers” (Clayton, 1986i).

Worker power in Malone, however, continued to diminish in the 1980s, in the context of
increasing consumer debt, relaxed controls on capital flows, and consolidation of agriculture and
industry. In the years following the averted strike, Tru-Stitch went on to reduce operations in
Franklin County, moving machinery overseas until finally pulling out of the North Country
completely in 2000. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1 is no longer a force to be
reckoned with in Northern New York. Unlike NYSCOBPA, United Food and Commercial
Workers is not running any political ads on television, nor are they influencing local elections.

General Motors announced, in August of 1986, that they were shutting most of their operations
down in Massena. 1,100 workers would be “phased out” over the next two years, leaving a
workforce of 100 at the Central Foundry on the St. Lawrence River. The Telegram reported that
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300 hundred of those who would be affected were from Malone and nearby Franklin County
communities. Local 460 of the United Auto Workers would be no more. New York State
officials made a show of being incensed, but lacking powers to nationalize or penalize the
industry, could do very little. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan pointed out that GM had been
using subsidized hydroelectricity from the St. Lawrence Seaway (sold to them at below market
rates by the New York Power Authority) since the 1950s: “For more than a generation, the
people of New York have given General Motors a precious resource… now GM walks away
with its profits, leaving the North Country behind and the state looking as if it were conned.”
Vincent Tese, Mario Cuomo’s economic advisor and the head of the Urban Development
Corporation was more upfront about his surprise at the situation, revealing the State of New
York’s weakness vis-à-vis big capital. “Quite frankly,” he said, “I’m absolutely shocked that they
did this without even checking with us” (Clayton, 1986d).

As Malone was transitioning into a prison town, the power of workers who were not guards or
police or border agents continued to decline. The petit bourgeoisie of Malone—property owners,
small business owners, formal intellectuals of local media—sided with bourgeoisie financial
interests and guards in order to prioritize prison development in Malone at the expense of
working and poor people in other parts of the state, and also at the cost of silence about the
declining power of labor in Northern New York itself At the same time, since the power of the
petit-bourgeoisie in Malone was based largely in their connections with the State of New York,
through their local representatives, corrections, which was one of the only parts of the state
whose power and capacity was growing during this time, was a way for the petit-bourgeoisie to
advance their class interests in this context.
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In the aftermath of the New York City fiscal crisis, the State of New York had been leveraged to
prioritize the interests of real estate and finance capital. As labor’s position vis-à-vis capital was
weakened during this time, this was reflected in the state’s increasing inability to act in the
interests of the working classes in the different regions of New York. Instead, as the state was
both disciplined by fiscal austerity and captured by real estate and finance interests, state
capacity was turned towards the development of carceral infrastructure, which was used in New
York to both discipline labor through the violence and threatened violence of incarceration and
premature death, and to reward regional petit-bourgeoisies while expanding the ranks of police
and prison guards. The state is not a unified entity. Rather, it is the expression of political power
that it fought over and contested by different class and regional factions. Labor in Northern New
York was weakening. Capital was abandoning the North Country, real wages were in decline,
and the material basis for labor’s organizations was being systematically eroded. The ranks of
the industrial working class in Malone, and of Upstate New York more generally, were
diminishing. As mills and mines closed, some of the workers in Northern New York left,
following what was left of the jobs. For example, a few of the workers from the iron mines were
relocated to Buffalo by Republic Steel. Still other workers moved, or retired early.

Young people were leaving the area in search of work. As the prison system expanded across the
rural counties of the state, DOCS absorbed some of this now-surplus work force and provided
few but much better-paying jobs than in what other sectors of the service economy remained in
the area. As cities across the state were losing industrial jobs, communities of color were being
arrested and imprisoned at higher and higher rates. As Jordan Camp (2017) points out, prisons
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served as a revanchist solution for increasing militancy among a generation of Black and Puerto
Rican workers who had, in the past two generations, moved into urban areas across the country,
many of them migrating out of agrarian economies structured by semi-feudal racist regimes of
Jim Crow.

In order to understand the massive ‘surplus population’ of Black and Puerto Rican workers in
New York City during the decades of deindustrialization in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, we might
look at the construction and maintenance of racial categories of that time in relation to the
agrarian question. New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse, like many industrial cities
in the Northern and Western United States, had experienced in-migrations of Black agricultural
workers from the semi-feudal Jim Crow South in the wake of agricultural mechanization and
crisis. New York City had also experienced a massive in-migration of Puerto Rican workers,
many of them recently ‘surplused’ in the wake of Operation Bootstrap, which prompted the
industrialization of Puerto Rico and the collapse of the sugar plantations (and their intensive
labor systems) on the island (Ayala, 1996). To follow Camp’s thesis then, the prison provided a
bourgeoise revanchist resolution to a crisis of militancy among the sectors of the working class
who had been recently forced out of the countryside by crises in agriculture, consolidation,
and/or shifts in global agricultural production.62

Camp (2017) argues that increased state investments in policing and prisons, rise of
‘mass incarceration’, was a bourgeois strategy to discipline increasingly militant working-class
movements. These movements, most importantly what Camp refers to as “the Long Civil Rights
movement were fighting for, at the minimum, access to the investments in social reproduction
that had been made in white working class communities during the Cold War, as well as for a
more visionary and anti-capitalist second reconstruction (Camp, 2017). Camp, relying heavily on
Stuart Hall’s reading of Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1986b, 1988a) argues that the building up
of the carceral state, at various scales, was part of a bourgeois strategy of remaking societal
common sense in order to undermine and undo the gains that Black workers had made in
62

167

In the 1980s, small farms across the country were experiencing the worst crisis since the Great
Depression, squeezed by rising debt load and skyrocketing interest rates. Malone, the county seat
of one of the dairy farming regions of Upstate New York, was no exception. In 1985, Governor
Mario Cuomo commissioned a report on the state of agriculture in New York State. Of particular
interest to Upstate New York were the statistics on the dairy industry ("Economy owes much to
dairying," 1985). New York at that time was the third largest dairy producer in the nation, behind
Wisconsin and California, and had 8.5 percent of the nation’s milk cows in 1983, up from 7.1
percent in 1960. Rates of production in the dairy industry in 1983 were still slightly higher than
the national average, but the advantage that the state’s dairy farmers had enjoyed in output per
cow in 1960 had narrowed considerably by 1983.63 During this same period, dairy farms in New
York had declined at about the same rate as the rest of the country, and New York experienced a
34 percent decline in the number of dairy farms in the thirteen years between 1970 and 1983. In
other words, New York State dairy farms, which had been slightly more capitalized and quick to
adopt new technology in the 1950s and 60s, were continuing to consolidate, as more and more
farmers were leaving the industry voluntarily or going out of business.

increasing the social wage across a racially divided working class. Camp focuses much of his
analysis on how this common sense was contested at key moments during the long Civil Rights
Movement. He points to the ‘revanchist’ nature of much of the roll out of the neoliberal carceral
state, arguing that the entrenched bourgeoisie took revenge the Black working class as part of the
class warfare that was happening throughout this time period.
63
In 1960, New York held an approximately 1,500 pound per cow advantage over the United
States average. By 1983 the state average was 12,437 pounds of milk per cow compared to a
U.S. average of 12,587.
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On September 5th of 1986, dairy farmers from across northern New York met at the Exhibit Hall
of the Franklin County Fairgrounds in Malone. It was one of the first meetings of the recentlyformed The Dairy Farmers of Northern New York, a group brought together by 50 local farmers
who were organizing a milk dumping campaign in protest of federal agricultural policies. The
group was demanding that the federal government raise the price of milk. “There is no way I can
meet my bills at this price,” said one dairy farmer, “I haven’t been able to for the last two years.”
(Boyer, 1986a).

The meeting brought together about 300 dairy farmers from Upstate New York, Maine, and New
England, over 75 percent of whom supported the idea of a milk strike, or milk dumping, until
prices doubled. The next day, about 50 farm families drove their tractors and equipment up and
down the Main Street of Malone, in a forceful show of support for the national milk strike in
reaction to federal agricultural policy. Baily, an organizer, told the participants at the meeting
that they needed to demand parity in milk pricing. ‘“If we got parity unemployment would be
down, people could work and feel good about themselves,” Baily said. […] “You and I are
destroying this nation by not demanding 100 percent of parity,” Baily cried.’ (Clayton, 1986a)

Farm debt had been increasing in the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the 1980 Farm Bill and the
Agricultural Food Act of 1981 completely eliminated parity pricing as a factor for setting the
support price for milk, which meant that costs of production were no longer taken into account
when setting the price for government pricing for raw milk, leaving the dairy industry to the
whims of the ‘free market,’ and allowing for a widening gap between the countryside and the
city. When the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy in 1979, interest rates skyrocketed,
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going from an average of 6.8 percent to a high of 21.5 percent, and leaving highly indebted
farmers, who were often producing at a loss, crushed. Farm debt in the United States doubled
between 1978 and 1984. For small dairy farmers in places like Malone, this meant increasing
immiseration and the loss of farms and farmland. Malone, and Northern New York in general,
did not have the same development pressures on farmland as farmers in counties adjacent to
urban areas. The result was a sped up process of proletarianization in the context of declining
industry, and the loss of jobs for proletarian farm workers.

By the end of the 1980s, 28.6 percent fewer New York farms shipped almost 4 percent more
milk than they had ten years earlier. This rate of consolidation and loss was higher than the
national average outside the state, where the number of producers declined by 16.7 percent
during this decade. Rural Franklin County lost 20 percent of its dairy farms during the 1980s,
while milk production increased by 12.8 percent. For those larger farmers with access to capital
and reserves to weather the shock, production increased. Small and highly indebted farmers were
squeezed out (Jack & Novakovic, 1991). Unlike small farmers who owned land downstate or
around Albany, farmers in Malone were not able to take advantage of rising land prices resulting
from suburban development pressures (Simler, Bills, & Kaiser, 1988).

Like their proletarian counterparts in manufacturing and textiles, small farmers in Northern New
York were losing their social power and material basis for their class organization in the 1980s
due to the way that the economic crisis was playing out in rural areas of the state. Prison
development was presented as a solution, or at least a salve, to the resultant social crisis in the
countryside. Wage earners could dream of a job in the new prisons, if not for them then for their
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children, or could believe the hype about the multiplier effect and what would be an increase in
service sector jobs in the area. Agricultural wage workers were in a similar position. For small
farmers who were being forced out of the dairy industry by federal agricultural policies,
encouraged to sell off their cows later during the dairy termination program, prison development
held out hope for rising land and real estate prices. These were some of the interests that underlie
the local growth coalition that Dick LaVigne and Kevin Travis were able to organize in Malone.
Crime, drugs, and prisons, as understood in Franklin County, were urban problems which,
depending on one’s political position, were caused either by criminal minorities or racist
suburbanites downstate, or both. The Malone Prison Task Force, led by petit-bourgeois business
owners and guided and enabled by the Department of Corrections, brought together different
class fractions in the countryside of Northern New York to transform their village into a prison
town. Malone was on the move.
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Chapter 6: The Mines of Moriah
“Upstaters live in a different universe. Three months into my chairmanship in 1987 I was
already deluged with letters, telegrams and resolutions—seemingly from every town and
village north and west of Albany—urging me to give them a prison (Feldman &
Benjamin, 2010).” - Daniel L. Feldman (D-Brooklyn), Former Chair of the NYS
Assembly Corrections Committee
Moriah
After the Malone campaign for the prisons, well-publicized locally, communities across Upstate
New York started seeing a future for themselves in prisons. This was especially true in Northern
and Western New York. By 1985, Kevin Travis had established a methodology for identifying
and organizing rural communities around prison construction, and Ron Stafford, who had
worked with Mario Cuomo to get the Lake Placid prison built when Cuomo was secretary of
State, was advancing in seniority in the Republican-controlled state senate. In the years
following the Malone campaign, one nearby community in the 45th that looked towards prison
development was Moriah.

One of the first interviews I conducted for this research project, during the exploratory phase,
was with a 60-year-old artist and school board activist who had grown up in the southern
Adirondacks. We talked about the politics of the State, and he told me about some of the cultural
changes that he had perceived in the aftermath of the prison build-up in the North Country.
“People have more racist attitudes,” he said, “for many local people up here now, the only
interaction they have with minorities is in the context of this fraught, tense ‘work’ that they’re
doing inside of these hellish prisons” (CS, 2012). As a lifelong Adirondack resident, he was
sympathetic to the need for employment, and talked about the failures of the mines and of the
timber industry, and the slow death of the towns that he had known in his youth. The prisons,
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however, he viewed as a form of torture and dehumanization, and he lamented the ways in which
prison work had transformed communities once centered around logging and outdoor activities
into towns of jailers. He also sympathized with those people who were forcibly removed from
their communities downstate and locked up in the cold, foreboding forests of Northern New
York. “You know what you should do?” he said,
“you should go and drive into Moriah, past Moriah Shock. Come in from I-87, the same
way the corrections busses come in from the City. Try to imagine that you’re an 18-yearold kid from a neighborhood in Brooklyn, where you live now. Imagine what those
woods and mountains must look like if you have had no experiences outside of a city, if
you were young and Black and coming from someplace like Brooklyn or the Bronx.
Imagine how you would see the view from that window. And remember that those guards
are intimidating them, making all sorts of threats.”

I was familiar with Moriah, having grown up about an hour and a half drive south on Rt. 22, the
same road that goes through Port Henry, the largest village in the town. Rt 22 is the eastern-most
north-south corridor in New York State. It runs from New York City, along the border with
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont, past Great Meadows Correctional Facility, and then
along the western shore of Lake Champlain, northward to Montreal. I had driven every mile of
that route. I also had childhood friends whose family had been miners from Moriah, and who had
a small hunting camp in those mountains, to which we would sometimes convene during deer
season in the late autumn.

Moriah is a former iron mining town in Essex County, on the western shore of Lake Champlain,
exactly mid-way between Montreal, QC and Albany, NY, but by-passed by Interstate-87, the
main north-south corridor which lies to the west. There are 6 hamlets in the town, and fewer than
5,000 people live within its borders. Port Henry, the former village on the lake shore, dissolved
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its local government by referendum in 2016. The hamlets and landscapes of Moriah reflect an
obsolete iron mining economy. Iron Ore was mined in the area from 1824 until 1971. Along with
Lyon Mountain in Clinton County—which also became the location of a small prison in the
1980s—Moriah was a company town controlled by the Witherbee-Sherman Mining Company,
and then later, by Republic Steel.

I drove into Moriah from Intestate 87 this time. North from Albany, past Saratoga, and then past
Glens Falls, the highway climbs the eastern edge of the Adirondack Mountains, through thick,
dark forests of pine and hemlock. After about 110 miles, I turned off onto exit 30. There is one,
narrow, two lane road that leads to the east, through dense pines that grow on steep, rocky
outcrops. It was winter, and the forest was dark in the twilight, contrasting with the pale
reflection of the undisturbed snow that drifted across the narrow shoulder and into the road.
Moriah is a town of iron-rich mountains, and the road I was on leads over them, and then down
to Port Henry. The winter air was frighteningly cold and dry, and the ice sparkled in the trees as
the sky grew darker. About midway, there were small, boarded up cabins on either side of the
road, working class summer vacation spots along the aptly-named Paradox Lake.
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Figure 8: The Road to Moriah Shock
After about half an hour of this foreboding drive, I reached the hamlet of Witherbee, named after
one of the owners of the Witherbee-Sherman mining company. Witherbee is a collection of small
company houses, many of them constructed from large blocks of dark grey iron ore tailings, the
waste of the mining operations having provided the company with cheap materials to house poor
immigrant workers in the early 1900s. I took a left and drove through more forests to Fisher Hill
Road. Down the side of this mountain, in a clearing, in the Moriah Shock Incarceration facility,
which opened in 1989 as a small facility where younger prisoners, sentenced for drug-related
crimes, could serve a slightly reduced sentence for going through the boot-camp-like SHOCK
program. The prison was built on the grounds of the closed Fisher Hill Mine, incorporating some
of the mining buildings during the construction phase. I kept driving, into Mineville. An
abandoned building loomed above me, sitting on what appeared as a large, smooth and steepsloped hill. This was a tailings pile, remnants of an iron and steel industry around which these
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communities had been created, and which had finally and completely abandoned the town by the
early 1980s.

The end of an iron town
Moriah—named for the biblical mountain where Abraham ascended in order to sacrifice his son,
Isaac—had grown up around deep pit iron mining in the early and mid-1800s. Much of the raw
material for the Union naval force during the Civil War had been extracted from the area, and as
the decades wore on, the mines of Moriah contributed to the burgeoning steel and construction
industries in the Eastern United States. Irish labor was imported and used by the mining
capitalists, followed by Italians and Eastern Europeans. Moriah is a mostly-Catholic, poor,
mining town, relatively isolated within the state of New York. Once connected by lake and canal
travel to forges in Troy and beyond, the ore was later shipped by rail to steel plants in
Pennsylvania and beyond. Republic Steel took over the mining operations in the 1930s, and
closed the mines in 1971, devastating communities of miners who had built their lives in the area
over the course of three generations (Rosenquist, 1990).
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Figure 9: Moriah in the Daylight
Republic Steel shut the mines down for a number of reasons, not the least of which were new
transportation patterns that had changed the relative location of the industry at Moriah, leaving
the isolated community even further on the periphery of the global economy. The St. Lawrence
Seaway, which was completed in 1959, opened the Great Lakes, for the first time, to ocean going
shipping. As shipping costs around the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence system decreased, the open
pit mining of iron in the Mesabi Range in Northern Minnesota—linked to the Port of Duluth on
Lake Superior—became more cost effective. The steel industry in the United States, also in
decline, turned to cheaper sources of iron, and Moriah was one of the last deep pit mining
operations still open. Furthermore, Republic Steel had acquired extensive holdings in Liberia,
where labor was much cheaper than in the unionized mines of Northern New York (Rosenquist,
1990). In 1971, Republic Steel shut down all of their operations in Essex and Clinton Counties.
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In the early 1980s, Valerie Rosequist, a young woman who had grown up in Moriah, the
granddaughter of miners, conducted a series of oral histories in the area as part of a PhD
dissertation at Duke University. She later published a history of the community, which serves as
an invaluable resource for anyone trying to understand the history of the working class in
Northern New York, and of the consequences of economic decline in rural areas more generally.
Writing of her work in her former hometown almost thirty years ago, Rosenquist described the
palpable sense of loss that characterized Moriah at that time:
My task then became one of documenting the intense grief of a town in mourning. The
grief contained so much anger: anger at the iron ore companies that stripped the town of
its main resource, the vigor of its people. Anger at the generations of impotence before
the mine owners, who, it seemed, had the ability to dictate not only who might work and
earn a living, but who could decide to a large extent the quality of life experienced by
those who did work. […] Anger at their dependency, and their helplessness. Anger that
their town was in its death throes. They were mourning not only the loss of their part, but
the seemingly imminent demise of their future (Rosenquist, 1990: 2).
Democrat Ray Slatterly was the Moriah Town Supervisor during the closure, and in the years
that followed. In his interviews with Rosenquist, he comes through as exhausted, tired from
watching his community decline, and bitter at the blame-the-victim discourse emminating from
the Reagan White House in Washington in the early 1980s. Speaking in 1982, he gives a sense
both of a community turning to their local government for help with unemployment, and his
inability to provide jobs or answers after the devastating loss of the mines:
I get calls every day. Every day. This morning I was in the office for two hours and I had
three people come in looking for work, looking for jobs. So it isn’t a question of people
not wanting to work, which the politicians sometimes try to tell us, but the people wanna
work, but there just isn’t anything (Rosenquist, 1990: 204).
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Unemployment in 1972, the year after the mine closure, had been reported at 27 percent. By
1982, after a decade of young people leaving the area in search of work, the unemployment rate
was at an “under-reported 14 percent (Rosenquist, 1990)203.” Beth Russo, who worked in the
Civil Service department for Essex County, described the outmigration to Rosenquist in October
of 1982:
Most of the kids either go away to school or go away in the service and find a job
somewhere else. We’re a county of either the very young or the very old. There’s not
very many in this medium age bracket because they will go away, get some training, get
some education, and their talent will also stay away from here. And I think this is very
sad. Because I watch this. I work for Civil Service now and I have for the last 17 years,
and I go through this every day. And I think that’s the saddest thing to accept, that your
young people are not coming back here to live (Rosenquist, 1990: 205).

One person who did manage to stay in the area and find work with the town was Tom
Scozzafava. As a young man with deep roots in Moriah, Tom graduated from High School in
1974, took a civil service exam, and was hired as the buildings and grounds superintendent for
the Town that same year. He was 18 years old. Tom worked directly for Ray Slatterly, the Town
Supervisor, and trained as an electrician. Eleven years into the job, he was approached by the
Republican Party of Essex County and asked if he would run against Slatterly for the Supervisor
position in the next election. Scozzafava, now 27 and familiar with the unfolding story in
Malone, ran on a platform of bring a prison to Moriah. He won the election in 1985, becoming
the youngest Town Supervisor in the history of the county. Thirty-two years later, Moriah is a
prison town, and Tom Scozzafava is still the Town Supervisor.
Moriah Shock
I drove down to Moriah to interview Scozzafava in the summer of 2015. I returned in January
2017. The first time, I had been staying with some of my relatives in Wilsboro, NY, about 30
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miles north of Port Henry, the village, now hamlet, in Moriah that is on the western shore of
Lake Champlain. It was early morning, and Port Henry was quiet. Abandoned storefronts lined
the small strip of Main Street. Large Victorian houses, many of them boarded up, loomed on the
hills overlooking the village. These had been homes of the mining bourgeoisie, built at the turn
of the century. There were a few cars in the Stewarts parking lot, where I stopped for coffee. I
took a left, towards the lake, and drove down to the Moriah Town offices which are in a large,
three-story brick building in second-empire style, originally constructed as offices by the
Witherbee Sherman Company. They look out over a dirt covered tract of empty land on the
railroad tracks that run along the lakeshore. This had been the location of Republic Steel’s
shipping operation, where the ore from the hills of Moriah would be sorted and loaded onto
trains and barges. There is a massive, faded black and white photograph of the pre-1971
operation in the small lobby of the Town Office.

Tom Scozzafava is a tall, lanky man with a full head of curly, greying black hair. He welcomed
me into his office in the back of the building; a crowded, dark room crammed with filing
cabinets, piles of paper, and framed photographs from his decades as town supervisor. A
taxidermied bobcat stands on four legs on the windowsill behind his desk, its head turned as
though listening to something. Tom has a thick Northern New York accent. He spoke to me with
the avuncular respect that I often get from people in my hometown who are proud that I have
made it this far in my studies. He was interested in the research I was doing, and he gave me
some background on how he helped get a prison built in Moriah:
I remember the time period very well. It was in the 80s—I took office in 1985—and the
um, Senator Stafford, Ron Stafford, had a lot of power. He had been in the Senate for a
number of years, and the inmate population had grown to such a degree in New York
State that they needed prisons. They needed expansion and they needed new prisons. […]
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the property was available, the old Fischer Hill, which was a former mining site. The
buildings were already there and some infrastructure was in place. The buildings hadn't
been occupied since 1971, so I contacted Senator Stafford. I wrote a letter to the
Department of Corrections asking about the possibility of locating a minimum-security
facility at that site. And they came up and looked at it, and decided that they were going
to—well, they decided at the urging of Senator Stafford, at that time also, I believe the
Governor was Mario Cuomo, and so they designated that site for a camp. Now during the
process, as they were doing the plans and everything, they came up with the concept of
Shock Incarceration, and Moriah actually went from a camp to a Shock incarceration
unit. So that's pretty much how we gave birth to a prison (Scozzafava, 2017).
Scozzafava had run for the Town Supervisor position on a long shot, mostly to appease a local
Republican organization that felt obliged to contest the election:
They approached me, the town Republican Party. And I said, "You know, I don't really
want to." I said, "I can't beat that guy, he's been there forever and he's..." you know?
"Well we know you can't, but just run. Just to get your name." In other words, they
wanted to use me just to have some opposition." And I knew about everybody in town,
cause I had a paper route through high school, and you know, I knew a lot of people. So I
decided I was going to run, and I told the supervisor at the time, and he said "you'll never
beat me, but if you want to run go for it." So alright, and then I ran and went door to door.
Twice.
The young Scozzafava had some fresh ideas for ways to bring jobs to the failing town. He read
the papers, and he had watched prisons go up in Lyon Mountain, Altona, Camp Gabriels,
Ogdensburg, and Malone. All of these sites, save Malone, had had prisons built through the
conversion of existing social infrastructure—hospitals, schools, sanitaria. Moriah had been built
for and around the mines. Scozzafava proposed, as part of his election campaign, to lobby New
York State to convert some of the mining infrastructure into a prison camp. Having grown up in
Moriah, he was familiar with the landscape and thought that the Fisher Hill site—with its intact
outbuildings, surrounded by dense forests—would make a good site for a prison. After he won
the election, Scozzafava contacted Stafford, who contacted Cuom’s office, which contacted
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Coughlin, who sent Kevin Travis north to Moriah. Travis was impressed by Scozzafava, and
with Moriah. As he told me in 2014:
The governor's office called the Commissioner and said […] "Send Travis up to Moriah
and take a look at the MINE." The mine! […] I said, "What the hell is the mine?" He
says, "I don't know, but come back and tell me what it is." [laughs] So, Scozzi, he's my
contact […] he gave me the history. The iron they took out of that Moriah, out of that
vein, and he showed me the map. Have you ever seen the map of the, where those tunnels
go? Under Lake Champlain. Under. Lake. Champlain. […]
Kevin Travis drove to Moriah and met Scozzafava in the winter. Scozzafava had Travis walk
through the woods, through heavy snow drifts, in order to explain his vision for a prison in the
hills of Essex County. Scozzafava explained the relationship of the infrastructure to the nowobsolete daily work routines of the former mining community. Travis was impressed both with
the site and with Scozzafava’s energy and foresight. As Travis later told me:
So here I am in a suit, moving the snow away from this rickety door. Oh he's
[Scozzafava] a piece of work. So, we get inside and I look, and here's this huge, empty
building, and there were concrete blocks, and I said, "What's this?" And he said, "Well,
when it was an iron mine, they had the lockers for the miners on these concrete blocks,
and they had the shower facility over here, and they’d come in and take off their clothes,
shower, and then get into their civilian clothes and go home." […] I said, "But this isn't a
mine, where's the mine?" He said, "The mine is outside." We trundled down, another
forty yards, and here’s this opening that's all rubble’d in, right? He said, "The mine's
down there." I said, "We're not going to build a prison in a mine." He said, "No, you'll
probably get your water out of the mine."
Now, he was thinking ahead. They were having problems with water in the community.
He figured if we got water out of the mine, we might get sufficient that they could build a
plant and serve the whole community. Start that process... But come to find out, the water
had high iron content, obviously.
DOCS deemed the Fisher Hill site to be sufficient for the needs of their planned expansion, but
the choice of sites would ultimately be up to the state legislature, who generally chose the sites as
part of budget negotiations with the Governor. Associate Commissioner Kevin Travis, in the
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following months, went on to advise Scozzafava on how to build a successful campaign for a
prison in Moriah. Scozzafava formed a prison task force, and began lobbying local officials in
the county and surrounding towns to pass resolutions and write letters in support of the state
locating a prison at the abandoned mine. The letters often followed the line established by
Scozzafava early on, encouraging the use of the Fisher Hill mine site, emphasizing that the
existing infrastructure could be revalorized through its conversion to carceral use. For example,
resident of Mineville (a hamlet in Moirah) Dominick Ida, then the Commissioner of Elections
and a Commissioner of Jurors for Essex County, wrote to Governor Cuomo in March of 1985,
detailing the infrastructure at the Fisher Hill Mine site, and encouraging the selection of the site
for a new prison in New York.64 Scozzafava, for his part, communicated relentlessly with the
Department of Corrections. When I asked Scozzafava, in 2017, about the organization of this
process, he explained that Kevin Travis had advised him on the letter writing and media
campaigns:
JN: Did he [Travis] tell you how to go about all that?
TS: Yeah, yeah, and I'm glad you brought that up. Because he did. And of course, he
couldn't say that publicly at the time, but him and I developed a relationship where
absolutely he would give me, "These are things that you need to do."
JN: And what kind of things would he say?
TS: The letter writing. To the commissioner. Press. The more press, the better. And at
that time, I think it was John Paritano, maybe McKinstry, I don't remember... Chuck
Kelly [who ran the newspapers in the North Country]? So you know, so we played. And
in those days you didn't have the internet, you didn't. I don't even think we had fax
machines back then. So everything was... Media wasn't like it is today. I think back now
how much easier it would have been to orchestrate something like this versus how it was
then. You know? So it was just a lot of work and some hard lobbying.
Ida, Dominick. (1985, March 12). [Letter to Mario Cuomo]. Cuomo Central Subject and
Correspondence Files, 1983-1994, New York State Archives (Series 13628, Box 25, Folder
“Correctional Institutions, Construction, General, 1/1/1985—6/30/1985”), New York State
Cultural Education Center, Albany, NY.
64
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Figure 10: DOCS Photo of the Fisher Hill site in Moriah, 1985 (Cuomo papers)
The campaign went on for years, as Scozzafava sought to position Moriah at the front of the line
for the next round of prison expansion. Essex County includes the High Peaks region of the
Adirondack Mountains, as well as some of the most beautiful lake front in the United States.
There are many wealthy second home owners, and the county has more ‘old money’ than other
counties in Northern New York. Moriah is a poorest, most blue collar, and most ‘ethnic’ town in
the county. The town was hit hard by the closure of the mines, Moriah lost the majority of its tax
base overnight. Scozzafava did his best to play up some of the paternalism of the wealthier
landed classes in the county, towards the mining towns, to its full effect. In January of 1987,
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Florence Hathaway, the Town Supervisor of Wilsboro (three towns north of Moriah) wrote a
letter to Cuomo where she pleaded for a prison in Moriah. This is how she described the working
classes in the town:
In some respects, I must compare these people with the coal miners of West Virginia.
When the mines closed here, people refused to leave for other remote job opportunities
because their very hearts and souls were embodied in this region. Proud, beyond
compromise, they have hung on desperately, some still hoping that a miracle might even
yet cause the mines to reopen. […] I must admit it has been an enigma to me, having
knowledge of the hopelessness of their situation, how they have survived at all.65
Hathaway draws on tropes of Appalachian coal miners to emphasize the desperate situation in
which the proletariat of Moriah found itself in the years after the closure of Republic Steel. This
trope relies on a racist understanding of the mostly-catholic former miners as having a special
connection to the hills in which they had labored for generations, and was void of any analysis of
the exploitation and oppression that had extracted wealth from these workers in order to
accumulate it in fortunes outside of the town. While it is true that many of the people who stayed
in Moriah after the closure of the mines loved the area and were connected by ties of kinship, it
is also true that much of the older proletariat of Moriah lacked the mobility to leave, given the
decreasing value of their homes, where most if any wealth they may have accumulated was
likely to have been stored.

Scozzafava, who was elected Town Supervisor at just 27-years-old, wanted to bring his town
into some sort of future beyond the mines. As someone who had grown up in Moriah, he was

Hathaway, Florence. (1987, January 5). [Letter to Mario Cuomo]. Cuomo Central Subject and
Correspondence Files, 1983-1994, New York State Archives (Series 13628, Box 22, Folder
“Correction, Institutions, Construction, General, 1/1/1987—3/31/1987”), New York State
Cultural Education Center, Albany, NY.
65
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both aware of the desperate situation of many of the working people of the town, and committed
to looking for jobs that would stimulate the low-end real estate market in the area and stem the
outflow of younger workers. Scozzafava also knew how to use the town’s reputation as the home
of poor, rural, backwards miners in the service of these goals. He explained this to me in 2017:
Yeah I mean we were in a timeframe where the community—and even to this day, some
of my generation, and my parents, most of them are gone now—but we had this feeling
about ourselves that we were very poor and destitute, as a community. Our town was
dying, we were never going to come back, it was hopeless. And one of the things that I
tried to do, which was difficult, was to get away from that hopelessness feeling. I mean
the prison coming here was a big help in that. Then we got the monies to build the
industrial park, and we did... you know, we had to stop professing ourselves as, you
know, "poor me." Although the "poor me" worked well when we were trying to get a
prison. And you saw the letters. I mean we played up the fact that we had lost all those
jobs, right to the hilt. So... you know, I think I was the master at using the "poor me." But
it worked.
The State Legislature included Moriah in the 1988 prison expansion bill, and the prison—a
shock incarceration camp—opened in 1989. Scozzafava claims that a majority of the people
working in the prison live in the Town of Moriah. In 2010, Moriah Shock was slated for closure,
but Scozzafava lobbied successfully, under Governor Patterson, to keep it open.

As a young man in Moriah, a town in the midst of a decline following the closing of the iron
mines around which the town was built, Scozzafava looked to Malone for a model of how he
might bring jobs to his area. He campaigned on a platform of prisons-as-development, and he
successfully followed through once elected. Having grown up close to Moriah during this period,
I could appreciate the lengths that Scozzafava went to try and keep his hometown alive in the
wake of the abandonment of the working-class by the capitalist mine owners. Kevin Travis,
when I spoke to him in 2014, was surprised that Scozzafava hadn’t gone up to the state
legislature, given what he considered were Tom’s excellent political skills in the North County.
186

Travis thought about it, and mused: “He's a low key guy, though. But he is fun to deal with.” I
also liked Scozzafava. When I met him, he immediately identified me as being of an Italian
background, and we discussed the history of our families in Northern New York. Here is an
exchange from our first interview:
TS: I could tell you were Italian just by looking at you.
JN: On my mother’s side.
TS: Where [in Italy] are you from?
JN: Everyone says Calabria.
TS: Calabrese, like me. What’s your mother’s name?
JN: Farrara.
TS: Iron workers! You know what my name means…?
JN: Scozzare fava…
TS: ...Yup. Fricken’ bean shuckers [laughs].66
The Scozzafavas may have earned their name in a rural Calabrian past, but Tom’s grandfather,
John, who had immigrated to New York, worked as a job agent for the Witherbee-Sherman
Mining Company a century ago. He was the padrone of Moriah, arranging for southern Italian
laborers to come north to Moriah to work underground in the dangerous conditions of the mines
(Rosenquist, 1990; Scozzafava, 2017). The elder Scozzafava would arrange to house workers in
a ‘hotel’ in Mineville. It is unclear if he owned the housing or simply managed it for the
company, but, as padrone, Scozzafava served as the middle man between labor and capital in

In current Italian, scozzare means to shell or to shuffle, and fava is a word for broad beans
(like ‘fava beans’ in English). Farrara might be derived from any number of origins. Iron is ferro
in Italian, iron worker (or blacksmith) would be ferraio, the word for ironworks is ferriera, etc.
66
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Moriah, supplying labor to the owners, and bringing newly arrived immigrants from agrarian
southern Europe to work in the growing iron and steel industry, taking fees from both labor and
capital.

Now that the mines were gone, the younger Scozzafava, John’s grandson, would go on to play a
similar role, helping people to get work for the county and state, within his capacities as Town
Supervisor. Kevin Travis, in 2014, referred to Moriah Shock as “Tom’s Prison,” referring to the
central role that Scozzafava played in getting the state to build in Moriah, and to convert some of
the abandoned mining infrastructure to carceral use. When I asked Scozzafava whether he plays
a role in getting people work at the prison, he explained:
I help a lot of people get jobs there. Now, there's only certain jobs that you can help
people get. First of all, let me say that they have to be, obviously, qualified for the
position. Now most positions up there are civil service, they're tested positions.
Obviously, I can't do anything for corrections jobs. Those are all... I mean, but the civil
service positions, if they're tested, there's nothing you can do, they gotta go off the list.67
But there's also a number of appointed positions, and those names come out of the
Governor's office, there are referrals made... but to answer your question, yeah.
Absolutely.
As the Town Supervisor of Moriah for the last 32 years, Scozzafava continues to use what
influence he can organize in order to bring jobs to Moriah, and to keep them there. This has
resulted in Moriah becoming a prison town. The real “job agent” in the 1980s, however, as
described by the interviewee in Lyon Mountain, was Senator Ronald Stafford. Early in his

I.e. local political machines in Upstate New York, at least at the county level, according to
Scozzafava, have no control over who DOCS hires from the ‘list’ of civil service exam results. I
did, however, hear a story from someone in Lyon Mountain, whose family was involved in the
county Republican committee, of Ron Stafford making calls to the head of NYSDOCS to order
them to place people in civil service-tested jobs at some of the newly-built prisons in the early
1980s.
67
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career, Stafford worked to get the Olympics to come to Lake Placid (also in Essex County), and
to get a federal prison built as part of the federal monies that washed into the region. With his
growing power in the state legislature, Stafford was able to amplify the campaigns for prisons in
the communities that he represented in the 45th senate district, where almost three times as many
prisons were built, compared to any other district, in the expansion years following the Lake
Placid Games. Scozzafava, like Travis, remembered that day in 1985, digging out the snow at the
Fisher Hill site:
TS: Kevin, what he said to me that day, as we're digging ourselves in the building, and I
quote: "I don't know who the hell you know in Albany," he said, "but it's gotta be
someone with a lot of power." [laughs] He says, "I can't even believe we're up here."
JN: And that person [who you knew] was Ron Stafford.
TS: Yup.
Stafford’s influence was a crucial factor in getting DOCS Commissioner Thomas Coughlin III to
send Kevin Travis to look at the site in the first place. Stafford passed away in 2002, but
continues to function as a sort of folk hero to many in the North Country, largely because of the
way in which he was perceived as being responsible for the legislatures decision to build prisons
in the area in the 80s and 90s. Scozzafava, looking back with the benefit of hindsight, and
speaking obliquely, tried to explain to me that the prison boom in Northern New York was more
complicated than that telling:
One thing I've learned in 30 years: perception. It's not what you've got, it's what people
think you've got. Ok? So, perception is... A lot of people had the perception that he
[Stafford] had all this power. And he liked that perception. People in the state thought
that, people here. But the reality is that he really didn't have all that much power that
people gave him credit for having. It takes more than just one, you know? And most
people that have that kind of power don't want people to know they have that kind of
power. Believe me.
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In other words, the prison expansion of the last decades has been the product of political
economic forces larger than the small towns of Northern New York. Stafford and Scozzafava,
each in their own way, had acted as middle-men between the working classes and petitbourgeoisie of their region, in the interests of state and capital in Albany, New York City, and
beyond. And yet, for the small towns and villages of Upstate New York, and for the people who
are caged in this remote region, Stafford’s influence was real, its results manifest in concrete and
steel.

The Malone Model
In the years following Malone’s campaign for a prison, communities across Upstate New York
began to look to prisons as a solution to the crisis of social reproduction caused by
deindustrialization and the consolidation of agriculture. Mario Cuomo and DOCS, coming out of
the debacle that was Pilgrim State in Long Island, created a policy whereby communities who
wanted to be considered for prison sighting had to demonstrate support from local levels of
government. In the later years of Governor Carey’s administration, there had been a number of
conversions of abandoned social infrastructure towards carceral use, as was the case with Lyon
Mountain, Altona, Gabriels, and Ogdensburg. Malone, by contrast, starting in 1983, had
successfully organized to become a prison town through the construction of new facilities as
greenfield projects, for the ‘cookie cutter’ jails, as Travis called them.

Malone was particularly successful given the ties that the petit-bourgeoisie in the town had to
Senator Ron Stafford, and the experience that some of them had had with Stafford, and with
Cuomo, in successfully advocating for prison construction as development in the lead up to the

190

1980 Olympics in Lake Placid. The ‘Malone Model’ of prison siting—communities contacting
DOCS with support of their local legislators and local branches of government, organized prison
task forces, demonstrated support throughout community documented in the local press—now
became the way in which New York State sited prison facilities within senate districts. The
districts that were chosen were the result of negotiations within the State Legislature, and
between the Legislature and the Governor’s office during budget negotiations in the spring.

DOCS and the Governor’s office, after the first years of the Cuomo administration, required
proof of support from local government officials in the towns and villages that sought
development money in the form of prisons. In the early years of Cuomo’s (and Travis’s) tenure,
this often took the form of letters. After 1984, when the scheme of funding prisons through the
Urban Development Corporation had held up in court and prisons were explicitly linked to the
development of rural New York, the state began to require resolutions from different levels of
local government. Towns, villages, counties, and cities would pass resolutions at meetings
formalizing their desire to have a prison built within their community, and they would send those
resolutions to the governor’s office. In the more successful cases, such as Moriah, the town that
wanted the prison would organize neighboring towns, as well as their county leaders, to pass
resolutions in support of a prison as well. While many prisons were built during the expansion
period in New York as either ‘additional’ prisons next to older facilities, or as reconversion
projects using surplus state facilities, this form of organizing was especially relevant to
communities like Malone and Moriah that had no prior history as prison or asylum towns.
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The early years of the prison boom—the late 1970s through 1982—are characterized in New
York by the conversion of hospitals, schools, and asylums. By 1983, when Cuomo comes in as
Governor after having promised to close the prison at the former Pilgrim State mental institution
in Long Island, DOCS was looking north to more easily site prison facilities and to avoid
community resistance. When Cuomo decides to use the Urban Development Corporation to get
around constitutional limitations on debt, but in the name of economic development for declining
rural counties and small cities, Kevin Travis writes in a system of community organizing in order
to overcome local political resistance in would-be prison towns. Malone is an early case of a
small town that organized locally to become a prison town, and provides a model for DOCS for
how a town might demonstrate willingness and ability to host a prison—local political support in
the form of resolutions at the county, town, village, and city levels; media support in the form of
editorials and favorable coverage; justification of the need for the prison in terms of
unemployment and need for jobs.

The map below displays all of the counties, towns, and villages or cities that passed resolutions
in favor of prison construction between 1985 and 1990.68 Some of the localities passed the
resolutions in order to promote the building of a prison within their own boundaries. For

In order to get a sense of the geography and timing of these campaigns, I went through the
corrections-related boxes of the Governor Mario Cuomo papers in the New York State archives
in Albany. Mario Cuomo was the governor of New York between 1983 and 1994, and there are
34 boxes of material filed under ‘corrections’ for his tenure in Albany. While there are many
individual letters concerning prison siting in 1983 and 1984, most of these are from the early
campaigns in Malone, and Elmira (already a prison town), or from people opposing prison
sighting in their communities, often downstate. The resolutions, from government bodies, begin
in 1985, and had crawled to a stop by the early 90s, at which point the queue of places wanting
prisons upstate had grown rather long.
68
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example, the Town of Messina passed a resolution in the hopes of having the state locate and
build a prison in Messina. Kevin Travis was sent to Messina, but the land that the city proposed,
along the St. Lawrence River, was prone to flooding and thus unsuitable. Other localities passed
resolutions as part of a wider campaign to either get a prison build in a general area, or as part of
an organized strategy to have a prison built in a specific place nearby. The map is a visualization
of the local campaigns for prison between 1985 and 1990. The campaigns for a prison in Brasher
Falls and in Moriah during this time they stand out, as they were especially well-organized in
terms of getting adjacent communities to pass resolutions on their behalf.
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Figure 11: Map of Pro-prison Siting Resolutions, 1985-1990
One of the towns that campaigned for a prison, for many year, was Brasher Falls, in the western
part of the 45th state senate district, about an hour and a half southwest of Malone. Jim Dawson,
the Democratic town supervisor, led that campaign. Kevin Travis made multiple trips to Brasher
Falls, and worked with a prison task force there to identify possible sites, to build popular
support for a facility, and to move the process forward. The state legislature allocated a new
prison for the area in the late 1980s, but when the area was redistricted shortly thereafter, Brasher
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Falls fell outside of Stafford’s area. Stafford ‘took the prison with him,’ according to both
Dawson and Travis. In the final analysis, it was Stafford’s prison.

The letter writing drives and local government resolutions were meant to give both Stafford, and
then Cuomo, political cover for siting prisons in the North Country. They also helped to produce
a common sense; something for the Department of Corrections to reply with in the face of any
criticisms they might face from individuals in towns selected for prison construction. In essence,
the campaigns were a way for Travis to pre-empt the sort of opposition he had faced post-facto
in Long Island, and to undo the more state-wide opposition to prison expansion and prison
financing faced by DOCS and the state government only a few years earlier. The genius of
Travis was to take opposition to the Urban Development Corporation—to a powerful public
authority meant to override local racism, local zoning codes—and turn it on its head through
taking the community organizing clause seriously.

The prison that was meant for Brasher Falls, after that, was to be built in Stafford’s district, at
Tupper Lake, a town within the Adirondack Park in the southern part of Franklin County. It was
supposed to be the state’s second supermax prison, a torture center made entirely of Special
Housing Units, where every prisoner would be made to spend 23 or every 24 hours in a sealed
solitary confinement box. Tupper Lake is a deindustrialized sawmill town, but it is also within
the boundaries of the Adirondack Park. Because of this, anti-prison landowners and Park
activists were able to tie up construction of the prison using addition environmental assessments
through the Adirondack Park agency. In the face of this opposition, DOCS, and Stafford, simply
moved the prison site to the north of the county, to Malone, and in 1999 the state build a third
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prison in Malone, off of Bare Hill Road, next to the two prisons that had been built in the late
1980s. Howard Maneely, a retired DOCS supervisor who had been the Democratic town
supervisor of Malone in the late 90s, told me in 2013 of Stafford’s role in bringing the third
prison to Malone:
JN: You must have had a part in… is it called Upstate? They built it in ’99 or 2000?
HM: ’98 they started.
JN: Were you involved in that?
HM: Well (laughs). Back to Ron Stafford. He called me one night at home, “Howard, this
is Ron.” He was a Republican I was a Democrat. “I got a problem” he says, I says
“Alright Senator, I’d be glad to help you.” “You know Tupper Lake’s supposed to get
this maximum-security prison?” I said, “Yeah.” “Well it’s not going to happen, the
APA’s not going to let it happen and I don’t want to lose it out of my district, and I’m
going to send some people up, I want you to walk around with them, I need to find a
location quickly, and I got to have you…. This is confidential at this time” he says. So,
they sent them up, and found a location for Upstate… but we didn’t steal from Tupper
Lake… (laughs) back then you know we were afraid of a rift between the North and
South part of the county. It [the prison in Tupper Lake] just wasn’t gonna happen.
JN: ‘Cause of the APA?
HM: ‘Cause of the APA.
Dick Lavigne recounted a similar story, but differently:
Ron Stafford was having trouble with the environmentalists in Tupper Lake, but he was
smart enough to put in the legislation that it would be built in Franklin County, not
Tupper Lake. He said it would be built in Franklin County. I got a call on a Friday
afternoon from Bob Herran, who was OGS, and who was the site guy, he was the guy
who oversaw the construction of all the prisons. He said, “Dick, we got a major fucking
problem. I said “What’s that,” he said “We’re gonna pull out of Tupper Lake.” I said,
“You gotta be kidding me,” I said, “How come?” He said, “Tree Huggers! We’ve had it
with ‘em!” He said, “They just… roadblock and roadblock, we’re never gonna get this
thing built.” He said, “Find me another site,” I said, “when?” he said “we’ll be there
tomorrow morning.” I said, “you guys are working on Saturdays?” [inaudible] this is the
only state employee I know that works on Saturday. He said, “there’s gonna be about a
dozen of us there on Saturday.” I said, “OK.”
So, I went down to this other location, and I took two of the superintendents who were
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already here, with me, and there was a no trespassing sign. Well doesn’t the guy catch us,
threatens to shoot us. Well, I finally pulled the guy and said, “Look, don’t be such a
dipshit. If you want to sell your property, pal, this is your opportunity of a lifetime.” So,
he says “OK.” [laughs] So anyway, they all came up Saturday morning. I got in the front
seat with him [the landowner], nobody would get in with him, all the rest jumped in the
back of the pickup truck and away we went through his property. Came back out and he
said, “That’s what we want.” That was for Upstate [CF], the third one, ok? And, uh, so,
we let the guy go and we said “Ok, thanks, we’ll be back to you,” and the guy [Herran],
we walked back to my car and he said “This is a done deal, we’re gonna do it, um, we’ll
give you a call on Monday.” On Monday they called, and he said, “everything’s
approved, you’re gonna have our third prison.” So that’s how it happened. That was the
sequence.
By the late 1990s, northern New York was well-organized to accept new prisons. LaVigne was
still serving on the Malone Prison Task force, and the local class factions that had organized
around prison construction the decade prior were now ‘the powers that be.’ Local developers and
business owners like LaVigne were well-placed to accept a new prison siting with minimal
notice, and to convince reluctant community members to go along with what seemed at that point
to be the inevitable land use function for Malone and northern Franklin County. The political
leadership of the town, after a decade of prison expansion in the area, was retired NYSDOCS.
All of them had by then longstanding ties to Stafford, who was, in essence, a representative of
their class who had amassed power in the legislature (he was the Chair of the Ways and Means
Committee at that point) through a prisons-as-development program. The Adirondack Park
Agency, and the more liberal environmentalists—including second home owners, and people
whose property values were tied to recreation and environmental amenities—were able to stall
prison construction in the southern part of the county, within the so-called Blue Line of the
Adirondack Park. Stafford could rely on Malone.
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In 1999, while construction of the Upstate supermax was ongoing in Malone, Jennifer
Gonnerman wrote a sympathetic profile of the town for the Village Voice. In it, she describes the
longing, still there in the late 1990s, of the town leaders to create a place where their children
would be able to stay and work.

Upstate’s experiment in human containment requires the participation of Malone residents—
without the town’s leaders’ encouraging its construction, and without men and women willing to
work inside, the prison would not exist. Malone’s citizens do not decide prison policy, nor do
they, for the most part, commit the crimes that have packed the state’s prisons. But they are the
ones who will enforce Upstate’s rules. In exchange, Malone will get what it craves: a boost for
its ailing economy. The prison will create 510 well-paid jobs (including guards, administrators,
and clerical workers). Townspeople hope it will also end the exodus of young people moving
away in search of work (Gonnerman 1999).
Prison construction was sold to northern New York communities as a way to resolve the crisis of
social reproduction in a time of deindustrialization and outmigration. In the late 1990s, after 20
years of this strategy, other sectors of the economy were still in decline, and young people were
still leaving. This outmigration was a particular drain on communities that tended to invest
resources in local public schools, and especially into the most talented of their youth, those
people most likely to leave the area as young adults. The transition from agricultural and
manufacturing, to prisons, however, while failing to meet the development fantasies of jail
boosters (projected back to them by state bureaucrats), resulted in the production of new places,
of prison towns. The transition to prison town, in Malone’s case, and in other towns in Northern
New York, involved a decline in the political and social organization of the working class—with
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the exception of police and guards—along with the ascendency of a local petit bourgeoisie
working with their representatives in the state.

The transformation of daily life
After the first prisons had been built in Malone, by the early 90s, the built infrastructure of the
village of Malone continued to decline. At the present, almost all of the commercial fronts along
the main streets are vacant. In 1997, the Flannigan Hotel, which along with the courthouse is the
main landmark in the village, burned. This was the hotel where Kevin Travis his team had met
with community leaders to plan Malone’s future as a prison town back in the early 1980s. For the
past twenty years, the hotel has stood as a shell, its windows boarded up, a blight in the center of
town.

Figure 12: Flannigan Hotel, Malone, 2014

199

Tru-Stitch, where strikes were threatened in 1986, the year that the first prison was built in
Malone, decreased their labor force to 350 by 1999, from a high of 1,100. A couple of years after
the Upstate supermax prison was built, Tru-Stitch closed the remaining and much-diminished
plants in the area. The textile union is no longer a social and political force in northern New
York, while the leadership of NYSCOBPA, the guards’ union, now comes from Ogdensburg.

One of those workers from the North Country who had labored on the line, sewing moccasins at
Tru-Stitch in Franklin County, was Joyce Mitchell. A modestly educated working-class woman
in a small town, Joyce married at a young age, worked in the declining textile industry, and was
rumored to have had an affair with co-worker from the plant. Normal small town working class
life in a rural area of northern New York. After the closure of Tru-Stich, Mitchell went on to
work in nearby Clinton Correctional Facility as an instructor in the textile shop there, teaching
prisoners how to operate sewing machines to create and mend prisoners’ and guards’ uniforms.
Mitchell was a central character in the drama of the 2015 escape at Dannemora (Clinton
Correctional) and is currently serving a sentence at the prison in Bedford Hills for her role in the
escape. In order to stay in the area, Mitchell had had to find a way to adapt her skills to the
context of the prison. What once was the stuff of daily life in the pre-prison-town Malone,
romantic liaisons with co-workers now took place inside a maximum-security prison. When
Mitchell was arrested in the summer of 2015, she was transferred to the Renssalaer County jail
(which had been expanded in the 90s), just north of Albany, since there were concerns that she
would not be safe in far-northern New York, where almost everyone has a relative who works
for the State Department of Corrections. Her parole hearings have become somewhat of a local
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news and social media spectacle where she is pilloried and mocked in various comments sections
by the people who used to be her neighbors and colleagues in these prison towns.

In the decades following prison expansion into northern New York, the political and social
landscape was transformed in Malone and places like it, and the economic outlook remained
grim. Recent assertions that prison construction was a stop gap measure that kept towns like
Malone from an abyss fail to recognize the important class dynamics at play within these places
(Eason, 2017). Small developers, insurance salespeople, and other members of the class that
brought prisons to Malone will point out what they see as the economic importance of prisons to
the area. When I asked Dick LaVigne if the prisons had been good for Malone in the end, he
replied:
Absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. You wouldn’t have Robert’s Sports Center, you
wouldn’t have the new one down on route thirty-seven, Polaris. I mean all these places go
up for a reason. Because these guys [guards] have got discretionary income that they can
use, you know, to buy all these toys. And, that’s what it’s all about. You know? So, it’s
been very good for Malone. There’s no question about it. I don’t think there’s a business
man you could talk to that would say anything negative about them.
Likewise, Howard Maneely credited the presence of the prisons for him being able to lobby
Walmart to build a Supercenter on the edge of town, on the former farmland along route 11 that
LaVigne had developed into a commercial strip. For the working class of Malone, however,
there are few places to go outside of corrections or low-paid service jobs, and the institutions of
social and political power have vanished along with manufacturing. In their stead, there is a
coalition of small business owners and corrections officer—the chamber of commerce, and
NYSCOPBA. Those who can leave, leave. Those who would stay have to navigate a landscape
of police, prisons, declining wages, and physical blight. And since the turn of the millennium, as
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prison and jail incarceration rates have fallen in New York City and other urban areas in the west
of the state (Rochester and Buffalo), prompting prison closures in the area, more and more
people from upstate New York are being locked up in jails and prisons (Norton, 2018; Pragasz,
2016; Rahman & Mai, 2017).

202

Chapter 7: Conclusions

Back when I interviewed former Associate NY DOCS Commissioner Kevin Travis at his home
in Florida in 2015, he explained to me how he had built a program of community organization
into the New York’s prison expansion program in the 1980s. And in his telling, he reminded me
of something very important: people in the small towns of northern New York were already
organized—through churches, family ties, local political machines, and in some cases union
locals—and that they were desperate to address the crisis of social reproduction that they faced at
the time, which was characterized by and understood in terms of deindustrialization and
outmigration. Facing this crisis, they organized with the Department of Corrections in such a
way whereby the reproduction of their own communities would come to depend on repression
and forced outmigration from urban, mostly Black and Brown neighborhoods that were
experiencing crises stemming from the same national and global economic shifts that were
threatening to strand Malone outside of flows of capital and commodities. Yet they did not
reproduce their communities, but rather produced something else—prison towns where
manufacturing continued to decline, and where a greater percentage of residents were now
working as guards and police.

I grew up in northern New York in the 1980s, and I have been returning upstate quite a bit during
these last years to organize with people fighting jail expansion and policing. I have also been
returning to the end of Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s book, Golden Gulag, to the section at the end
called What is to be Done:
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The places where prisons are built share many similarities with the places prisoners come
from. Rural communities stuck in economies that have languished for more than twenty
years have not profited from prisons as expected; rather they continue to struggle for the
same kinds of opportunities and protections that the urban mothers want for their
biological and fictive kin. These forgotten places, and their urban counterparts, can be
understood to form one political world, abandoned but hardly defeated (Gilmore, 2007:
247).
In many ways, this has never been truer for New York State than it is now. Incarceration rates
since 2000—the rate of people in county jail plus the prison incarceration rate by county of
origin—are higher in almost every rural upstate county than in New York City. Black
incarceration rates in these rural counties are extremely high, Latino incarceration rates in these
rural counties are extremely high. And white incarceration rates in places like Malone have been
rising very steadily over these the past 15-16 years even as incarceration rates in New York City
and other major cities—with a few very important exceptions--have fallen quite significantly
since 2000.

Figure 13: Jail plus Prison Incarceration Rates of NYC and Suburbs, and of Rural NYS
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Montgomery County has the highest incarceration rate in the State. It’s a largely rural,
deindustrialized area on the Mohawk River, just went of Schenectady. The jail incarceration rate
in Montgomery County in 2014 was close to 600 per 100,000 people between the ages of 15 and
64, which is nearly three times the jail incarceration rate of New York City as a whole, which is
slightly over 200 per 100,000 (Norton, 2018). Amsterdam, NY, is the main city in Montgomery
County. The jail is full, and much of the town sits vacant and abandoned. Empty textile factories
dominate the landscape.

Last year, I spent some time talking with people in Amsterdam about the police and the county
jail. One man, though, told me about his struggle to bring attention to the high levels of lead that
were in the municipal water in Amsterdam. He said that it had been difficult to get local
authorities to acknowledge the problem, and very difficult as well to find any media that would
cover the issue, because the NYC papers were, at that time, with what limited space they had for
upstate issues, coving the water crisis in nearby Hoosick Falls, New York—30 miles north of
Albany. In that town, Hoosick Falls, a factory worker whose father had died of a rare cancer, had
figured out, despite non-cooperation from every level of the state--that the municipal water there
contains very high levels of poisonous PFOA from Teflon production, and that the water had
been contaminated since the mid-1960s.

My father grew up in Hoosick Falls, and raised me four miles outside of the village. In Hoosick
Falls, we know now—we think—why so many have been dying young of various cancers. The
man I spoke with in Amsterdam was not resentful of the scant attention that Hoosick Falls had
received. Rather, he was implying, from the vantage of that particular hollowed-out city, that if
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Flint and Hoosick Falls could not build the movement that they needed to survive, then
Amsterdam would not have much of a chance.

To fail to bring these “forgotten places” into our analysis is to place ourselves in peril. The
abandonment of these regions—and the building of prisons in so many of them—was and is
central to the structured relationships that we so ardently desire to abolish and rebuild.

We need to look past liberal interpretations of rural areas benefitting from prisons. Who
benefitted in these towns? At a more regional level, it was NYSCOPBA—the prison guards and
their union, who expanded their membership; the New York Department of Corrections, which
expanded its bureaucracy and influence; and a faction of the petit bourgeoisie, which worked
with the other two groups to assume more political and economic power in a regional context.

Deindustrializing towns and cities in Upstate New York organized to have prisons built where
they were built--not because they wanted prisons, which they had rejected in 1981, but because
they were attempting stay within the stream--or even a minor tributary--of capitalist development
in the post-Keynesian era. They organized around prisons because unemployment was rising,
and their towns were losing their relative location in new patterns of the circulation of capital and
commodities. Prisons were the only thing on offer from the state. And it was only through the
state that local elites—petit bourgeois store owners and intellectuals, small-time developers—
were able to access development capital and to gain political dominance in this region of the
state, a dominance which they continue to maintain, but which would be vulnerable from
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challenges that offer a more dialectical analysis of the crisis of deindustrialization coupled with
an abolitionist critique of mass criminalization.

Prison expansion in New York was driven not by private companies running or building the
prisons, nor by profits reaped from the exploitation of labor within prison walls. Rather, the
expansion was about creating and maintaining more generalized conditions of exploitability
outside of the walls for the reproduction of capitalist social relations. It is in this context that
more and more people are being locked up across the state, just as more and more people are
dying from toxic waste left by industry that no longer requires their exploitation. It didn’t have to
be that way: we can organize it to be otherwise.
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